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1 Introduction 
During the last couple of decades, and especially after the terrorist incidents in 9/11, the 
research on terrorism has ‘exploded’. The main questions that have been asked are “why 
does terrorism occur?” and “who are the terrorists?” Several explanations have been 
presented, both at the individual as well as the societal level. In the latter case, economic, 
political and socio-cultural structures have all turned out to be important factors in that 
regard. The problem, however, is that most of this research has been focused around the 
occurrence transnational terrorism, which involves two or more countries. Yet, 
according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (LaFree & Dugan, 2006) and the 
newly presented data from Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011), most terrorism is 
domestically, meaning that it is being perpetrated against civilians in and from the same 
country as the perpetrator. This may be consequential for at least two reasons. First, this 
suggests that much of what we know might only apply to a small portion of the overall 
phenomenon of terrorism (Young & Findley, 2011). For instance, the societal 
characteristics that are thought to explain transnational terrorism, may in fact explain 
domestic terrorism. Second, even if the same societal factors explain both these types of 
terrorism, the causal mechanisms behind might be quite different.   
These aspects are important since they address whether results derived from studies of 
transnational terrorism can carry over to the case of domestic terrorism and thus 
provide insights into the determinants of the general phenomenon of terrorism. Or, if 
transnational terrorism is structurally different from domestic terrorism, a very large 
amount of what we know about the occurrence of terrorism may be based on false 
assumptions. In other words, have scientists in trying to explain the occurrence of 
terrorism used theories applicable to domestic terrorism, while testing them for 
transnational?  
Thus, this thesis seeks to answer two main questions. The first one addresses the 
societal factors that are argued to explain terrorism, and tries to find if there is any 
difference between domestic and transnational terrorism. It is formulated as follows: 
Research question 1: Are the societal factors that explain the rate and probability 
of domestic terrorism the same as the societal factors that explains the rate and 
probability of transnational terrorism?  
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If the societal factors are indeed different for domestic and transnational terrorism, 
there is no doubt that the causal mechanisms leading to either one of these types of 
terrorism are also different. Yet, as suggested by Young and Findley (2011), even if the 
societal factors that explain domestic and transnational are similar, the causal 
mechanisms behind might be quite different. Thus, the second question that needs to be 
answered goes as follows: 
Research question 2: Are the causal mechanisms leading to domestic terrorism 
different from the causal mechanisms leading to transnational terrorism? 
There are very few studies which have separated these two types of terrorism. LaFree, 
Yang and Crenshaw (2009) dichotomized between domestic and transnational 
terrorism only on 16,916 terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2004 from 53 terrorist 
groups attacking the United States. This thesis, however, is a lot more comprehensive 
since it analysis 56,606 terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2007. This is similar to a 
recent paper by Kis-Katos, Liebert and Schulze (2011). However, they dichotomized 
between domestic and transnational incidents from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD), by first assigning every known terror group an origin nationality or base country, 
regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator. So, if one group committed a terrorist 
act outside its base country, it was counted as a transnational act. In addition, and more 
importantly, where the perpetrators remained unknown, they assumed it was a 
domestic incident. This involved over 32,000 terrorist incidents, which may have led to 
biased results.  
This thesis uses the newly presented data from Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011).  
In this data the ‘unknown’ events are separated from the domestic and the transnational 
events, leading to a more solid framework. In addition, the GTD data are calibrated with 
the ITERATE material which adds further strength to the empirical findings. This 
calibration method is unique and has never been done before (Enders, et al., 2011). 
Finally, I utilize zero-inflated negative binomial regression in this thesis instead of 
regular negative binomial regression. This may in a better degree account for excessive 
zeros in the data material. This makes this thesis a pioneering and important 
contribution to the field of terrorism research.    
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To best answer the two presented research questions, I have structured this thesis as 
follows: In chapter 2 I present definitions and theoretical perspectives on the 
phenomenon of terrorism. Although widely studied and discussed, the field has not 
managed to generate a commonly accepted definition (Badey, 1998). It is therefore 
important to discuss the different aspects of a good definition of terrorism. In addition, 
since this thesis is heavily based on the inclusion criteria set by the GTD, a discussion 
around these is central. Further, since this thesis is based around the differences 
between domestic and transnational terrorism, these will be addressed. Generally 
speaking, in a domestic terrorist event there are only actors from one state, while in 
transnational terrorism there are individuals from two or more states involved, either as 
a perpetrator or a civilian. Lastly, this chapter will include a brief discussion of other 
forms of political violence, and how terrorism finds its place among these.  
Chapter 3 contains the theoretical framework of this thesis. The theoretical framework 
is based around established thoughts preconditions from collective political violence 
and conflict theory namely: identity, frustration, and opportunity (Ellingsen, 2000). 
Frustration and opportunity have been adapted the field of terrorism research by 
several scientists (i.e.:Caplan, 2006; Crenshaw, 1998; Ross, 1993; A. Schmid & Jongman, 
1988).1 Identity have been used in terrorism research by, among others, Schwartz, 
Dunkel, and Waterman (2009), where the perceived ‘in-group-out-group’ cleavage is 
central.   
In chapter 4 investigates the societal root causes of terrorism. While the preconditions 
for collective action and political violence explains the framework in which terrorism 
occurs, this chapter will investigate the root societal settings that are believed to cause 
terrorism. This will be heavily based on the argued economic, political, and socio-
cultural causes on Krieger and Meierrieks’ (2011) overview over the determinants of 
terrorism in their article What Causes Terrorism?. This chapter will also draw the 
different causal mechanisms from the theoretical framework to the different societal 
factors – creating different hypotheses between domestic and transnational terrorism.  
                                                         
1 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) have in recent studies contrasted 
these approaches, labeling them ‘grievance’ (frustration) and ‘greed’ or ‘feasibility’ (opportunity or 
rational actor).     
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Chapter 5 discusses this thesis’ research design, the data, and the operationalization of 
the dependent and independent variables. Since one of the aims of this thesis is to map 
out the root causes of terrorism, I only include two control variables. I argue that this is 
adequate to measure the explanatory power of the independent variables. Finally, this 
chapter presents the two statistical methods used in the empirical analysis, namely: 
zero-inflated binomial regression to measure the discrete count variables, and regular 
logistic regression to measure the dichotomous variables.  
Chapter 6 will perform the empirical analysis. To test the argued hypotheses, two sets of 
analysis are run. First, domestic terrorism is addressed. Here, a zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression model (ZINB) is run to test whether or not the different 
independent variables influence the rate of the domestic events, then to test if these 
variables influences the probability of domestic terrorism, a logistic analysis. Secondly, 
this process will be repeated with transnational terrorism as the dependent variable.  
In the end, in chapter 7, the main findings and concluding remarks of this thesis will be 
discussed. Here, it will be argued that the societal factors that explain domestic 
terrorism are quite similar to the one that explains transnational terrorism. The causal 
mechanisms are, however, different. There seems to be more explanations leading to 
domestic terrorism than transnational terrorism. One of the reasons for this may be that 
the research on terrorism has in a larger degree explained domestic terrorism, while 
tested for transnational terrorism. In addition, it seems that being attacked by 
transnational terrorism is much more connected to proxies of opportunity. As I suggest, 
this may simply be because transnational terrorism demands more resources and 
support to carry out than domestic terrorism. For instance, this thesis suggests that a 
countries regime type influences the rate and probability of both domestic and 
transnational terrorism. For domestic terrorism, a lack of democratic freedom such as 
the opportunity of political participation may generate frustration and thus aggression. 
For transnational terrorism, a higher rate of democracy may be associated with a larger 
degree of media exposure form a free press and thus be explained by the theory of 
opportunity. The explanation, as to why there are fewer causal mechanisms leading to 
transnational terrorism, can also be that these studies relies in a larger degree on a 
dyadic research design. 
5 
 
2 What is Terrorism? 
This chapter reviews the debate surrounding the definition of terrorism. First, it 
addresses the debate concerning the definition of the overall phenomenon of terrorism 
and how the inclusion criteria set by the Global Terrorism Database fits into this. Then, it 
discusses the differences and similarities of domestic and transnational terrorism. 
Finally, it explains what terrorism is not, and how this phenomenon separates itself from 
other forms of political violence.  
2.1 Defining Terrorism 
Terrorism is a dangerous ground for simplificateurs and generalisateurs. To 
approach it, a cool head is probably more essential than any other intellectual 
quality.  
    (Walter Laqueur as quoted in: Kegley, 1990, p. 1) 
Terrorism’ may be the most important word in today’s political vocabulary. Still, since 
the 1970’s, and especially after the attacks on the Israeli athletes by the Palestinian 
Black September organization during the 1972 Munich Olympics, the attempts to define 
terrorism have been continuous (Crenshaw, 2007, p. 68). The discord among both 
politicians and scientists has even led to some voicing that a definition of terrorism can 
never be agreed upon (Ganor, 2002). Indeed, “one person’s terrorist is another person’s 
freedom fighter” (Walter Laqueur as quoted in Primoratz, 2004, p. xi). However, fighting 
a ‘beast’ based on a subjective outlook of the warrior is difficult. An objective and 
collective understanding of what terrorism is and who the terrorists are, based upon 
agreed international laws and criteria’s are therefore essential if we are to effectively 
deal with the problem. As some has indicated, an accepted definition may be 
quintessential in the battle against terrorism. The United Nations High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change notes in that regard that:  
[T]he United Nations has not made the best use of its assets in the fight against 
terrorism. As the Panel rightly advocates, the United Nations must be able to 
articulate an effective and principled counter-terrorism strategy that is respectful 
of the rule of law and the universal observance of human rights. One of the obstacles 
hitherto (…) has been the inability of the membership to agree on a definition of 
terrorism.  
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        (UnitedNations, 2004) 
What further intensifies the definitional problem of terrorism is the different “arenas of 
discourse” including the “academic arena; the states’ statements; the public debate; and, 
finally, by those who benefit from different acts of violence and terrorism” (L. Weinberg, 
Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoeffler, 2004). Here, the academics may develop ‘maximalist’ 
definitions which included “too many attributes”, while states may develop ‘minimalist 
definitions’ which excludes theoretically relevant attributes (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002).  
An example of a maximalist academic definition of terrorism is the one made by Schmid 
and Jongman (1988, p. 28). Schmid and Jongman sought to develop an all-embracing 
definition of terrorism consisting of as many terrorism-related elements as possible. In 
correspondence with several scholars they extracted twenty two different elements 
from 109 definitions. They then formulated a definition of terrorism which consists of 
sixteen of these twenty two elements.   
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or 
political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are 
generally choses randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or 
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. 
Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist 
(organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the 
main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or 
a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda 
is primarily sought. 
      (A. Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p. 28) 
It has, however, been criticized by being ‘over-specified’ and ‘complicated’ (Badey, 
1998), and thus maximalist.  
On the other hand, a definition may be too minimalist. The widely used definition made 
by the U.S. State Department states that:  
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The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents.  
       (U.S. State Department, 2012) 
What makes this definition too minimalist is, for instance, that they only define 
terrorism as violence, and not the threat of violence. A good definition, therefore, is 
found between the maximalist and the minimalist definitions.  
A basic, but still comprehensive, definition is presented by Louise Richardson (2006) in 
her book What Terrorists Want. She chooses to define terrorism along seven factors that 
any act must have in order to attract that label. These factors or characteristics are as 
follows:    
Table 1: Seven characteristics of terrorism 
1. Politically inspired 
2. Violent or threatens violence
3. Communicates a message
4. Act and victim symbolically significant
5. Carried out by sub-state groups
6. Victim is different from audience
7. Deliberated targeting of civiliance  
First, by claiming that a terrorist act needs to be ‘politically inspired’, Richardson concur 
with a widespread assumption in the scientific tradition (A. P. Schmid, 2011, p. 77). This 
tradition includes the before-mentioned definition by Schmid and Jongman. Such 
political inspirations may, for instance, be to change the regime, changing the people in 
power or changing social or economic policies. Ganor (2002) claims that an violent act 
against civilians that lacks a political agenda is, at most, “an act of criminal delinquency” 
unrelated to terrorism. Even though this is an important aspect which needs to be 
addressed in the context of the definitional debate surrounding the term ‘terrorism’, it is 
not in the case of this thesis. As stated by Duvall and Stohl:  
Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most analysts 
fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as logical or 
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necessary aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are empirical 
regularities associated with terrorism. More often they simply confuse analysis.  
       (As quoted in Ganor, 2002)    
The second characteristic that, according to Richardson, needs to be included in a 
definition of terrorism is violence or the threat of violence. One very interesting aspect 
that presents itself is that terrorism is also the ‘threat of violence’. This, for instance, is 
not included in the definition by the U.S. State Department. As Schmid (2011, p. 79) 
points out, “[a] feeling of threat is usually created by one or several acts of violence”. 
Still, it is in the nature of terrorism that the terrorist play with the threat of future 
violence as a bargaining tool for reaching their goal. 
By utilizing terrorism, the terrorists seek publicity. They want to communicate a 
message to an audience. According to Richardson “the point of terrorism is not to defeat 
the enemy but to send a message” (2006, p. 4). An ongoing debate is whether terrorists 
seek the mass media because they depend on it, as a result of their mode of action. 
Others stress the cynicism and professionalism of the terrorists and the way they 
actively use and manipulate the media (Gerrits, 1992). For instance, this professionalism 
became clearly visible during the aftermath of 9/11. From professional edited film 
footage shown all over the word, Osama Bin Laden conveyed his messages. Distinctly 
illustrated by a former terrorist from Red Army Faction in Germany, terrorist groups are 
very aware of their relation with the mass media:        
We give the media what they need: newsworthy events. They cover us; explain our 
causes  and this, unknowingly, legitimates us. You must understand: the media are 
very interested in our actions. They look for contacts with us, they try to get 
information from us and they are eager to report everything we do and say. Take 
for example the news agencies—within half an hour after calling them and briefing 
them, which we did quite often, you are in the headlines all over the world. All you 
need is one phone call, a threat or a declaration. Those [terrorist organizations] I 
know managed to establish contact and close contact with selected journalists. And 
the activity is often planned with the media as central factor. Some actions are 
planned for the media.  
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        (A. P. Schmid, 2005) 
The fourth characteristic presented by Richardson (2006) is the symbolism of the act 
and victims. Thornton held as early as in 1964 terrorism as “a symbolic act” (as quoted 
in Hutchinson, 1972). A symbol is something that stands for something else. In the case 
of terrorism, the victims often represent an idea, ideology, political point of view or a 
religious belief. Attacking members of the major political party in a state, like Ander 
Behring Breivik attacked the Workers Youth League (AUF) in 2011, or an attack on 
important landmarks, like 9/11 in 2001, have for the perpetrators symbolic value. Bin 
Laden even referred to the Twin Towers as “icons of America’s military and economic 
power” (Richardson, 2006, p. 5). However, Schmid and Jongman (1988) claim in their 
definition that the victims may also be chosen randomly, in that they are “targets of 
opportunity” as opposed to “representative or symbolic actors”.   
Another characteristic set by Richardson (2006) is that a terrorist incident is 
perpetrated by sub-state of sub-national actors. Since any deliberate attack on civilians 
by military forces is, according to international law, considered a war crime; it is 
superfluous to label attacks made by a sovereign state ‘terrorism’. This includes states 
that supports, initiates, or perpetrates terrorism (Ganor, 2002). Given the point taken 
from Ganor (2002), a sovereign states’ involvement with terrorism, is in fact an act of  
warfare and can thus not be labeled in terms of the definition of terrorism. This is an 
interesting aspect of the definitional debate surrounding terrorism, and illustrates a 
conflict between two definitional arenas (academic versus state) of terrorism. The US 
State Department’s definition (as noted above) holds that “terrorism is the purview of 
non-state actors” (A. P. Schmid, 2011, p. 48). This conflicts with, for instance, Schmid and 
Jongman’s definition which holds that terrorism may be employed or sponsored by state 
actors. Indeed, a definition articulated like the one by the US State Department “absolves 
states of any responsibility for their role in terrorist developments within their borders 
and beyond” (A. P. Schmid, 2011, p. 48). We know however, that states sponsor and use 
terrorism as a strategy, such as in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya (Richardson, 2006, p. 5).          
The sixth characteristic of terrorism labeled by Richardson (2006) is in a certain degree 
similar to the third point in table 1. In that the victims of an terrorist act, is different 
from the audience, hence the “direct victims are not the ultimate target” (A. P. Schmid, 
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2011). This characteristic is also included in the definition by Schmid and Jongman 
(1988). Thus, the specific identity of the target is usually of no interest to the terrorist, as 
in contrast to the symbolic value mentioned above. The victim is merely a strategic tool 
the terrorists use to communicate a message to the main target. “[T]he skin on a drum 
beaten to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience” (A. P. Schmid & Graaf, 1982, 
p. 14).  
These victims need to be non-combatants or civilians if the act is to be labeled terrorism, 
according to Richardson (2006) in point 7, table 1. This is in line with the U.S. State 
Departments definition noted above. Thus, if the perpetrators only targeted military 
personnel, armed police, or other non-civilians, it would not be considered terrorism. In 
addition, if civilians are killed as merely collateral damage by mistake, or not 
deliberately, it is not view as a terrorist act (A. P. Schmid, 2011, p. 84). That being said, 
terrorists often do not make a distinction between ‘lawful’ combatants and innocent 
non-combatants. Bin Laden claimed that,  
[t]he ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an 
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible 
to do it.  
       (as quoted in Garrison, 2004).  
What marks the terrorists is that they may deliberately use civilians because of their 
innocence, or they do not care whether the victims are civilians or not. As both, the 
former and the following quote by Bin Laden illustrates:  
We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are 
concerned, they [Americans] are all targets.  
      (as quoted in A. P. Schmid, 2011, p. 81). 
2.2 The GTD Inclusion Criteria 
Since this thesis is heavily based on the inclusion criteria of terrorism set by the GTD, it 
is important to debate these. In order for an incident to be included in the GTD all of the 
three following criteria needs to be present (START, 2011): 
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 The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the 
part of a perpetrator.  
 The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence – 
including property violence as well as violence against people. 
 The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. This database 
does not include acts of state terrorism.  
The first criteria filters out incidents that are suspected to be a randomly act of violence 
or an accident. The second criteria covers the elements in both the definitions made by 
Schmid and Jongman (1988) and Richardson (2006), in that an act of terrorism is not 
only an act of violence, but also the threat of violence. The third criteria address’ the 
interesting discussion on whether or not it is terrorism, if the act is performed by states. 
In this case the GTD does not include acts of state terrorism, however it does include 
state-sponsored terrorism (Enders, et al., 2011). Thus, the inclusion criteria is more in 
concordance with the characteristics set by Richardson (2006) than by Schmid and 
Jongman (1988), as the latter suggest that terrorism may also be performed by state 
actors.    
In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to 
be included in the GTD: 
Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, 
religious or social goal. In terms of economic goal, the exclusive pursuit of profit 
does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, 
systemic economic change.  
Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the 
immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective 
if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As 
long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to 
coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met. 
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Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare 
activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by 
international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately 
targeting civilians or non-combatants).  
Criterion 1 focuses on the agenda set by the terrorists. What are their aims? One of the 
characteristics set by Richardson (2006) is that a terrorist act needs to be politically 
inspired. The GTD broadens this element and adds economic, social and religious goals 
alongside the political motives. The second criterion focuses on the communicative 
element of the terrorist act. The fact that the act in itself is only performed to send a 
message to a larger audience separates the immediate victims from the main target. 
Thus this criterion meets the characteristics set by both Richardson (2006), and Schmid 
and Jongman (1988). With criterion 3 in mind, the GTD separates an act of terrorism 
with legitimate warfare. One of the key statements set by the Geneva Academy of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights is the “principle of distinction”.  This 
principle obliges all parties in a conflict to “target only military objects and not civilian 
population or individual civilians or civilian objects” (Maslen, 2013). Thus, an act of 
terrorism cannot be an act of legitimate warfare per definition.  
The GTD inclusion criteria cover in a large degree the characteristics set by Richardson 
(2006), and the most important elements set by Schmid and Jongman (1988) (i.e.: 
Violence; Political; Threat etc.). The next section seeks to try and differentiate between 
the two types of terrorism which are in question in this thesis.  
2.3 Types of Terrorism 
The main pillar of this thesis is the distinction between domestic and transnational 
terrorism. It is therefore of high importance to differentiate between these two forms. 
2.3.1 Domestic Terrorism 
According to Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011) a terrorist incident is domestic if 
the perpetrators and the target are from, and in, the same country. Thus it has only 
consequences for the host country, and its institutions, people, property, and policies. In 
addition, there is no foreign sponsorship or involvement in a domestic terrorist event 
(Sandler, Acre, & Enders, 2008). For instance, the large amount of suicide bombings that 
took place during the Second Intifada in Israel was domestic terrorist incidents (Enders, 
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et al., 2011). Likewise, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City in 
April 1995 by Timothy McVeigh, was clearly a domestic incident, since only U.S. citizens 
where involved, both the perpetrator and the victims (Sandler, et al., 2008).  
As a contrast to this definition stands the ones used by Engene (2007)  in the TWEED 
dataset, and de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2011) in the DTV dataset. Here, domestic 
terrorism is defined solely in terms of the nationality of the acting group, thus the 
nationality of the victims are irrelevant (Engene, 2007). Engene argues that 
…though many acts of terrorism are consciously aimed at people of a nationality 
different from that of the perpetrator, by their randomness, acts of terrorism may 
also unintentionally or accidentally kill or injure people of the terrorist’s own 
nationality.  
         (Engene, 2007)    
Surely, an act of terrorism that is aimed at victims from the same state as the 
perpetrators may, owing to random factors, become transnational (e.g. if a foreigner is 
accidentally near the blast from a car bomb). The terrorists, however, usually plan their 
attacks carefully, so there is little grounds for anticipating this occurrence to be frequent 
or non-random (Enders, et al., 2011).      
2.3.2 Transnational Terrorism 
Since this thesis is based on the distinction embedded by Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev 
(2011), it is only natural to use their definition of ‘transnational terrorism’ as a point of 
departure. According to them a terrorist incident is transnational if: 
 Through its victims, targets, supporters, or perpetrators, an incident concerns more 
than a single country.  
 The nationality of the perpetrators differs from that of one or more of the victims.  
 The nationality of a victim differs from the venue country.  
 Terrorists transit an international border to perpetrate their attack.  
 Terrorist attacks against foreign diplomats.  
 It is a terrorist event that commences in one country but ends in another. For 
instance, if a midair hijacking of a plane that leaves Athens bound for Cairo and is 
made to fly to Algiers. 
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 A terrorist attack targets an international organization or international 
peacekeepers.  
In addition, if there is a terrorist act perpetrated against foreign buildings or property 
inside the country of the perpetrator, it is still a transnational terrorist incident. For 
instance, when the American Embassy was bombed in 1983 by a local terror group, the 
origin country was Lebanon, but the target was the U.S., even though the event occurred 
in Lebanon (Young & Findley, 2011). 
Thus, transnational terrorist are not linked to a specific country or state, like national 
actors are (Hough, 2007). These groups usually maintain organizational structures or 
carry out violent activities in more than one country or, in a certain way, larger 
territories in which they are not a subject to any jurisdiction (Reinares, 2005).  
Like many other terms and concepts floating around in the sphere of political science, 
the distinction between transnational terrorism and international terrorism are blurry 
and often used interchangeably. However, transnational terrorism is not the same as 
international terrorism (Hough, 2007; Reinares, 2005)! And since this thesis is heavily 
based on the former, it is important to draw the distinction. That being said, an act of 
transnational terrorism is an act of international terrorism, but, an act of international 
terrorism may not be an act of transnational (Reinares, 2005). What separates these two 
types is the scale of the terrorists’ aim (Marsden & Schmid, 2011, p. 184). According to 
Reinares (2005) international terrorism encapsulate to aims: First, it is deliberately 
aimed at affecting the structure and distribution of power on entire regions of the world, 
and even “the level of global society itself”. Second, the terrorists and their victims are 
located to a significant number of states, nationalities and regions. Thus, where the aim 
of transnational terrorism is to impact only a small number of states, the aim of 
international terrorism is more encompassing. 
In any case, the differentiation between transnational and international terrorism is 
solely for the theoretical mind. It makes, therefore, little difference in this analysis since 
the GTD inclusion criteria states that an incident is transnational if ‘two or more 
countries are involved’. Paul Wilkinson wrote as early as in 1977 that the “definitional 
debate has become somewhat confused in recent years by the introduction of the term 
‘transnational’ terrorism” (1977, p. 174), and argued that the term ‘international 
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terrorism’ was adequate in explaining this phenomenon. This argument has also been 
put forward in recent years by Badey (1998), who claim that the term ‘transnational’ 
“have little or no popular resonance and in most cases have meaning to only an anointed 
few”.          
To summarize, a terrorist incident is domestic if both the terrorists and the victims are 
in, and from, the same country. In which only one state is involved. In contrast, it is a 
transnational incident if there are two or more countries involved. For instance, in 1975 
the American CIA officer Richard Welch was killed in Greece by the Greek Revolutionary 
Organization. Ten years later, the same terrorist organization killed Nikos Monferatos, 
who was Greek. Both incidences were carried out in Greece, however the first one is 
considered transnational, while the latter domestic (Sánchez-Cuenca & Calle, 2009). 
Moreover, in 2002 there was a hostage seizure at the Moscow Theater by Chechen 
rebels. This was an act of transnational terrorism since the hostages included about 75 
foreigners from Australia, Austria, France, Germany, and elsewhere (Sandler, et al., 
2008).  
2.4 Terrorism as a Form of Political Violence 
According to Marsden and Schmid, “political violence is a heterogeneous term covering a 
wide variety of phenomena” (2011, p. 160). Types of political action may for instance 
include, along with terrorism: civil war; guerrilla warfare; revolution; and war. This 
point, therefore, to the difficult task of distinguishing terrorism from other types of 
political violence. Enders and Sandler argue that:  
In its classic sense, war targets combatants with weapons that are highly 
discriminating in order to limit collateral damage on civilians. Unlike war, 
terrorism targets noncombatants in a relatively indiscriminate manner. 
         (2006, p. 6) 
Thus, what distinguishes terrorism from other types of political violence is targeting of 
noncombatants and civilians. However, guerrillas may also occasionally target civilians, 
and terrorist may also target military personnel and objects. Richardson argues in that 
regard that the difference lie in the tactic of deliberately targeting civilians:  
16 
 
[I]f the primary tactic of an organization is deliberately to target civilians, it 
deserves to be called a terrorist group, irrespective of the political context in which 
it operates or the legitimacy of the goals it seeks to achieve.  
          (2006, p. 4) 
Terrorism then becomes a distinct form of violent action, as opposed to a tactic used in a 
wider context of political violence. For instance as a strategy used in a civil war 
(Sambanis, 2008). Yet, in certain cases it is difficult to distinguish terrorism as a 
separate violent action from a civil war. As noted by Sambanis (2008), a civil war may 
start “slow” with some guerrilla activist targeting both state personal and civilians 
associated with the regime. In addition, the regimes may describe certain acts of guerilla 
warfare as terrorism in an effort to downplay the political opposition they face. This 
gives scientists a great challenge when collecting empirical data, as they have to 
distinguish act of terrorism in the context of other types of political violence. As 
McAllister and Schmid puts it: “the terrorist ‘trees’ tend to be overlooked in the ‘forest’ 
(and fog) of war” (2011, p. 211). 
Bjørgo  argues that terrorism in most cases is an “extension and radicalization of various 
types of conflicts” (2005b, p. 4). And argue that they originate from the same root 
causes. This suggests that there might be the same underlying causes of terrorism and 
other forms of political violence. This thought is shared by Lia who suggests that 
“terrorism and armed conflicts are closely linked and the causalities explaining 
variations in civil wars may also help us in understanding the causes of terrorism” 
(2005, p. 12).  
In the light of these arguments, the next chapter discusses theories of political action, 
and show how they can relate to the phenomenon of terrorism.    
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3 Theories of Collective Political Violence 
Terrorism is in some events performed by individuals acting alone. The majority, 
however, are violent political acts performed by groups or organizations (Ross, 1996). 
For this reason terrorism may be labeled as a form of collective. This is also claimed by 
Thomson (1989), who sees a terrorist movement as a “collectivity that seeks change by a 
particular strategy – namely, terrorism”.  
According to Ellingsen (2000) for a group to mobilize to collective or political violence, 
three factors have to be present: a common identity, a feeling of frustration and finally a 
window of opportunity. This argument is based on the old debate between Gurr (1970) 
and Tilly (1978), where Gurr in his famous book Why Men Rebel argues that political 
violence comes as a result of frustration or relative deprivation. Tilly on the other hand, 
in his book From Mobilization to Revolution stresses the importance of an opportunity 
for mobilization as key to understand when political violence takes place. Gurr (2000) in 
his later works also emphasizes the importance of a common identity.    
The phenomenon of political violence, and hence terrorism, have been explained by 
group identity, minority frustration and opportunity (Ellingsen, 2000). These concepts 
will function as the theoretical backbone of this thesis.2 Later, in the next chapter, a 
focus on the causal mechanisms between these concepts and the societal explanations of 
terrorism will be addressed.      
3.1 Identity 
Collective action consists of people mobilizing and acting together in the pursuit of a 
common interest or goal (Tilly, 1978, p. 7). Tilly (1978), suggests that for a group to 
mobilize, it first needs a common identity: a self-understanding that defines one’s place 
in the world (Erikson, 1980, p. 22; Schwartz, Montgomery, & Briones, 2006). Everyone 
identifies with something, be it on a cultural, social, or individual level, where ethnic, 
religious and linguistic traits becomes important (Schwartz, et al., 2009). However, this 
‘group identity’ is not only formed by traits we have in common with others, but also by 
what separates us from other groups (Eriksen, 1995), creating ‘social categorization’ 
                                                         
2 The old debate between Gurr and Tilly resemble to a large extent the more recent debate within the civil 
war literature concerning greed versus grievance associated with Collier and Hoeffler (2004). This will be 
addressed later in the thesis.    
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(Hogg & Abrams, 1999, p. 11; Sen, 2006, p. 19). Tajfel (1974), claims that this creates 
social ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ that may, if a group is clearly distinct from another 
group, create dislike or hate towards the opposite group.  
Thus, the aspect of identity may be relevant explanations for both domestic terrorism 
and transnational. Ellingsen (2000) argues that if the identity fails to coincide with 
territorial border, a conflict may arise within a nation-state, since linguistic, ethnic, and 
religious factors seem more important that territorial boundaries. This thought 
resonates Huntington who argued that the fault lines between civilizations will be the 
dominating battle lines, and not the lines between nation-states (1993). Moreover, if a 
minority group is being discriminated against based on their ethnic identity, it may, 
according to Gurr (2000, p. 66) lead to political action. A dichotomous ‘us-versus-them’ 
thinking may especially become severe in matters of a cultural or religious absolutism 
that, for instance, advocates ‘a one true faith’, as opposed to the ‘evil infidels’ (Howard-
Hassmann, 1993; Schwartz, et al., 2009).  
3.2 Relative Deprivation and Frustration 
That frustration leads to aggression provides an explanation for why collective 
incentives can mount to violence, and thus terrorism (Davies, 1969; Gurr, 1970; 
Wilkinson, 1977). John Dollard and his associates claimed in 1939 to have proven that 
humans only become violent if they are frustrated in their efforts to attain a particular 
goal; frustration always leads to some form of aggression (Dollard, Miller, Doob, 
Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Wilkinson, 1977, p. 35). This theory of frustration-aggression, or 
relative deprivation, was later applied by Gurr (1970) and Davies (1969) to political 
conflict.3  
Davies rested on the notions of both de Tocqueville – that revolutions may arise when a 
regime becomes an improvement of its immediate predecessor, and Marx, – that a 
revolution may be more likely to occur when there has been a social and economic 
regress (Davies, 1969). Davies claimed that both ideas had explanatory and predictive 
value if they are put in the proper time sequence, de Tocqueville before Marx. And thus 
he presented the J-Curve:  
                                                         
3 The term ‘relative deprivation’ was first applied by Stouffer et al. (1949).  
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Figure 1: Davies’ J-Curve 
 
         (Based on Davies, 1969) 
According to him,  revolutions are more likely to occur when a prolonged period of 
economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal 
(Davies, 1969). Thus it becomes a discrepancy between people’s expected values and 
what they actually get, leading to frustration. Gurr (1970), who further developed the 
theory of relative deprivation as a fundamental and necessary prerequisite for armed 
intrastate conflict, held alongside Davies, that political action may develop if there is an 
perception of discrepancy between values that individuals believe they are rightfully 
entitled to and the values they think they are capable of getting and keeping (1970, p. 
24).  
Since aggression arises by a blockage of an individual’s or group’s goal attainment, 
terrorism may be a response to the lack of alternative modes of political expression 
(McAllister & Schmid, 2011, p. 215). The question that arises, however, is why do some, 
in this state of frustration, turn to terrorism, while others do not? The suggested answer 
is presumed to be individual differences (Horgan, 2003, p. 11). In his article The 
Staircase to Terrorism, Fathali M. Moghaddam (2005) illustrates an understanding of the 
process in which an individual becomes a terrorist. He uses the metaphor of…  
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…a narrowing staircase leading to the terrorist act at the top of a building. The 
staircase leads to higher and higher floors, and whether someone remains on a 
particular floor depends on the doors and spaces that person imagines to be open to 
her or him on that floor.        
While on the “ground floor” relative deprivation and frustration dominate, some 
individuals will climb to the first floor in a search for improving their situation and 
seeking justice. If they are unable to adequately amend their situations, they are likely to 
continue to a higher floor. This search may eventually, according to Moghaddam (2005) , 
lead the individual to a terrorist organization, where their aggression is aimed against a 
more specific enemy. According to Atran (2004), radical organization may exploit the 
frustration that are generated when “converging political, economic, and social trends 
produce diminishing opportunities relative to expectations”.  
3.3 Opportunity and Rational Choice 
Although Gurr argues that human frustration is a primary source for violence, he 
concedes that frustration alone is not a sufficient predictor (he even suggests that some 
men are motivated by greed) (Gurr, 1970, p. 36). Indeed, many people live their lives 
exposed to the worlds frustrating hardships, still very few of them actually become 
terrorists (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).   
Charles Tilly argues in From Mobilization to Revolution that a group will act on their 
interests if, for one, they have the opportunity to do so; second, if the groups 
organizational structure allows it; and third, if they have a collective control over the 
resources needed for action (Tilly, 1978). Thus, the interest of the group becomes a 
calculation of shared advantages or disadvantages that are likely to result from possible 
interactions with other groups. The strength and weakness of the groups comprise 
therefore the opportunities to act on its interests (Tilly, 1978, p. 98). This line of thought 
has in recent years been carried on by, among others, Sidney Tarrow who claims that 
“people join in social movements in response to political opportunities and then, 
through collective action, create new ones” (Tarrow, 1994). 
The theory of rational choice argues that the individual is always rational in every aspect 
of its decision-making process, or explores what would be the political outcome of 
rational behavior (Muller & Opp, 1986). Thus, the individual will compare the gains and 
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losses of participating, for instance in an act of terrorism, with those of inactivity. 
However, since a successful rebellion, riot or terrorist act, in most cases, will benefit all 
supporters of the dissident group’s goal, regardless of their own participation, the 
rational thing to do would be not to participate (Crenshaw, 1998, p. 8). So, why would a 
rational person become a terrorist? Although, there are several psychological 
explanations to this paradox (e.g.: Crenshaw, 1998), Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter 
Opp proposes an strategic answer. According to them the “average citizens may adopt a 
collectivist conception of rationality because they recognize that what is individually 
rational is collectively irrational” (1986). Therefore, the citizens acknowledge that it is 
collectively rational to participate, although is not individualistically rational – where 
suicide terrorism is the most extreme case in that regard (Pape, 2003).   
The debate between the theory of relative deprivation and the theory of opportunity 
resemble to a large extent the more recent debate concerning greed versus grievance 
associated with Collier and Hoeffler (2004). According to them rebellion either occurs 
when grievances are so acute that individuals engage in violent protest, or when 
profitable opportunities is being given to them. Thus, the latter is not necessarily 
explained by motive, “but by the atypical circumstances that generate profitable 
opportunities” (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).     
3.4 Summing Up the Theoretical Explanations 
As discussed above, identity, frustration and opportunity may lead to collective violence, 
and thus terrorism. In figure 3, I have showed this schematically. As argued by Tilly 
(1978) a group needs a common identity if it are to collectively mobilize. First, the 
identity aspect may further create ‘social categorization’ with social ‘in-groups’ and 
perceived antagonistic ‘out-groups’, thus the arrow from identity to terrorism.  Second, 
Gurr (1970) argues that if it becomes a discrepancy between people’s expected values 
and what they actually get, it may lead to frustration and, in turn, aggression. This 
explains the arrow from frustration to terrorism. Third, in his book From Mobilization to 
Revolution, Tilly (1978) argues that a group will act on their interests if they have the 
opportunity to do so. Thus the arrow from opportunity to terrorism is drawn.  
Although these theories are looked on as separate explanations, they might influence 
and reinforce each other in a more or less degree. For instance, frustration may make 
the social categorization of identity more salient. Moreover, frustration may also 
22 
 
influence the cost-benefit calculus of opportunity, making individuals think they have 
‘nothing to lose’.4    
 Figure 2: Explanations of Terrorism 
 
  
 
 
 
The next chapter combines the theories that have been used to explain terrorism. Even 
though these theories serves as explanations as to why certain individuals turn to 
political violence, and thus terrorism, it might be differences in the causal mechanisms 
to domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism. For instance, the level of democracy 
in a country could matter to both domestic and transnational terrorism. For domestic 
terrorism, a lack of democratic freedom could create frustration since individuals are 
not able to express their opinions. For transnational terrorism, a country’s regime type 
could also matter, but the causal mechanisms might be different. Here, a higher level of 
democracy might create better opportunities to gain media coverage and exposure for 
their cause. Thus, identity, frustration, and opportunity, may be influenced to cause 
terrorism in different ways by the same societal factor.   
  
                                                         
4 These relationships will not explicitly be tested in this thesis.  
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4 The Root Causes of Terrorism and Hypotheses 
Having presented the conceptual framework for understanding how collective violence 
and thus terrorism occurs, the next task is to identify factors that might influence the 
three core concepts – identity, frustration and opportunity. Thus, this chapter will first 
present a discussion on analyzing terrorism on the societal level as opposed to 
individual and group level. Then, it will explain how different societal factors can relate 
to the theoretical framework laid out earlier. The factors will be divided into economic, 
political, and socio-cultural determinants, and explain how these can relate to either 
domestic or transnational terrorism. It will show that these factors may influence a felt 
common identity, create frustration, and create a window of opportunity for the 
individuals.  
4.1 Analyzing Terrorism on the Societal Level 
The theme of conflict and violence is, according to Anatol Rapoport, “a theme that has 
occupied the thinking of man more than any other, save only God and love” (as quoted in 
Gurr, 1980, p. 4). From different view-points and scientific branches, researchers have 
tried to analyze and understand why individuals, groups and states turn to conflict and 
political violence. Thus, the explanations that have been given as to why political 
violence occurs may be analyzed on different levels. The level of choice, however, is 
mainly driven by what answers one might seek.    
No matter which environment individuals live under, very few become terrorists. Thus, 
every analytical aspect on every level is important in understanding terrorism. On the 
first level, the individual is analyzed. Here, psychological attributes of individuals are 
often used to explain why certain individuals turn to political violence. Do individuals 
who perform or participate in political violence have certain identities, traits, and 
perceptions? This psychological perspective may also be adapted to analyzing terrorism 
(see Post, 1998). One may ask why some becomes terrorists, or, do terrorists have 
certain attributes (Engene, 1994, p. 46)? The second level is focused on the group in 
which the individuals inhabit. Here, the main analytical object is the organization, 
growth, actions, and fate of political and socioeconomic groups (Gurr, 1980, p. 8). As 
with the first level, group level researchers utilizes terms and theory from psychology 
(Lia & Skjølberg, 2004). In relation to terrorism, the research questions often dwell 
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around internal processes within the group. How are they structured, how does the 
leadership work, and how does the group survive (Engene, 1994, p. 47)? 
The third level, and the one in question in this thesis, is the societal, or the 
environmental, level. On this level, scientists seek to explain political violence along 
historical, cultural and socio-political characteristics of the larger society (Lia & 
Skjølberg, 2004). Thus, the state, in which inhabits groups and individuals, becomes the 
central or defining element (Gurr, 1980, p. 8). Here, it is focused on the broader context 
of the terrorist, and the contextual or underlying root causes of terrorism (Engene, 1994, 
pp. 46-47). In regard to this thesis however, the two first levels are in a large degree 
dependent on psychological perspectives based on tests and interviews of former 
terrorists. In the political science school however, it is more common to attack the 
phenomenon from the societal or environmental angle. Crenshaw argues: 
A comprehensive explanation, however, must also take into account the 
environment in which terrorism occurs and address the question of whether broad 
political, social, and economic conditions make terrorism more likely in some 
contexts than others.  
          (Crenshaw, 1981)  
On the societal level it is common to separate between factors at the economic, political 
and socio-cultural level, where certain characteristics may lead to or prevent terrorism 
(Eyerman, 1998). The societal level may be a difficult level to analyze, since we here 
cannot account for certain triggering incidents or motivations that are held by different 
groups, organizations, and individuals. Thus, the aim an empirical analysis on the 
societal level, is to make probable why certain, for instance, country characteristics may 
relate to group or individual action (Engene, 1994, p. 47).   
4.2 Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism 
As noted in the introduction of this thesis, scientists have not in a large degree 
distinguished between domestic and transnational terrorism. Appendix A displays an 
overview of the quantitative research on the cross-country studies of terrorism. To this 
authors knowledge, there are only five attempts to analyze how societal determinants 
relates to domestic terrorism, while there are twenty-three works studying relationship 
between these determinants and being targeted by transnational terrorism. Although, 
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this is an informal and in no way a comprehensive overview, it suggests that the 
research on terrorism is somewhat skewed. Yet, as shown in figure 3 the number of 
domestic terrorism far exceeds the number of transnational incidents. 5 
Figure 3: Total number of terror events.  
 
This is important since transnational terrorism is not a representative sample of the 
overall amount of terrorism (Sánchez-Cuenca & Calle, 2009). Thus, it becomes 
dangerous to use data on transnational terrorism to explain the cross-country variations 
of the overall phenomenon of terrorism.  
This leads to the two main hypotheses of this thesis. Given that certain societal 
characteristics are argued to lead to a higher rate and probability of experiencing 
terrorism, I would expect that there is a difference between domestic and transnational 
terrorism.  
Hypothesis 1: The societal factors that explain domestic are different from 
the societal factors that explain transnational terrorism.   
                                                         
5 The data for 1993 was lost during transit by the PGIS and was never fully recovered (START 2012). It is 
apparent that the loss was greater for the domestic incidents than for the transnational. The remaining 
events accounts for approximately 15 percent of total events.    
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However, it is possible that the societal factors that explain domestic and transnational 
terrorism are similar, but the causal mechanisms behind them are different. Therefore, 
an alternative hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 2: The societal factors that explain domestic and transnational 
terrorism are the same, but the causal mechanisms behind are different.  
Hypothesis number two is clearly more based on the theoretical framework than the 
first hypothesis, and will therefore be answered in the following chapter.  
To answer the first hypothesis I have displayed a comparison between the number of 
domestic terrorist incidents and the number of transnational incidents in table 2. This 
table can be viewed as a pretest and compares the main economic, political, and socio-
cultural factors that are argued to influence domestic and transnational terrorism, using 
zero-inflated negative binomial regression.6 The factors that are included in this model 
are drawn from Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) and the overview of empirical cross-
country studies of domestic and transnational terrorism displayed in appendix A, 
chapter 9. Model A is run using the count of domestic incidents, while model B is run 
with the count of transnational terrorism. This table suggests that there is little 
difference between the societal factors leading to domestic and transnational terrorism. 
This does not give support to hypothesis 1.  
First, population and country size are both significantly associated with both domestic 
and transnational terrorism. While, population has a positive direction, country size is 
negative. GDP per capita is a factor that associated with both domestic and transnational 
incidents. According to the overview in appendix A, both Abadie (2006) and Findley and 
Young (2011) relates this factor to domestic terrorism, while, for instance, Krueger and 
Laitin (2008) and Blomberg and Hess (2008b) associates GDP per capita with 
transnational terrorism. In table 2, this factor is positively related to both domestic and 
transnational terrorism, although the level of significance is higher for transnational.  
 
                                                         
6 The characteristics of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression method will be addressed in 
chapter 5. The usage here is only to compare the direction and the significance of the factors between 
domestic and transnational terrorism.   
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Table 2: Comparing domestic and transnational terrorism on all societal factors 
 
Model A Model B 
Domestic Count Transnational Count 
Count Model 
  Population 1.041*** 0.491*** 
 
(0.255) (0.0560) 
Country Size -0.421** -0.221*** 
 
(0.143) (0.0533) 
GDP per Capita 0.340* 0.527*** 
 
(0.143) (0.0903) 
GDP Growth -0.0574* -0.0561*** 
 
(0.0252) (0.0101) 
Trade Openness -0.00902* -0.0165*** 
 
(0.00370) (0.00195) 
Democracy 0.0567 0.0641*** 
 
(0.0433) (0.0104) 
Democracy2 -0.0188*** -0.00838*** 
 
(0.00513) (0.00209) 
Durability -0.00678* -0.00904*** 
 
(0.00286) (0.00165) 
Population Growth 0.236*** 0.163** 
 
(0.0693) (0.0520) 
Urbanization 0.0201 0.00000193 
 
(0.0112) (0.00500) 
Education -0.0219*** -0.0149*** 
 
(0.00580) (0.00310) 
Ethnic Frac. 0.793 0.912*** 
 
(0.500) (0.260) 
Constant -11.08** -6.929*** 
 
(3.724) (0.917) 
Inflated Model 
  Population -0.147 -1.801* 
 
(0.757) (0.914) 
Country Size -0.275 -1.274* 
 
(0.373) (0.579) 
GDP per Capita -0.767* -2.216*** 
 
(0.357) (0.669) 
GDP Growth 0.0369 -0.0141 
 
(0.0488) (0.0439) 
Trade Openness 0.00646 -0.0239 
 
(0.0131) (0.0248) 
Democracy -0.114 0.0430 
 
(0.139) (0.0948) 
Democracy2 0.000399 0.00845 
 
(0.0171) (0.0123) 
Durability 0.0250** 0.0519 
 
(0.00949) (0.0285) 
Population Growth 0.171 0.609** 
 
(0.104) (0.211) 
Urbanization 0.0395 0.00227 
 
(0.0414) (0.0215) 
Eduaction -0.0317* -0.0208 
 
(0.0143) (0.0197) 
Ethnic Frac. 0.363 6.767** 
 
(0.655) (2.448) 
Constant 1.569*** 1.185*** 
 
(0.0532) (0.0607) 
Observations 2761 2761 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one period. 
* p<0.05      ** p<0.01      *** p<0.001 
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Further, both GDP growth and trade openness are significantly linked to both domestic 
and transnational terrorism. While, for instance, Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, and 
Klemmensen  (2006), and Koch and Cranmer (2007) associates trade openness with 
transnational terrorism, there is not a study, at least to this authors knowledge,  that 
explores the link between trade openness and domestic terrorism. Democracy turns out 
not to be significant in model A, but significant in model B. This may be due to the fact 
that there are other variables that take away some of the explanatory power of this 
factor. Both domestic and transnational terrorism are, however, widely associated with 
different measures of democracy. As seen in the overview in appendix A, chapter 9, 
every study of domestic terrorism, has included a form of proxy of regime type. This is 
also the case for studies on transnational terrorism. Finally, ethnic fractionalization 
seems to be only significant to transnational terrorism. However, as will be argued later 
in this thesis, this factor also matter to domestic terrorism.  
In the end, the result shows that there is not much difference between the factors that 
influence domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism, conversely to what 
hypothesis 1 argues. Regardless of this, as argued in hypothesis 2, the causal 
mechanisms that may lead to this may be quite different.  
The following section discusses what is perceived to be the root causes of terrorism. The 
idea of a ‘root’ cause is that there is some form of underlying causal relationship 
between economic, political and socio-cultural characteristics and the occurrence of 
terrorism (Newman, 2006). Scientist and scholars have in a large degree linked these 
root causes to economic, political, and socio-cultural factors. An overview of these 
factors is displayed in appendix A (chapter 9.1). At first glance, it seems to be little 
agreement of the root causes of terrorism. For economic factors, Blomberg and Hess 
(2008a) finds that higher income discourage domestic terrorism, while Findley and 
Young (2011) finds that higher GDP per capita actually encourage domestic terrorism. 
This discord is also apparent in the study of transnational terrorism. While, for instance, 
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen (2006); Eyerman (1998); and Tavares 
(2004), finds that higher rates of GDP per capita increases the rate of events, Li (2004); 
and Braithwaite and Li (2007) finds that GDP per capita actually reduces transnational 
terrorism. There is also a lack of agreement concerning the political factors. For 
domestic terrorism, Findley and Young (2011) finds that terror is more likely in semi-
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democratic states and autocratic states, while Blomberg and Hess(2008a) argues that 
greater levels of democracy are positively related to domestic terrorism. In the case of 
transnational terrorism, it seems that the majority of studies finds there to be a positive 
relationship between a country’s level of democracy and being attacked by foreign 
groups. As for socio-cultural factors, the empirical overview suggests that the only solid 
evidence is found in the relationship between population size and the amount of 
domestic and transnational terrorism.  
By using Krieger and Meierrieks’ (2011) article What Causes Terrorism? as a point of 
departure, these root causes will be linked to domestic and transnational terrorism. This 
will be done by creating causal mechanisms from the theoretical foundation laid out 
earlier to the different societal factors. This will first be done with domestic terrorism, 
then with transnational terrorism.    
4.2.1 Economic Conditions 
 We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror.7  
4.2.1.1 Domestic 
One of the controversial subjects among terrorism scholars is whether domestic 
terrorism originates in poor economic societies. While both Piazza (2011) and Findley 
and Young (2011) finds that higher economic development encourage domestic 
terrorism, Blomberg and Hess (Blomberg & Hess, 2008a) finds that it discourage. 
Moreover, Abadie (2006) finds that there is not significant relation at all.   
In accordance with the frustration-aggression thesis and the theory of relative 
deprivation, it is the perceived injustice underlying the economic deprivation that gives 
rise to anger and frustration (Crenshaw, 1981; Ross, 1993). Li and Schaub (2004) even 
suggests that poor economic conditions create “terrorist breeding grounds”, where 
disaffected populations turn to terrorist activities as a solution to their problems. This 
might suggest that poorer countries might experience a higher rate and a higher 
probability of domestic terrorism. Thus, the first hypothesis may be created: 
HD1: Countries with lower rates of GDP per capita will experience higher 
rates and a higher probability of domestic terrorism.  
                                                         
7 George W Bush (2002) remarks at the United Nations International Conference on Financing for 
Development in Monterrey, Mexico: http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/usaE.htm 
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Yet, as Lea and Young puts it: “Sheer poverty does not necessarily lead to violence, it 
may just as easily lead to quiescence and fatalism” (1996, p. 142). Therefore, poverty in 
itself, no matter how bad it is, may not create frustration, and thus terrorism, as long as 
it seems just and natural for the individual. In addition, Sánchez-Cuenca and Calle 
(2009) suggests that “terrorist organizations are the guerrillas of rich countries”. From 
an opportunity perspective, poor states may not have the ability to take the necessary 
countermeasures against antagonizing groups. Here, these groups may turn into 
guerrilla or rebellion groups (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004). This may suggest 
that countries with higher levels of GDP per capita will experience higher rates and a 
higher probability of domestic terrorism. It is therefore necessary to create an 
alternative hypothesis in this regard. 
HD1alt: Countries with higher rates of GDP per capita will experience higher 
rates and a higher probability of domestic terrorism.   
The theory of relative deprivation is perhaps applicable as an explanation on why 
economic inequality may encourage political violence. “The relation between inequality 
and rebellion is indeed a close one”, wrote Amartya Sen on the early pages of ‘On 
Economic Inequality’ (1973, p. 1). Indeed knowing that he was standing on the shoulders 
of De Tocqueville, who argued as early as in 1835 that “almost all of the revolutions 
which have changed the aspect of nations have been made to consolidate or to destroy 
social inequality” (KILDE se Lia & Skjølberg). The poor may fight for redistribution, 
while the rich might strive to keep the status quo. This is putting the ‘relative’ in the 
theory of relative deprivation. It is when people compare themselves to others that the 
discontent occurs, and thus political violence (Lea & Young, 1996, p. 142).  
From an opportunity perspective, it should be easier for terrorist organizations to 
muster recruits and resources in countries where the inequality is high (Krieger & 
Meierrieks, 2011). Thus, I would expect a positive correlation between economic 
inequality and the occurrence of domestic terrorism. 
HD2: Countries with higher rates of economic inequality will experience 
higher rates and a higher probability of domestic terrorism.    
Though terrorism can occur anywhere, it is argued that is more common in developing 
societies characterized by rapid modernization (Gurr, 2005, p. 21). As Huntington  
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famously noted “…modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability” 
(1968, p. 41). This is also pointed out by Ross (1993) who claims that most grievances 
are generated during the “transition from traditional to modern society”, an argument 
that is in line with radical theory, or dependency theory, which posits that the 
“modernization process has a harrowing effect” on the society (Lia & Skjølberg, 2004), 
and thereby encouraging political violence and terrorism. While both traditional and 
modern societies exhibit some form of equilibrium, a transitional development from the 
traditional to the modern may create grievances among the ‘modernization losers’ 
(Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). This way the modernization process alters the traditional 
social, cultural and organizational norms of the society, and may leave citizens in a state 
where institutions and organizations cannot cope with the new modern norms (Engene, 
1994, pp. 220-221). Thus, the felt grievances among the economic losers of 
modernization may turn into aggression and domestic terrorism. Krieger and Meierrieks 
(2011) suggest that terrorists can capitalize on the grievances felt among the people, 
making recruitment and support more likely. Thus, both the theory of relative 
deprivation and opportunity may explain the occurrence of domestic terrorism through 
the process of modernization. One proxy for modernization is the rate of economic 
growth in a country. A rapid increase in a country’s GDP per capita growth may 
therefore influence domestic terrorism.  
HD3: Countries with higher rates of economic growth will experience 
higher rates and a higher probability of domestic terrorism.    
4.2.1.2 Transnational 
As discussed earlier, poverty may not lead to domestic political violence per se. It is 
when economical differences become apparent that frustration may arise. This is also 
the case with transnational terrorism. From the theory of relative deprivation, we 
cannot rationalize a causal chain from poverty to terrorism unless individuals from a 
poor country attack a rich country. This, however, requires a dyadic research design and 
not a univariate cross-country approach like in this thesis.  
Although, the relation between poor and rich countries requires a dyadic approach, one 
could rationale that richer countries have a greater probability of experiencing 
transnational terrorism. Rich countries may offer better channels of exposure through 
media coverage and targets of greater symbolic value. Moreover, Blomberg, Hess, and 
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Weerapana (2004) argues that since economic developed countries have a better ability 
to not give in to the dissident groups, these groups turn to terrorism instead of guerrilla 
warfare, since this is more cost-efficient. Therefore, the theory of opportunity may 
explain that richer countries are more exposed to foreign attacks.  
HT1: Countries with higher rates of GDP per capita will experience higher 
rates and a higher probability of transnational terrorism.    
A state’s level of trade openness may be linked to transnational terrorism. Although, a 
dyadic design must be utilized to test whether ‘losers’ on the global economic marked 
target the ‘winners’; it may be possible that state’s succeeding in the global market are 
more prone to being attacked. Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) suggests that the 
dominant state’s in the global market may be attacked “to counter foreign dominance”. 
This relates to the theory of relative deprivation in that individuals may fear 
globalization and being ‘left behind’ in the global market, especially if the global order is 
perceived as unjust.   
This may also be explained by the theory of opportunity.  Since transnational terrorism 
is driven by global factors, it is more plausible that relatively open societies are more 
prone to being a target. Li and Schaub (2004) argues that “as globalization increases, the 
cost of illegal activity declines relative to the cost of legal activity, and the overall level of 
terrorism increases”. In addition, transnational terrorist organizations often take 
advantage of the international trade networks to trade contraband to fund their 
operations (Li & Schaub, 2004; Matthew & Shambaugh, 1998). This suggests that states 
with a high level of economic trade openness attract more transnational terrorism by 
lowering the opportunity costs of illegal operations.  
HT2: Countries with higher levels of trade openness will experience higher 
rates and a higher probability of transnational terrorism.  
4.2.2 Political Factors 
4.2.2.1 Domestic 
A continuous debate in the field of terrorism research is whether a certain regime type is 
more prone do experience terrorism than others. Two lines of thought, namely the 
political access school and the strategic school, have sought explanatory power 
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(Eyerman, 1998). Both these thoughts, however, share the premise that terrorists are 
rational individuals who operates in a cost-benefit calculus.  
The political access school argues that because democracies are broadly based upon 
fundamental pillars like freedom, openness and popular participation, dissatisfaction 
among the citizens rarely reaches a level of serious threat to the existence of the regime 
itself (Li, 2005; Lia & Skjølberg, 2004; 2000; Sánchez-Cuenca & Calle, 2009). Citizens in a 
stable democracy are therefore allowed to express their grievances through established 
institutional venues where their voice can be heard and popular demands can be 
processed and responded to, thus resolve their dissent in a non-violent way (Drakos & 
Gofas, 2006; Eyerman, 1998; Wilkinson, 2011). From an opportunity perspective, this 
would increase the opportunity for the dissident group to participate in institutional 
politics, and thus decrease the benefit of a potential domestic terrorism act.  
On the other hand, however, according to the strategic school, democratic regimes 
cannot make use of ‘hard’ counter-terrorism measures which make them soft targets as 
they are constrained by a commitment to civil liberties and are less able than other 
states to prevent terrorism or retaliate once it occurs (Eyerman, 1998; Krieger & 
Meierrieks, 2011; Wilkinson, 2011, p. 22). In addition, democratic states provide more 
freedom of speech, movement, and association that, may lower the opportunity-cost, 
and thus incite terrorist organizations (Drakos & Gofas, 2006; Li, 2005).  
This would suggest that democracies are neither a regime type that suppress radical 
forces by channeling their opinions or, on the other hand, encourage terrorism by not 
having the ability to take the necessarily counter-terrorism measures. On the other side, 
autocracies do not have the ability to let individuals express their opinions, but they do 
have the ability to take the necessarily ‘hard’ counter-terrorism measures. In their work 
on democracy and civil war, Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch (2001) argues that 
semi-democracies experience more political violence, than both autocratic states and 
democracies. Since, semi-democracies are “partly open yet somewhat repressive” they 
give groups the motivation to act and the freedom to operate. In addition, frustration 
may emerge in these types of regimes since citizens do not get their voices heard. Thus, 
we can expect that there is an inverted U-shaped curve between regime type and 
domestic terrorism.  
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HD4: Semi-democratic countries will experience higher rates and a higher 
probability of domestic terrorism.  
The relationship between regime stability and domestic terrorism may also be explained 
from an opportunity perspective. Piazza (2011) finds that regimes age is a negative 
predictor of domestic terrorism, and similar, Findley and Young (2011) finds that when 
regimes are in transition domestic terrorism are more likely. This thought is in line with 
Gurr who claim that “political terrorists in democratic societies almost invariably 
emerge out of larger conflicts, and that they reflect, in however distorted a form, the 
political beliefs and aspirations of a larger segment of society” (1998).  
In instable or politically changing states it may arise political vacuums which terrorist 
groups use to push their agendas (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). In times of instability 
and distress governments are weak and unable to control radical domestic groups, 
which might lower the opportunity costs of violence. In addition, these groups might 
find it easier to muster support and recruits as individuals struggle to find alternative 
ways of expressing their political agendas (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; Piazza, 2008b).  
HD5: Countries with higher rates of regime stability will experience lower 
rates and a lower probability of domestic terrorism.  
4.2.2.2 Transnational 
In dealing with domestic terrorism we saw that the arguments were drawn in the lines 
of either the ‘access school’ and the ‘strategic school’, where the former argued that 
democracies provided channels for their citizens to express their dissatisfaction, and 
thus preventing domestic terrorism, while the latter suggested that democratic states 
created opportunities for the dissent group, due to their lack of hard counter-terrorism 
measures. While the ‘access school’ may have explanatory value in the case of domestic 
terrorism, it has not for transnational terrorism.  
The ‘strategic school’ may, however, work as a rationale on why democracies are more 
prone to being a target of transnational terrorism. Since counterterrorism capabilities of 
democracies are constrained by the need to protects civil liberties, its citizens may not 
tolerate significant reduction in personal freedoms, which may be necessary in dealing 
with the threat of transnational terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Koch & Cranmer, 2007). 
Thus, the potential gain of the attacker becomes higher than the costs. In addition, 
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because “the success of a terrorist operation depends almost entirely on the amount of 
publicity it receives” (Walter Laqueur as quoted in A. P. Schmid, 2004), the terrorist 
would seek countries where the incidents are more likely to be reported. And because 
democratic countries place fewer restrictions on media, press freedom is a probable 
factor (Li, 2005). This is also noted by Engene, who claims that the terrorist benefits on 
the independent institutions that liberal democracies inhabits (1994, p. 52). Moreover, 
autocratic regimes may be more able than democracies to impose the greatest control of 
a state and thus repress potential terrorist incidence, making violent challenge too 
costly (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; Lai, 2007; Sánchez-Cuenca & Calle, 2009). 
Because of this, we cannot expect an inverted u-curve in the relation between regime 
type and transnational terrorism, as we did with domestic terrorism. We can, however, 
expect that democracies are more prone to experience transnational terrorism.   
HT3: Countries with higher rates of democracy will experience higher rates 
and a higher probability of transnational terrorism.  
Terrorist attacks may be more common in politically instable environments. Weak and 
instable states lack the capacity or will to exercise territorial control and “maintain a 
monopoly of violence” (Bjørgo, 2005a, p. 258). This may create political vacuums which 
radical groups use to push their agendas, including foreign groups. These may be less 
challenged by an instable, and thus weak government (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). This 
may, in turn, lower the opportunity cost for the terrorists. 
HT4: Countries with higher rates of regime stability will experience lower 
rates and a lower probability of transnational terrorism.  
4.2.3 Socio-cultural Factors 
4.2.3.1 Domestic 
A state that is undergoing a rapid demographic change may be more prone to experience 
domestic terrorism. Demographic strain as a product of a large population and a rapid 
population growth may foster more frustrated and deprived citizens (Krieger & 
Meierrieks, 2011). This may trigger terrorism for instance through food shortage and 
environmental scarcities like “shortage of water, forests, and especially fertile land” 
(Homer-Dixon, 1994). Henrik Urdal (2005) addresses the neo-Malthusian concern and 
its relation to civil war. According to this theory, a rapid growth in the population will 
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increase the risk of violent conflict, due to degradation and scarcity of natural resources. 
Although Urdal do not find strong evidence in favor of the neo-Malthusian concern, he 
does suggest that countries facing high rates of population growth may experience 
higher risks of violence if productive land is already scarce.  
HD6: Countries with higher rates of population growth will experience 
higher rates and a higher probability of domestic terrorism.  
Crenshaw (1981)  argues that there is a relation between terrorism and urbanization. 
According to her, urbanization increases “the number and accessibility of targets and 
methods”. This argument is backed up by Ross (1993), who states that “cities are more 
likely than rural environments to facilitate terrorism”. This suggests that the 
opportunity cost for the terrorist lowers if they operate and target urban civilians and 
objects. In addition, rapid urbanization may generate demands from the urban 
population that the state may not be able to satisfy, thus creating frustration and 
deprivation (Auvinen, 1997). Thus we can expect that states undergoing a high rate of 
urbanization are more prone to experience political violence, and hence terrorism.  
HD7: Countries with higher rates of urbanization will experience higher 
rates and a higher probability of domestic terrorism.  
From 1996 to 1999, Nasra Hassan interviewed almost two hundred and fifty people 
involved in sub-governmental military camps fighting the Palestinian cause. His 
observations conflict with the prevailing impression that terrorists are uneducated, 
poor, and mentally disturbed. In his own words:  
None of the suicide bombers—they ranged in age from eighteen to thirty-eight—
conformed to the typical profile of the suicidal personality. None of them were 
uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle class 
and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs. 
(Hassan, 2001)   
Also Krueger and Malecková (2003) challenge this thought. They find that participation 
in Hezbollah in Lebanon is more likely among people with secondary school or higher 
education. A possible explanation for this is that terrorist organization may seek and 
recruit individuals who have better education (Drakos & Gofas, 2006). In addition, well-
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educated citizens could identify more strongly with goals of the terrorists organization 
(Krueger & Malecková, 2003).8 In any case, as terrorist organization recruit educated 
citizens, both as leaders and soldier; it benefits their opportunity to act, and their 
chances for success.    
HD8: Countries with higher rates of education will experience higher rates 
and a higher probability of domestic terrorism.  
John Stuart Mill argued as early as in 1861 that “free institutions are next to impossible 
in a country made up of different nationalities” (Mill, 2010 [1861], p. 296). Though 
written in a different context, the statement is quite adaptable in the today’s current 
research on ethnic diversity and terrorism. If the identity of a group does not coincide 
with the territorial borders of its country, it may be difficult for the societies to define its 
people, and thus it may lead to legitimacy problems (Ellingsen, 2000). In societies which 
inhabit several different ethnic groups, one could thus expect a higher likelihood of 
domestic terrorism. Lia and Skjølberg argue that “the conditions for the emergence of 
terrorism are most favorable in countries where the public is fragmented into several 
opposing groups” (2004). In addition, ethnic and religious hatreds are widely perceived 
as a cause of conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Although, this aspect is difficult to 
quantify and measure, it is reasonably to believe that these hatreds occur in a higher 
degree in multiethnic societies. This relates to the aspect of identity in that ethnic groups 
may have an ‘us versus them’ mentality creating domestic friction that may turn into 
political violence.  
In addition, as suggested by Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), it may be both easier and 
less costly for a group to muster recruits and support against an antagonistic group. This 
may especially be the case in states where identity-related ideologies are present. Like, 
for instance, absolutist religion which stresses the one true faith.  
HD9: Countries with higher rates of ethnic fractionalization will experience 
higher rates and a higher probability of domestic terrorism.  
                                                         
8 Gurr notes that “education without opportunities is an explosive combination” (2005, p. 23). So, my 
initial though was to control for job opportunities, however, the existing data material is very limited and 
thus not suitable for this thesis.   
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4.2.3.2 Transnational 
As noted before ethnicities and cultural diversity does not necessarily operate across 
territorial borders, but along civilizational lines (Huntington, 1993; Krieger & 
Meierrieks, 2011). Thus, many ethnic groups may live within two or more nation-states 
(Ellingsen, 2000). This may elevate potential ethnic tensions to not only domestic 
conflict, but also transnational. An identity group that may be a minority in one state 
may have ethnic affinities in another state, which may utilize terrorism against a 
majority or a competing group.    
Another aspect, which also can be seen through the glasses of identity and cultural 
conflict, is the ‘Westernization’ of the world. Barber (1992) describes the globalization 
process as a “Jihad versus McWorld”. Here, he draws a picture of a world where the 
“forces of Jihad and the forces of McWorld operate with equal strength in opposite 
directions”. So, the new transnational terrorism occurs as a defensive, reactionary 
backlash against pressure from globalization, both in economic and cultural terms (Lia & 
Skjølberg, 2004). In combination with Huntington’s ‘clash of the civilizations’, one could 
rationalize that terrorist groupings on both sides will seek the opportunity to benefit 
from the ethnic tension in their recruitment work and legitimate their war.  
HD5: Countries with higher rates of ethnic fractionalization will experience 
higher rates and a higher probability of transnational terrorism. 
4.3 Summary of Arguments and Hypotheses 
Figure 4 and 5, displays the societal determinants of domestic and transnational 
terrorism separated. First, we see that there are more arrows leading to domestic 
terrorism than there are arrows leading to transnational terrorism. One explanation for 
this may be that the research on terrorism has explained the occurrence of domestic 
terrorism, while they have used transnational data in their analysis. Thus, it is easier to 
explain the causal mechanisms leading to domestic terrorism than the mechanisms 
leading to transnational. Second, it seems that the theory of relative deprivation and 
opportunity are both significant theories in explaining the occurrence of domestic 
terrorism, while for transnational terrorism it seems that opportunity have more 
explanatory power. Transnational terrorism may be more associated with larger costs 
for the terrorists than domestic terrorism. Transnational terrorism may demand more 
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resources and planning than domestic terrorism, thus the terrorists need to operate in a 
cost-benefit calculus in a larger degree than with domestic terrorism.  
As shown in figure 4, all the economic factors that are thought to influence domestic 
terrorism, namely GDP per capita, inequality, and economic growth, is explained by both 
frustration and opportunity. Thus, these determinants may cause frustration and 
aggression, and create windows of opportunity to initiate a domestic terrorist act. The 
same can be said about regime type. As shown earlier, domestic terrorism may be more 
frequent in semi-democratic regimes since the state cannot utilize adequate counter-
terrorist measures, thus lowering the cost of political violence and terrorism. In 
addition, frustration may arise since semi-democratic states do not offer good channels 
for the citizens to express their opinion. Regime instability may lower the cost of 
domestic terrorism since instable states create vacuums in which dissident groups may 
use to push their agendas. This explains the blue arrow going from regime stability to 
opportunity. As noted before, the socio-cultural factors a colored green. Population 
growth may generate frustration among the citizens due to demographic strain like food 
shortage and environmental scarcities.     
The arrow from urbanization to frustration is explained by the increased demands from 
the urban civilization that the state may not be able to satisfy. Moreover, urbanization 
may increase the number of accessible targets and methods for the terrorists, thus 
creating greater opportunity to act. An arrow is also drawn from education to 
opportunity. This is explained by the terrorist’s eagerness to recruit individuals with 
higher education. Higher educated terrorist leaders and soldier may increase the 
probability for the terrorist operation to succeed. Lastly, two arrows are drawn from 
ethnic fractionalization, namely to opportunity and identity. Since it may be easier, and 
thus less costly, for terrorist organizations to muster support and gain support against 
antagonistic ethnic groupings, one arrow is drawn from, ethnic fractionalization and 
opportunity. This aspect also relates to identity, in that strong ethnic groupings may 
create an ‘us versus them’ mentality against other groups.  
As displayed in figure 5, there are fewer causal mechanisms leading to transnational 
terrorism, compared to domestic terrorism. The reason for this may be due to the fact 
that the research on terrorism has explained domestic terrorism while tested for 
transnational terrorism. Thus, it is easier to find plausible causal chains explaining why 
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terrorist groups would want to attack domestic targets. Another interesting point is that 
the majority of arrows displayed in figure 5, leads to the theory of opportunity, while 
only trade openness may be argued to influence frustration. The reason may be that 
transnational operations are more costly and demands more resources than domestic 
operations. Thus, these attacks are more planned in a cost-benefit calculus, than just an 
act motivated by pure frustration. Another reason may be that, in regard to 
transnational attacks, the theory of frustration demands a more dyadic research design, 
where, for instance, groups from poor states targets rich states.   
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Figure 4: Societal determinants of domestic terrorism 
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Figure 5: Societal determinants of transnational terrorism. 
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Table 3:  Summary of hypotheses. 
Domestic Terrorism Transnational Terrorism 
Economic Factors Economic Factors 
HD1: Countries with lower rates of GDP per 
capita will experience higher rates and a 
higher probability of domestic terrorism. 
HT1: Countries with higher rates of GDP per 
capita will experience higher rates and a higher 
probability of transnational terrorism.  
HD1alt: Countries with higher rates of GDP per 
capita will experience higher rates and a 
higher probability of domestic terrorism. 
HT2: Countries with higher levels of trade 
openness will experience higher rates and a 
higher probability of transnational terrorism. 
HD2: Countries with higher rates of economic 
inequality will experience higher rates and a 
higher probability of domestic terrorism. 
 
HD3: Countries with higher rates of economic 
growth will experience higher rates and a 
higher probability of domestic terrorism.  
  
   
Political Factors Political Factors 
HD4: Semi-democratic countries will 
experience higher rates and a higher 
probability of domestic terrorism.  
HT3: Countries with higher levels of democracy 
will experience higher rates and a higher 
probability of transnational terrorism.  
HD5: Countries with higher rates of regime 
stability will experience lower rates and a 
lower probability of domestic terrorism.  
HT4: Countries with higher rates of regime 
stability will experience lower rates and a lower 
probability of transnational terrorism.  
   
Socio-Cultural Factors Socio-Cultural Factors 
HD6: Countries with higher rates of 
population growth will experience higher 
rates and a higher probability of domestic 
terrorism.  
HT5: Countries with higher levels of ethnic 
fractionalization will experience higher rates 
and a higher probability of transnational 
terrorism.  
HD7: Countries with higher rates of 
urbanization will experience higher rates and 
a higher probability of domestic terrorism.  
  
HD8: Countries with higher levels of education 
will experience higher rates and a higher 
probability of domestic terrorism.  
  
HD9: Countries with higher levels of ethnic 
fractionalization will experience higher rates 
and a higher probability of domestic terrorism.  
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5 Research Design and Data 
This section will provide for the research strategy, design, and data material. First, it will 
briefly discuss the research strategy and design. The strategy is the basic choice between 
the quantitative or the qualitative approach. Once this is set, a research design needs to 
be formulated. Then, the data used in this thesis will be presented, as well as other data 
that are being used in the research on terrorism. Here, the dependent variable will be 
presented in addition to the explanatory and control variables that are being included in 
the analysis. Lastly, the two statistical methods that will be used in this thesis will be 
discussed. These are namely: the zero-inflated negative binomial regression and logistic 
regression.     
5.1 Strategy and Design 
In social science, there are mainly two branches of research strategies, namely the 
quantitative and the qualitative strategy. There are several differences between these 
two strategies, and which one of these is chosen needs to be decided by the research 
question. According to Ringdal (2007, p. 91), a quantitative strategy is often guided by 
theory and a deductive approach. This means that the scientist deduce different 
hypotheses from relevant theoretical perspectives. Variables are then used as 
measurements of the different theoretical aspects. In contrast, the qualitative strategy is 
often inductive. Here, the scientist often goes to the informant first, and then tries to 
apply theoretical explanations to explain the informants actions or thoughts.  
In this thesis, I am going to look at the societal explanations of domestic and 
transnational terrorism, by comparing the number of domestic and transnational 
terrorist incidents in a country per year. The chosen strategy is thus quantitative, since 
my approach is to find theoretical causal mechanisms and test these by using a statistic 
approach.  
A design is the researcher’s plan or outline for how he or she are going to conduct the 
study (Ringdal, 2007, p. 93). This study conducts a longitudinal approach, where the 
number of domestic and transnational events in a country has been measured each year 
from 1970 to 2007. Time-series studies and longitudinal are similar, however, according 
to Chuck Huber, time-series data “arise from the collection of many data points over 
time from a single source” (2013). While longitudinal data follows one or more 
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analytical unit over time (Ringdal, 2007), As this thesis includes data from 177 
countries, a longitudinal is suitable. 
5.2 Data 
5.2.1 Other Datasets 
As discussed earlier, the research on domestic terrorism has been overshadowed by the 
fixation on transnational terrorism. This is mainly due to the lack of adequate data 
material on domestic events.  The studies on terrorism have in a large degree, since the 
late 1960’s, depended on the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events 
(ITERATE) and data from the National Institute of the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) 
(Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock, & Flemming, 2010).9 Currently, ITERATE covers 
transnational terrorist incidents from 1968 to 2009, and gathers its information from 
different sources, including the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters 
tickers, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, and major US 
newspapers (Sandler & Enders, 2004).  
Data sets covering domestic incidents have been, until recently, very limited. For 
instance, MIPT only started to record domestic incidents in 1998 (Enders, et al., 2011). 
Blomberg and Hess (2008a) applies the RAND data in their analysis. However, it has a 
very limited time span, covering incidents from 1998 through 2003. Moreover, Jan 
Oskar Engene’s data set, Terrorism in Western Europe: Event Data (TWEED), covers 
internal terrorism for eighteen West European countries between 1950 through 2004 
(Engene, 2007). Likewise, Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca cover terrorism 
in Western Europe from 1965 through 2005 in The Domestic Terrorism Victims (DTV) 
dataset (Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2011). However, as discussed before, both TWEED and 
DTV data define domestic incidents only by the nationality of the attacker and the 
country in which the attack occurs, and not by the nationality of the victim. In addition, 
the DTV data uses fatality as the unit of observation, and not the numbers of attacks 
(Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2011).   
                                                         
9 As displayed in the overviews in table A1 and table A2 in appendix A, out of twenty-three studies on 
transnational terrorism, fourteen have applied the ITERATE data and eight the MIPT data.  
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5.2.2 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
This thesis seeks to compare the societal explanations of domestic terrorism and 
transnational terrorism. Up until recently this has not been possible, or it has only been 
possible through a very limited data material. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD), is 
the first worldwide data set to comprise both domestic and transnational terrorism over 
time, and is maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) (Enders, et al., 2011; START, 2010). The GTD draws its 
information entirely form publicly available, open-source materials, including electronic 
news archives, existing data sets, books, journals, and legal documents (START, 2012).    
However, the GTD  does not distinguish domestic incidents from transnational incidents 
per se (Enders, et al., 2011).  Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011) derive their event 
counts of domestic and transnational incidents by undertaking several steps. They start 
by purging the 85,536 terrorist events counted in the GTD for 1970 to 2007. By cleaning 
and eliminating events that are considered doubtful or mischaracterized, they are left 
with 66,383 events, eliminating approximately 16,000 incidents. The remaining 66,383 
events undergo a five-step procedure in which they are classified as either domestic or 
transnational. Furthermore, this separation is aided by comparing and contrasting the 
transnational GTD events with ITERATE. After a procedure of comparing terrorist 
incidents with the ITERATE, they land on 12,862 transnational events, and 46,413 
domestic incidents.10   
The GTD has, however, some idiosyncrasies. First of all, the dataset consists of two 
coding phases. The first phase of data was collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence 
Service (PGIS) from the years 1970 to 1997, and cases that occurred between 1998 and 
2007 were identified and coded by the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies 
(CETIS), in partnership with START (START, 2012). The coding conventions, however, 
used for 1970 to 1997 do not match those used in the second phase since a broader-
based definition of terrorism was applied by PGIS (Enders, et al., 2011). However, no 
documentation is provided as to how this definition is broader. In addition, the data 
collection between 1970 and 1997 was done in real time, and retrospective between 
1998 and 2007 (START, 2012). In any case, a reasonably accurate count is produced as 
                                                         
10 The remaining is classified as ‘uncertain’, and counts 7,108 incidents. 
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Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011) assume that the domestic and transnational data 
are adjusted along the baseline of the ITERATE data. Another problem with this data is 
the absence of material from 1993. This data was lost during an office move and was 
never fully recovered. The survived data only accounts for 15 percent of the actual 
attacks  (START, 2010).  
Moreover, since both the GTD and ITERATE collect their counts from open sources, it 
may be reasonable to expect systematic reporting biases. For instance, terrorist 
incidents that are aimed at governments may be under-reported in countries where the 
media is controlled or weak relatively to those states with a strong media (Eyerman, 
1998).  
5.2.3 Sample 
This thesis is, as noted above, based on the calibrated data made by Enders, Sandler and 
Gaibulloev (2011). From the 12,862 transnational events and the 46,413 domestic 
events they have worked out, this thesis holds 10,605 transnational events and 46,001 
domestic events in the period from 1970 to 2007, for 177 countries. The reduction is 
mainly due to difficulties in adapting their raw-data material into an operationalized and 
functionally dataset. For instance, there were several small states included in the GTD 
data, which are not included in other data material like, for instance, the World Bank 
Indicators.   
Further, the raw-data does not separate between West-Germany and East-Germany in 
the period from 1970 to 1991. It is just labeled as Germany. This makes it difficult to 
merge this data with other data, and have thus been excluded. Finally, the GTD have 
systematically separated incidents happening in the West-Bank and Gaza Strip from 
Israel (START, 2011). Although, this is in my opinion an important distinction, it is not 
consistent with some other data sets; hence a few potential errors may come of this. All 
in all, however, the reduction is very limited from that of Enders, Sandler and 
Gaibulloev’s (2011) raw-data.11 And it will not hinder this thesis’ main quest, which is to 
compare the societal determinants of domestic and transnational terrorism.   
                                                         
11 In addition, the raw data was not presented in a country-year format.  
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5.3 Operationalization of Variables 
This section presents the different operationalizations of the variables that are believed 
measure the root causes of terrorism. An operationalization seeks to link empirical 
indicators to theoretical concepts (Ringdal, 2007, p. 467). Hence, in the following section 
an explanation on how I intend to quantifiable measure the theoretical foundations laid 
out earlier will be addressed. Both dependent variables, namely the counts of domestic 
and transnational terrorism, are derived from the calibrated GTD data presented by 
Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011). The independent variables and control variables 
are mainly derived from Krieger and Meierrieks’ (2011) overview of the empirical 
evidence on the determinants of terrorism. In addition, to the count variable, I have 
generated two dichotomy variables from the before mentioned count variables to 
address the probability of domestic and transnational terrorism.  
5.3.1 Dependent variables 
The data set presented by Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011) produces this thesis’ 
four dependent variables. These are, namely, the count of domestic and transnational 
terrorist incidents in country-year units for the period 1970 to 2007.  In addition, I have 
generated two dichotomy variables measuring whether or not a country experienced 
domestic or transnational terrorism in a given year.  
This thesis’ first dependent variable is the yearly count of domestic terror events in a 
country from 1970 to 2007. As shown in figure 6 the count increases significantly from 
the mid 1980’s to the beginning years of the 1990’s. The event count peaks in 1992, 
which holds 3,220 events, while the year that holds the fewest counts is 1972 with 56 
events. Hence, during a period of 20 years, domestic terrorism increased with 3,165 
incidents per year.   
The second dependent variable is the country-year count of transnational terrorism 
from 1970 to 2007. As shown in figure 7, there is a significantly increase in counts from 
the early years of the 1970’s to 1979. However, unlike the domestic terrorism count, 
there is a decline in the yearly events in the 1980’s, followed by a rapid increase around 
1990. The yearly number of transnational terrorist events peaks in 1991 with nearly 
800 events.  
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Figure 6: Number of domestic terror events. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Number of transnational terror events 
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The immediate difference between the two dependent variables is, as noted earlier, the 
vast difference in the yearly count. While the amount of incidents is fairly equal along 
both types in the early seventies, the amount of domestic terrorist events increases 
rapidly towards the 1980s. According to Rapoport (2004) the late seventies saw the 
emergent of the ‘religious wave’ of terrorism, with Islam at the heart of it, causing some 
of the most “significant, deadly, and profoundly international attacks”. Combined with 
the politically charged ‘new left’ wave of terrorism, this may explain the rapid increase 
for both domestic and transnational events. Interestingly, the amount of domestic 
incidents increases during the 1980s, while there is a decline for transnational events. 
As will be further addressed later, this may be related to events in Latin America. 
According to Feldmann and Perälä (2004) many countries in Latin America ”that 
regained democracy in the early 1980s had to confront new opposition organizations”. 
The amount of terrorist events peaks in the early nineties for both types of terrorism. 
This may be explained by noteworthy events like the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1990; 
the start of the Gulf War in 1991; the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact in 1991; the 
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991; and the creation of a single European market in 
1993 (Enders & Sandler, 2002). For both domestic and transnational terrorism, there is 
a steadily increase in events from the beginning of the 2000s. Torbjørn Kveberg (2012) 
finds in his master’s thesis, a steady rise of exclusively religious incidents each year up 
until 2010.  
Table A3 in appendix A (chapter 9.2) displays an overview of every country included in 
this study, in addition to the rate of domestic and transnational terrorism they have 
experienced. Table 4 displays the seven countries that have experienced the highest rate 
of domestic and transnational terrorism. First of all, the difference between the rates of 
domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism is evident. Peru has almost experienced 
five times more domestic terrorism than the country that has experienced the most 
transnational terrorism. Secondly, it is very interesting that only two countries, 
Colombia and Spain, appear on both lists. This suggests that being tormented by 
domestic terrorism does not necessarily increase the rates transnational terrorism.  
A third point is that, for domestic terrorism four of the seven countries is located in 
Latin America, while for transnational terrorism, only Colombia is. Colombia has also the 
highest rate of transnational terrorism. Terrorism in Latin America is in a large degree 
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associated with left wing ideologies and drug trafficking. According to Dennis, political 
violence has tormented the past two centuries of Colombian history, but this reached 
unprecedented levels after the outbreak of La Violencia in 1948 (2006, p. 91). Later 
guerilla and terrorist groups such as FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de 
Colombia) was established. Although formed as the military wing of the Colombian 
Communist Party, they have today ties to drug trafficking and actively targets foreign 
and domestic individuals (NCTC, 2012). In Peru the Shining Path has hundreds of 
combatants, and is also involved with drug trafficking (Sullivan, 2008). Indeed, the 
larger part of the domestic terrorist incidents in Peru happened during the 1980’s and 
early 1990’s. This is clearly linked to the progress of the Shining Path. In the words of 
Starn, Robin, and Degregori (2005, p. 319): 
On May 18, 1980, Peru held elections for a civilian president after twelve years of 
military rule. Few paid much attention to reports that, just the day before, five 
masked members of the Communist Party of Peru– Shining Path had burned ballots 
in the Ayacucho village of Chuschi. But Chuschi was the opening salvo in a 
revolutionary assault on the Peruvian state. As it continued into the 1990s, the 
Shining Path became the largest insurgency on Peruvian soil since Túpac Amaru’s 
rebellion two centuries before and one of the most violent in late-twentieth-century 
Latin America. 
Interestingly, only Colombia and Spain occur on both lists. In Spain the ETA is by far the 
most important terrorist organization, if not in Europe (Barros, 2003). ETA has not only 
committed numerous attacks on Spanish citizens, but have has also targeted journalists 
and tourists areas, which may explain the high rates of transnational incidents 
accounted to Spain (Office for Counterterrorism, 2012). With the terrible civil war onset 
and the breakdown of state institutions, Lebanon got sucked in a regional conflict that 
included their neighbors Israel and Syria, along with Iraq, Iran, and Libya; the United 
States and France; as well as the Soviet Union (J. Marshall, 2012, p. 1). This may explain 
Lebanon’s high rate of transnational incidents.  
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Table 4: The seven countries with most terrorist incidents 
The seven countries with highest rate of 
domestic terrorism. 
The seven countries with highest rate of 
transnational terrorism. 
Country Domestic Incidents Country Transnational Incidents 
    Peru 4,648 Colombia 962 
Colombia 4,218 Lebanon 598 
El Salvador 3,045 Spain 431 
India 2,944 Germany12 405 
Spain 2,095 Iraq 392 
Chile 1,774 Italy 383 
Turkey 1,651 France 335 
Total 20,375 Total 3,506 
 
As noted above, in addition to analyzing if certain societal traits of a country may explain 
the rates of the two types of terrorism, a regular logistic regression analysis to account 
for the probability of experiencing terrorism will be run. Therefore, I have created two 
dichotomy variables. In the first variable I have plotted 1 if the country experienced 
domestic terrorism that year or 0 if it did not experience domestic terrorism. And in the 
second variable the country-year have been give 1 if it experienced transnational 
terrorism that year or 0 if it did not. Of all the 177 countries that are included in the 
analysis 161 have experienced at least one incident of domestic terrorism, while 148 
countries have experienced transnational terrorism. Independent Variables 
The theory chapter outlined in what way economic, political, and social factors could 
trigger both domestic and transnational terrorism. By certain traits, societal factors may 
lead to frustration among citizens, create opportunities to act, or make certain identity 
factors more salient. As seen in appendix A (chapter 9.2), there is a vast amount of 
different theories and causal mechanisms that are argued to play a factor in the genesis 
of terrorism as well as increasing the rate and probability of being a target of foreign 
attacks. In this thesis, I have used, as a point of departure, the overview of the 
determinants of terrorism made by Krieger and Meierrieks (2011).  
                                                         
12 The data has not distinguished between West Germany and East Germany.  
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5.3.2 Economic variables 
In accordance with the empirical foundation laid out in this thesis, I present the 
following operationalization of the economic variables.   
5.3.2.1 Poverty and Wealth 
One variable that have been widely used to measure poverty is a country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (e.g.: Findley & Young, 2011; Krueger & Laitin, 2008; 
Tavares, 2004). This variable is derived from The World Development Indicators (WDI), 
published by the World Bank (2013), and indicates a country’s GDP in constant U.S. 
2000 dollars. This variable is calculated annually and covers every year of this thesis’ 
sample. Due to a possible decreasing return to scale, I use a log transformed version in 
the analysis.13 In addition, this variable has been lagged one year. Countries associated 
with low rates of GDP per capita are mostly found in Africa, like Liberia, Congo Kinshasa, 
and Burundi. As seen in the overview in table A3 in appendix A, they are however not 
associated with very high rates of either domestic or transnational terrorism.  
5.3.2.2 Economic Inequality 
As noted earlier, terrorism may arise in countries tormented by economic inequalities. 
Frustration may arise if there is a discrepancy between what individuals think they 
deserve in the economic distribution process and what they actually receive, while 
radical groups may exploit economic inequalities to muster support and recruits.  
A widely used measure of economic inequality is the GINI index. The GINI index 
measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure 
among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution (WorldBank, 2013). The index of 0 represents perfect equality, while and 
index of 100 implies perfect inequality. Thus, in the case of domestic terrorism, I would 
expect a positive direction. In addition, this variable is lagged one year.  
The GINI index is, however, not perfect. It is severely characterized by the lack of 
coverage for many years and countries. To account for this I have combined the index 
derived from the World Bank data (2013) and the UNU-Wider World Income Inequality 
Database presented by the World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-
                                                         
13 For instance, the leap from 10,000 to 20,000 is more than the leap from 10 to 20.  
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WIDER, 2008). Although, this combination improves the quality of this variable in a very 
large degree, it is still not perfect.   
5.3.2.3 Economic Growth 
As noted earlier, it is expected to be a connection between a state’s economic growth 
process and domestic terrorism. This is usually measured by a GDP per capita growth 
index, which I have drawn from the World Development indicators (WorldBank, 2013). 
This variable measures continually the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at marked 
prices based on constant local currency, and is aggregated on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. 
This variable is also lagged one year.  
5.3.2.4 Trade Openness 
The first aspect that is believed to only matter for transnational terrorism is a country’s 
level of trade openness. Economically integrated states may be more prone to 
experience transnational terrorism as a reaction by groups to counter foreign 
dominance. One could hypothesize that these groups grow from states that are falling 
behind in the global market, but this requires a dyadic research design.  
To measure a countries level of economic integration, a country’s level of trade openness 
is used. This variable is drawn from the World Development Indicators (WorldBank, 
2013), and is the logged “sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as 
a share of gross domestic product”. In addition, this variable is lagged one year.  
5.3.3 Political variables 
5.3.3.1 Regime Type 
As noted earlier, it is an ongoing dispute in the terrorism research whether a certain 
regime type is more prone to experience terrorism. In the debate between political 
access school and the strategic school, there is still no consensus whether democratic 
states are more prone to experience domestic terrorism that autocratic states. As 
discussed above, I expect that being a semi-democratic state increases the rate and 
probability of experiencing domestic terrorism, and that democratic states are more 
exposed to transnational terrorism. As displayed in the overview in table A3 in appendix 
A, it is difficult to assess this. For instance, both China and Cuba, two countries that are 
associated with higher rates of autocracy, have not experienced a lot of terrorism 
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despite their high levels of population.14 Still, Mexico, during their period of 
democratization in the 1990’s, experienced a boost in domestic terrorism. From 1994 
through 1997, Mexico experienced 134 domestic terrorist incidents. As seen in the 
overview in table A3 in appendix A, this accounts for over half of the total amount (228 
counts) of domestic incidents counted in Mexico from 1970 through 2007.  
A common and widely used measure of democracy, is the Polity IV project presented by 
Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr (2011). The polity project measures and computes a 
country’s level of aggregated democracy and autocracy by certain composite indices and 
characteristic. These proxies are: executive recruitment; the independence of executive 
authority; and political competition and opposition. The Polity IV have variables that 
includes a country’s degree of democracy, which is scored along an eleven point scale 
were 10 is strongly democratic. Likewise, autocratic is measured along an eleven point 
scale were 10 is strongly autocratic. From this, they have made a combined scale called 
Polity2. This is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score; 
resulting in a unified scale that ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly 
autocratic).  
Figure 8: Quadratic prediction plot of democracy and domestic terror events 
 
                                                         
14 China has experienced 92 domestic events and 23 transnational events, while Cuba has experience 16 
domestic events and 7 transnational.  
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Figure 8 displays the possibility of a curvilinear relationship between the degree of 
democracy and the rate of domestic terrorism.15 As seen, there is reason to believe that 
there is an inverted U-curve. Thus, the analysis will also include a squared term of the 
Polity2 variable.16 These variables are both lagged one year.  
5.3.3.2 Regime Stability  
A sizable number of scientists find that regime age is a negative predictor of terrorism 
(Eyerman, 1998; Koch & Cranmer, 2007; Piazza, 2011). Thus, it is believed that 
established regimes are less likely to experience both domestic and transnational 
terrorism than relatively new regimes.  
To measure this, I use the duration variable from the polity data. This variable measures 
continually the number of years since the most recent regime change, or the year of 
independence (M. G. Marshall, et al., 2011). Thus, a country will be given the baseline of 
0 (year zero) and one value added in the subsequent year until a new regime change or 
transition period occurs. This variable is lagged one year. 
5.3.4 Socio-cultural variables 
5.3.4.1 Population Growth 
As shown earlier, there is reason to believe that a rapid growth in population may 
increase the risk of domestic terrorism. Following Homer-Dixon (1994), frustration may 
arise as a consequence of shortage of water, forest and fertile land. To account for this, I 
include a lagged measure of population growth from the World Bank Indicators  
(WorldBank, 2013). Population growth is the annual percent of the exponential rate of 
growth of midyear population from year -1 to t. 
5.3.4.2 Urbanization 
As suggested by Crenshaw (1981), a high rate of urban population may increase the rate 
and probability of terrorism. As discussed before, this may be explained both from a 
frustration-aggression perspective and from an opportunity perspective. To test this, I 
include a lagged measure of the urban population inhabiting a country. This variable is 
                                                         
15 I have also created a quadratic prediction plot of democracy and transnational terrorism. This figure 
shows a steadier incline and is included in figure B1 in appendix B.  
16 I did assess using a dummy variable to measure semi-democratic states. I found, however, that using a 
squared term was the most appropriate for this thesis. This is also done by Hegre, et al.(2001)  
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also derived from the World Bank data (2013). Urban population is drawn from the 
percentage of a county’s total population.  
5.3.4.3 Education 
To test whether higher education increases the rate and probability of experiencing 
domestic terrorism I use a lagged state’s net enrollment rate of secondary school, drawn 
from World Bank (2013). The problem, however, is that this variable is very poor and 
lacks a huge amount of observations. Thus, in the analysis I will proceed with caution.    
5.3.4.4 Ethnic Fractionalization 
As discussed earlier, it is expected that the rate and probability of experiencing both 
domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism increases in ethnic fragmented and 
fractionalized states. This may be explained by a severe group identity friction, creating 
opposing groups. This may not only be a domestic phenomenon since ethnic groups may 
operate across civilizational lines instead of territorial borders (Ellingsen, 2000; 
Huntington, 1993).  
To test for this an updated measure of a country’s ethnic fractionalization, taken from 
Ellingsen (2000) is included.17 This variable measures the probability of two random 
individuals belongs to different ethnic groups. Thus, a value of 1 indicates a perfect 
heterogeneous country and 0 a perfect homogenous country. Examples of the latter are 
countries like North Korea and Iceland, while examples of highly fractionalized 
countries are Uganda and Kenya.18  Ellingsen (2000) have based this variable on three 
different sources, namely The Handbook of Nations, Britannica Book of the Year, and 
Demographic Yearbook. This variable is lagged one year.  
5.4 Control Variables 
In this thesis I have chosen two control variables. What makes this thesis special is that 
it consists of many independent variables. Since the aim of this thesis is to compare two 
dependent variables along different environmental characteristics, it is difficult to 
develop a solid set of variables to control for the effects of the independent variables. I 
any case, I have decided to use two measures that are argued to be solid indicators of a 
                                                         
17 This data is updated to the year 2012. 
18 Uganda has the highest level of ethnic fractionalization is this analysis with a level of 0.872, while Kenya 
has a level of 0.864.  
59 
 
country’s societal characteristic, and are widely used as explanations of terrorism. These 
are, namely, population and country size.      
5.4.1 Population Size and Country Size 
The first control variable is the population size of a country. Since the difference 
between 2 and 3 million inhabitants may be more substantial than 152 and 153 million, 
I have log transformed this variable. Population size is taken from the World Bank Data 
(2013) and is lagged one year.   
Population size is probably the most consistent finding in the research on terrorism 
(Burgoon, 2006; Dreher & Gassebner, 2008; Findley & Young, 2011). More people mean 
more accessible targets and potential recruits for the terrorists. In addition, as pointed 
out by Eyerman (1998), more people means more demands placed upon the 
government than in less populous states. Thus, I expect that a more population increases 
the rate and the probability of experiencing terrorism, both domestic and transnational.  
Eyerman (1998) further argues that in smaller states the government should be more 
able to monitor their population than large states. In addition, large areas may make it 
easier for dissident groups to find safe havens with difficult access (Abadie, 2006). This 
may suggest that larger areas increase the rate and probability of experiencing domestic 
terrorism. However, as Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009) points out, terrorists 
must remain underground. In large areas they may develop to become guerillas instead 
of terrorists. From the overview in table A3 in appendix A, country size is not necessarily 
linked to higher rates of terrorism. For instance, while both Russia and the United States 
have experience higher rates of attacks, China has been fairly spared. To account for this 
I thus include a log transformed measure of a country’s square kilometer.  
5.5 Statistical Dependency 
In the research on terrorism it is both intuitive to believe, and empirically found (see 
Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011) that there is temporal contagion. Past terrorism breads 
new terrorism. In regression analysis one of the assumptions is that “the usual standard 
errors, tests, and confidence intervals assume no correlation among errors” (Hamilton, 
1992, p. 51). When using cross-section time-series data to analyze the probability of 
terrorism occurring, it is unlikely that units are statistically unrelated over time. Beck, 
Katz and Tucker (1998) suggests adding a temporal dummy variable measuring time 
since last observation (in this case, time since last terror incident) and splines to the 
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logistic regression. The splines give a smoothed version of the hazard information (risk 
of terrorism) captured in the temporal dummy.  
5.6 Quality of Data 
As noted before, the GTD data have some problems in regards to the two separated 
coding phases. The fact that the coding conventions that were used for 1970 to 1997 do 
not match the years of 1998 to 2007, is not optimal. However, I do not see that this will 
reduce the quality of the findings in this thesis. First, this thesis’ approach is 
longitudinal. This means that it uses data of every year from 1970 through 2007. If the 
research question had suggested a cross-sectional design, the problem would have been 
potential bigger. Secondly, the ITERATE have used a consistent coding method over the 
entire period (Enders, et al., 2011). This way, the potential differences may have been 
reduces in the calibration process between the GTD and ITERATE. Third, and finally, the 
fact that a large amount of data for 1993 is missing, may be a potential problem. 
However, since this is the case for both domestic and transnational terrorism, I will 
argue that this does not reduce the quality of the empirical results.  
The Polity2 data have come under some criticism. Munck and Verkuilen  (2002) argue 
that one “particularly grave problem for the Polity index” is the omission of 
‘participation. Alternatively, it could have been possible to include Freedom House’s 
measure of political rights and civil liberties or Vanhanen’s measure of democracy. 
Finally, as noted earlier, the GINI index drawn from the World Development Indicators 
(WorldBank, 2013), lacks a vast amount of observations. Although, I have merged this 
the income inequality data from the UNU-Wider World Income Inequality Database 
(UNU-WIDER, 2008), it is far away from optimal. This diminishes the explanatory power 
of this variable in a large degree.   
5.7 Statistical Methods  
As noted previously, two types of statistical methods are applied namely, zero-inflated 
negative binomial regression and logistic regression. While the zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression is being applied to the count variable to test whether certain 
societal characteristics may explain the rate of terrorism, the logistic regression is being 
applied to test whether these characteristics may increase or decrease the probability of 
experiencing terrorism.    
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5.7.1 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression: A Count Data Approach 
The main purpose of my statistical model is to account for differences and similarities 
between the two dependent count variables namely, the number of domestic terror 
events and the number of transnational events. Since both these variables measure the 
number of events that occurred in a country in a given year, the values are discrete and 
non-negative (King, 1989). Scientists from various disciplines have often relied on 
regular linear regression when dealing with count outcomes, however, according to 
Long and Freese this can result in “inefficient, inconsistent, and biased estimates” (2006, 
p. 349).  
For count variables, Poisson regression provides the most basic model. Here, a Poisson 
distribution determines the probability of a count (one terrorist incident in this case).19 
This model, however, rarely fits due to overdispersion. This means that it does not allow 
the conditional variance to be greater than the conditional mean (Long & Freese, 2006, 
p. 372). As for this thesis’ two dependent variables the conditional variance is vastly 
greater than the conditional mean, thus indicating a potential overdispersion.20 This 
makes either the negative binomial regression model or the zero-inflated negative 
regression model more applicable since they allow the variance to exceed the mean.  
Figure 9 and 10 shows that zero is the most common count in both variables. What 
speaks in favor of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression is that it accounts for 
excessive zeros. According to Long and Freese (2006, p. 394) the zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression allows for zeros to be generated by two distinct processes. In the 
first process, an outcome of 0 occurs with a probability of 1 in an always zero group, and 
in the second, not always zero group, an outcome of 0 occurs, but there is still a nonzero 
probability that there is a positive count. This means that certain country-year cases are 
never likely to experience terrorism, while other cases are likely to experience terrorism 
while still experiencing some periods without it (Findley & Young, 2011). Moreover, test 
statistics aimed at providing guidance in deciding between negative binomial regression 
and zero-inflated negative binomial regression recommend using a zero-inflated 
                                                         
19 In a Poisson distribution, the relationship between the expected count, µ, and the probability of 
observing any observed count, y, is shown as: Pr (y|µ) = e-µµy/y!, for  y = 0, 1, 2 … (Long and Freese 2006, p. 
349).  
20 For the country-year count of domestic incidents the mean is approximately 6 and the variance 932, 
while the transnational count shows a mean of 1 and a variance of 47.  
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technique.21 Thus, what we end up with is two models. The first model is a count model 
presenting result equivalent to the negative binomial regression model. The second 
model is an inflated model and accounts for excessive zeroes in the analysis.  
Figure 9: Country-level distribution of domestic events. 
 
 
Figure 10: Country-level distribution of transnational events 
   
                                                         
21 I have applied BIC, AIC, and Vuong statistics to determine whether or not to use the zero-inflated 
negative binomial method. See figure D1 and table D2 in  appendix D. 
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5.7.2 Logistic Regression: A probability approach 
Logistic regression is a widely applied approach when dealing with dichotomous 
variables (Hamilton, 1992). Therefore I have recoded both count variables measuring 
the number of terrorist events occurring in one country in a certain year, to measure if a 
country experienced terrorism. This makes me able to analyze the probability of a 
country experiencing either domestic or transnational terrorism, where a terrorist event 
is coded as 1 if a country experienced terrorism that year, and 0 if a country did not 
experience terrorism. Logistic regression is defined as: 
     ( )  
 
    (        )
  
Where P(Y) is the probability of Y occurring, King and Zeng (2001) suggests applying 
rare event logistic regression when dealing with excessive zeros since regular logistic 
regression may result in biased results. This, however, is suggested for small samples 
(under about 200), in which this thesis’ sample is not. Therefore I am applying regular 
logistic regression.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
5.8 Data Summary 
Table 5 displays this thesis’ descriptive statistics. As shown, there are four dependent 
variables, two count variables and two dichotomy variables. Every independent variable 
is lagged one period, and is measured as continually variables. As noted, the GINI index 
lacks a vast amount of observations, which may become potentially difficult in the 
analysis.   
Table 5: Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Domestric Incidents 6,046 7.609  33.920  0  673  
Transnational Incidents 6,046 1.754  6.339  0  135  
Domestic Dichotomy 6,046 0.331 0.471 0 1 
Transnational Dichotomy 6,046 0.305 0.451 0 1 
Economic Variables 
     Log GDP per Capita 5,407 7.500 1.576  4.057  10.891  
GINI Index 1,810 38.617  10.981  12.1  76.6  
GDP per Capita Growth 5,353 1.847  6.662  -50.290  147.549  
Log Trade Openness 5,187 4.147  0.630  -1.175  6.084  
Political Variables 
     Polity2 5,241 0.459  7.492  -10  10  
Polity2 Squared 5,241 56.329  31.957  0  100  
Regime Durability 5,464 22.436  28.542  0  198  
Socio-Cultural Variables 
    Population Growth 5,863 1.893  1.598  -10.955  17.535  
Urbanization 5,654 49.324  24.506  2.382  100  
School Enrollment 4,065 56.798  34.085  0  162.349  
Ethnic Fractionalization 4,696 0.324  0.256  0  0.873  
Control Variables 
     Log Population 6,046 15.604  1.864  9.859  21.001  
Log Country Size 5,801 11.896  2.132  5.768  16.612  
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6 Empirical analysis 
This chapter performs the empirical analysis based on the theoretical foundation put 
forward earlier. In order to properly test for both the rate of terrorism and the 
probability of experiencing an attack, I intend to run two different analyses. First, to 
account for the rate of terrorism, the discrete count variable counting the number of 
times a country in a given year experienced either a domestic or a transnational 
terrorist attack is utilized. To test for this, as noted before in chapter 5, zero-inflated 
negative binomial regression is applied. The zero-inflated negative binomial regression 
analysis reports two distinct sets of models in each table. First, it produces the negative 
binomial regression model, referred to as the count or non-certain-zero model. This 
model can be interpreted as an increasing in the number of events with an increasing or 
decreasing in the rate of the explanatory variable. The second model reports the inflated 
model. This reports the probability of a country being a certain zero or not. In addition, 
to test if certain societal factors may influence the probability of experiencing either 
domestic or transnational terrorism, logistic models are also run. Thus, this empirical 
analysis makes it possible to both answers whether certain country characteristics may 
influence the rate of terrorism and the probability of experiencing an event.  
6.1 Domestic terrorism 
As noted above, this section provides the empirical analysis of the rates and probability 
of domestic terrorism. First, I will provide a separate test for the economic, political, and 
socio-cultural factors that have been argued to influence domestic terrorism. Second, 
this will lead up to a final model where all variables are included.  
6.1.1 Zero-inflated negative binomial models 
Table 6 displays a zero-inflated negative binomial regression analysis where the 
economic factors that are hypothesized to influence the rate of domestic terrorism are 
included.22  In model 1 and 4, GDP PER CAPITA is included along with the control 
                                                         
22 An ongoing debate is surrounding whether or not to include all variables in the inflated section of the 
zero-inflated negative binomial regression model. Drakos and Gofas (2006) argue that only factors 
associated with regime type should be included in the inflated section. This is due to potential under-
reporting biases caused by, for instance, limited press freedom. I have, however, chosen to include all 
variables in the inflated section, which is also done by Piazza (2011). Appendix D table D1 provides a 
comparison between models with all factors included in the inflated section, and models with only the 
variable measuring DEMOCRACY is included.  
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variables.23 As shown GDP PER CAPITA is not a significant predictor of the rates of 
domestic terrorism in either model 1 or 4. In the inflated model, GDP PER CAPITA is 
significant and negative when it is included with all the other economic predictors 
(model 4). This may suggest that when all other variables are being held constant, the 
log odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by 0.387 for every additional point 
on the GDP PER CAPITA scale. In other words, the larger the GDP PER CAPITA the less 
likely it is that the zero would be due to not experiencing domestic terrorism. Thus, the 
larger the GDP PER CAPITA, the more likely the country is of experiencing at least one 
event of domestic terrorism. This, will however, be further addressed in the logistic 
analysis. In model 2, the GINI INDEX is included to measure a country’s level of 
economic inequality. Unfortunately, the variable is very poor with only 1,773 
observations. Still, this variable shows, in the count model, to be significant on the 
p<0.001 level and positive. In model 3, GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH is included. As 
shown, this variable is a significant and negative predictor of the rate of domestic 
terrorism, when all other variables are held constant. This is interesting since it disputes 
the suggested hypothesis that higher rates of economic growth increase the rate of 
domestic terrorism. In addition, in the inflated model, in model 4, the variable becomes 
significant on the p<0.05 level when POPULATION, COUNTRY SIZE, and GDP PER 
CAPITA is accounted for and held constant. This suggests that, not only do GDP PER 
CAPITA GROWTH explain a decrease in the rate of domestic terrorism; it also suggests 
that states that have a higher rate of economic growth have a lower probability of 
experiencing at least one event of domestic terrorism. This aspect, however, will be 
further tested in the logistical model later.   
Turning to the control variables, it is shown that POPULATION may explain an increase 
in the rate and probability of experiencing domestic terrorism in all models, except in 
the inflated model when it is tested against the GINI INDEX. The lack of significance here 
may be explained by the lack of observations. COUNTRY SIZE however is, in the count 
model, only significant when the GINI INDEX is included. This may not have any other 
substantial effect than that COUNTRY SIZE becomes more important when there is a 
high degree of economic inequality.      
                                                         
23 Throughout the empirical analysis I use capital letters when I address the variables.  
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Table 6: Economic variables and domestic terrorism 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Count Model 
    Population 0.686*** 1.065*** 0.690*** 0.710*** 
 
(0.0859) (0.131) (0.0676) (0.0915) 
Country Size -0.111 -0.319*** -0.105 -0.105 
 
(0.0634) (0.0856) (0.0623) (0.0616) 
GDP per Capita -0.0127 
  
-0.0370 
 
(0.0879) 
  
(0.0897) 
GINI Index 
 
0.0867*** 
  
  
(0.0103) 
  GDP Growth 
  
-0.0241** -0.0252** 
   
(0.00848) (0.00869) 
Constant -7.477*** -15.03*** -7.691*** -7.725*** 
 
(0.869) (2.016) (0.797) (0.897) 
Inflated 
Model 
    Population -1.038*** -0.485 -1.127*** -1.009*** 
 
(0.0973) (0.373) (0.0939) (0.0965) 
Country Size 0.240** -0.428 0.296*** 0.239** 
 
(0.0812) (0.276) (0.0852) (0.0816) 
GDP per Capita -0.325 
  
-0.387* 
 
(0.167) 
  
(0.190) 
GINI Index 
 
0.0740* 
  
  
(0.0373) 
  GDP Growth 
  
0.0189 0.0245* 
   
(0.00972) (0.0104) 
Constant 1.762*** 1.619*** 1.751*** 1.737*** 
 
(0.0497) (0.0696) (0.0445) (0.0540) 
Observations 5184 1773 5141 5059 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one period. 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
  
Table 7, provides the separate test of the political variables based on the theoretical 
foundation put forward above, namely: regime type, measured by a country’s level of 
DEMOCRACY, and regime stability, measured by DURABILITY.  
In model 5, DEMOCRACY and DEMOCRACY-SQUARED are included. In both models a 
country’s level of DEMOCRACY is significantly positive, while DEMOCRACY-SQUARED is 
significantly negative, when all other variables are being held constant. This suggest that 
there is an inverted U-shape in the relation to the counts of domestic terrorism, and thus 
that a higher rate of domestic terrorism may occur in semi-democratic states. In model 
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6, the regime DURABILITY is included. As shown, this variable is a negative and 
significant predictor of higher rates of domestic terrorism. In the inflated model, regime 
durability is also found to be significant and positive, both when it is only measured 
alongside the control variables and when it is included with the other political variables 
in model 7.  
Table 7: Political factors domestic terrorism 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Count Model 
   Population 0.655*** 0.915*** 0.744*** 
 
(0.122) (0.0933) (0.142) 
Country Size -0.110 -0.187** -0.143 
 
(0.0878) (0.0671) (0.0883) 
Democracy 0.0634*** 
 
0.0636*** 
 
(0.0141) 
 
(0.0151) 
Democracy2 -0.0179*** 
 
-0.0158*** 
 
(0.00245) 
 
(0.00237) 
Durability 
 
-0.0103*** -0.00630*** 
  
(0.00156) (0.00147) 
Constant -6.329*** -10.32*** -7.389*** 
 
(1.112) (1.024) (1.399) 
Inflated Model 
   Population -0.890*** -1.398*** -0.864*** 
 
(0.182) (0.134) (0.202) 
Country Size 0.143 0.427*** 0.0986 
 
(0.137) (0.109) (0.135) 
Democracy -0.0846*** 
 
-0.0956*** 
 
(0.0213) 
 
(0.0264) 
Democracy2 0.00404 
 
-0.000261 
 
(0.00361) 
 
(0.00398) 
Durability 
 
0.00727** 0.00886*** 
  
(0.00255) (0.00256) 
Constant 1.651*** 1.892*** 1.664*** 
 
(0.0444) (0.0467) (0.0452) 
Observations 5110 5325 5110 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one 
period. 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01             *** p<0.001   
  
Table 8, includes the socio-cultural factors that are argued to influence the rate and 
probability of domestic terrorism. Hypothesis HD6 suggests that countries with higher 
rates of population growth will have higher rates of domestic terrorism. In model 8, 
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POPULATION GROWTH in included. In the count model, POPULATION GROWTH is 
significant on the p<0.001 level and positive, when all other variables are being held 
constant. However, this variable loses its significance in model 12 where all other socio-
cultural variables are included. This may suggest that population growth is not as 
important in predicting the rates of domestic terrorism as other variables. Another 
interesting find is that in the inflated model, POPULATION GROWTH shows significant 
and positive results in model 8. This suggests that higher rates of population growth 
may not increase the probability of experiencing at least one event of domestic 
terrorism. Thus, as it may not increase the probability of domestic terrorism, it may 
increase the rate of the events. This will, however, be further addressed in the logistic 
test.  
In model 9, the variable URBANIZATION is included. Hypothesis HD7 argues that 
countries with higher rates of urbanization will experience higher rates of domestic 
terrorism. In both model 9 and 12 the variable turns out to be significant on the p<0.001 
level and positive. Model 10 has the variable EDUCATION included. Hypothesis HD8 
argues that countries with higher rates of education will experience higher rates of 
domestic terrorism. Conversely to the hypothesis, education is negatively associated 
with the rates of domestic terrorism, both in model 10 and 12. This suggests that higher 
rates of domestic terrorism may be associated with a lower level of education.  
In model 11, a measure of a country’s ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION is included. As 
argued in hypothesis HD9, it is expected that countries with higher levels of ethnic 
fractionalization will experience higher rates of domestic terrorism. As shown in model 
11 and 12, ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION is a significant and positive predictor of the 
rate of domestic terrorism, when all other variables are being held constant. In fact, it is 
even more significant when it is included alongside the other socio-cultural measures, 
going from a p<0.05 level to p<0.001.  
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Table 8: Socio-cultural analysis and domestic terrorism 
 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Count Model 
     Population 0.740*** 0.721*** 0.997*** 0.718*** 1.055*** 
 
(0.0639) (0.0640) (0.0842) (0.112) (0.0805) 
Country Size -0.172** -0.198** -0.227*** -0.192* -0.388*** 
 
(0.0581) (0.0632) (0.0661) (0.0960) (0.0824) 
Population Growth 0.167*** 
   
0.0653 
 
(0.0465) 
   
(0.0895) 
Urbanization 
 
0.0173*** 
  
0.0297*** 
  
(0.00356) 
  
(0.00532) 
Education 
  
-0.0161*** 
 
-0.0234*** 
   
(0.00286) 
 
(0.00501) 
Ethnic Frac. 
   
1.128* 1.720*** 
    
(0.516) (0.480) 
Constant -8.027*** -8.043*** -10.36*** -7.499*** -11.26*** 
 
(0.748) (0.797) (0.977) (1.110) (0.894) 
Inflated Model 
     Population -0.991*** -1.027*** -0.621*** -1.260*** -0.790*** 
 
(0.0856) (0.0867) (0.142) (0.140) (0.137) 
Country Size 0.169* 0.145 -0.0570 0.243 -0.133 
 
(0.0733) (0.0869) (0.0999) (0.143) (0.171) 
Population Growth 0.207** 
   
0.224 
 
(0.0670) 
   
(0.135) 
Urbanization 
 
-0.00737 
  
-0.0142 
  
(0.00590) 
  
(0.00936) 
Eduaction 
  
-0.0560*** 
 
-0.0299** 
   
(0.00921) 
 
(0.00947) 
Ethnic Frac. 
   
-0.759 0.255 
    
(0.860) (0.952) 
Constant 1.785*** 1.783*** 1.783*** 1.926*** 1.818*** 
 
(0.0451) (0.0474) (0.0454) (0.0515) (0.0590) 
Observations 5629 5596 4015 4551 3265 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one period.  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
   
6.1.2 Final ZINB model domestic 
Table 9 displays the final zero inflated negative binomial regression analysis for the 
count of domestic terrorism. This table builds further on the separated models built 
above. Thus, in model 13, I have included, alongside the control variables, the economic 
and political factors; in model 14 the political and socio-cultural factors; and in model 15 
the economic and socio-cultural factors. Then, in model 16, all these factors are included. 
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This is being done to make it possible to test the different factors across the societal 
classifications. 
Hypotheses HD1-HD3 addresses the economic factors that are argued to influence the 
domestic terrorism. Hypothesis HDI, argues that countries with lower rates of GDP per 
capita will experience higher rates of domestic terrorism, while HD1alt argues that 
countries with higher rates of GDP per capita will experience higher rates of domestic 
terrorism.  In table 6, as displayed above, it is shown that GDP PER CAPITA is not a 
significant predictor of the rate of domestic terrorism, when it is included alongside the 
control variables. Here, in table 9, this variable is significant and positive in model 13 
and 16, but not in model 15. This is interesting since in these two models (model 13 and 
16), the variable measuring a country’s GDP per capita is tested alongside the political 
factors. Thus the political factors actually give GDP PER CAPITA explanatory power. This 
may indicate that higher rates of domestic terrorism may occur in the combination 
between good economic and poor institutional conditions.  
Hypothesis HD2 argues that countries with higher rates of economic inequality will 
experience higher rates of domestic terrorism. The variable measuring economic 
inequality, as noted before, lacks a vast amount of observations, and is therefore not 
included in the final model. However, results from table 6, indicates that the GINI INDEX 
is a positive predictor if the rates of domestic terrorism, although this is not enough to 
either confirm or reject the hypothesis.  
Hypothesis HD3 argues that countries with higher levels of economic growth will 
experience higher rates of domestic terrorism. Here, ECONOMIC GROWTH is used as a 
proxy for a country’s level of economic modernization.  In model 13, 15 and 16, this 
variable is included. As displayed in table 9, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed. Growth 
per GDP capita is in fact a negative predictor of the rate of domestic terrorism. This 
means that countries that have higher rates of growth in the GDP per capita will actually 
experience lower rates of domestic terrorism. Also here it may be a relationship 
between ECONOMIC GROWTH and the political factors. Although, this variable is 
significant in all models, it is more significant in models where it is included alongside 
political variables (with p<0.01 in model 15, and p<0.001 in model 13 and model 16). 
This may suggest that economic growth lowers the rate of domestic terrorism in 
countries that have the institutions to satisfy the people’s demands.  
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Hypotheses HD4 and HD5 accounts for the political factors that argues to influence the 
rate of domestic terrorism. The political factors are included in model 13, 14, and 16. 
Hypothesis HD4 argues that semi-democratic countries will experience a higher rate of 
domestic terrorism. This is measured by including a DEMOCRACY-SQUARED variable 
together with the DEMOCRACY variable. Earlier, in table 7, it was shown that when only 
the political variables were tested, this turned out to be confirmed. Here, in table 9, this 
is not the case in model 13, when it is tested against only the economic variables. In 
model 13 only the squared term is significant and negative, indicating a decreasing line 
on the democracy scale. This may suggest, as pointed out above, that there is a 
correlation between a country’s regime type and the level of economic development.24 
This may indicate that low democracies that also have a higher levels of GDP per capita, 
have higher rates of domestic terrorism. Still, in model 16, where all of the variables are 
included, both DEMOCRACY and DEMOCRACY-SQUARED are significant. This suggests 
that semi-democratic states have a higher rate of domestic terrorism. Hypothesis HD5 
argues countries with higher levels of regime stability will experience lower rates of 
domestic terrorism. To test for this I have included a proxy of regime DURABILITY. In 
table 7, this was shown to be confirmed. This is also the case here in table 9. In model 16, 
DURABILITY is negative and significant on the p<0.05 level. Thus, hypothesis HD5 can be 
confirmed. The fact that the level of significance drops from a p<0.001 level in model 13 
to p<0.005 in model 14 and model 16, may suggest that the socio-cultural factors take 
away some of the explanatory power of DURABILITY.  
Hypotheses HD6 through HD9, addresses the socio-cultural factors and are included in 
model 14, 15, and 16. Hypothesis HD6, argues that countries with higher rates of 
population growth will experience higher rates of domestic terrorism. In table 8, it was 
shown that POPULATION GROWTH was not significant when it was included alongside 
the other socio-cultural factors. Here, in table 9, it is significant on the p<0.05 level in 
model 14 and on the p<0.01 level in model 16. Interestingly, it is only significant when it 
is included alongside the political variables. This may suggests that population growth 
becomes important in semi-democratic states, where the government may not have the 
ability to handle an increase in demands from an increasing growing population. In any 
case, this hypothesis may be confirmed.   
                                                         
24 The correlation test displayed in table C1, appendix C, shows a value of 0.590; which is not too high.  
73 
 
Hypothesis HD7 argues that countries with higher rates of urbanization will experience 
higher rates of domestic terrorism. Interestingly, this variable is significant in all models, 
except in model 16, where it is included alongside all the other variables. The reason for 
this may be that, when combined with the political and economic variables, a country’s 
level of URBANIZATION is not important in predicting the rates of domestic terrorism. 
Thus, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed.  In table 8, it was shown that a country’s level 
of EDUCATION was negatively associated with the rate of domestic terrorism. As 
conversely argued in hypothesis HD8, it is expected that countries with higher levels of 
education will experience higher rates of domestic terrorism. In model 14, 15, and 16, 
this variable is negative and significant on the p<0.001 level, showing that higher rates 
of education leads to fewer events of domestic terrorism. Thus, this hypothesis cannot be 
confirmed.   
Finally, hypothesis HD9 argues that a higher rate of ethnic fractionalization leads to 
higher rates of domestic terrorism. This cannot be confirmed since this variable is only 
significant in model 16. Thus, it is not significant when it is included alongside the 
political variables. This may, suggest that the political variables are more important in 
explaining the rates of domestic terrorism than ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION.   
Turning to the control variables, it seems that the more people that are living in a 
country (measured by POPULATION SIZE), the higher rate of domestic terrorism they 
experience. Further, COUNTRY SIZE is a negative predictor of the rate of domestic 
terrorism. This finding goes against the initial thought put forward in this thesis. 
However, it is plausible, as suggested by Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009) that in 
larger countries insurgents groups may develop to become guerillas instead of 
terrorists.  
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Table 9: ZINB model for domestic incidents - all variables 
 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Count Model 
    Population 1.081*** 1.054*** 1.060*** 1.010*** 
 
(0.0608) (0.0959) (0.137) (0.116) 
Country Size -0.215*** -0.374*** -0.334*** -0.315*** 
 
(0.0488) (0.0827) (0.0818) (0.0913) 
GDP per Capita 0.552*** 
 
0.0132 0.351* 
 
(0.0635) 
 
(0.113) (0.152) 
GDP Growth -0.0526*** 
 
-0.0438** -0.0762*** 
 
(0.0116) 
 
(0.0146) (0.0177) 
Democracy 0.0159 0.0986*** 
 
0.0824*** 
 
(0.0127) (0.0185) 
 
(0.0249) 
Democracy2 -0.0227*** -0.0176*** 
 
-0.0173*** 
 
(0.00266) (0.00300) 
 
(0.00371) 
Durability -0.0137*** -0.00556* 
 
-0.00585* 
 
(0.00167) (0.00218) 
 
(0.00260) 
Population Growth 
 
0.208* 0.0903 0.224** 
  
(0.0899) (0.153) (0.0732) 
Urbanization 
 
0.0317*** 0.0279*** 0.0175 
  
(0.00566) (0.00690) (0.00916) 
Education 
 
-0.0259*** -0.0271*** -0.0279*** 
  
(0.00486) (0.00679) (0.00459) 
Ethnic Frac. 
 
0.572 1.369** 0.639 
  
(0.435) (0.494) (0.524) 
Constant -15.60*** -10.44*** -11.59*** -12.13*** 
 
(0.829) (1.091) (1.904) (1.730) 
Inflated Model 
    Population -0.332 -0.700*** -0.682** -0.661* 
 
(0.190) (0.207) (0.230) (0.292) 
Country Size -0.160 -0.128 0.00930 -0.0626 
 
(0.105) (0.156) (0.277) (0.194) 
GDP per Capita 0.0456 
 
-0.446 -0.422 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.421) (0.374) 
GDP Growth 0.0224 
 
0.0220 -0.000117 
 
(0.0176) 
 
(0.0208) (0.0388) 
Democracy -0.399*** -0.0276 
 
-0.0489 
 
(0.0761) (0.0611) 
 
(0.0677) 
Democracy2 -0.0344*** 0.00638 
 
0.00682 
 
(0.00881) (0.00857) 
 
(0.0112) 
Durability 0.0323*** 0.0151** 
 
0.0192** 
 
(0.00762) (0.00559) 
 
(0.00630) 
Population Growth 
 
0.171 0.226 0.209 
  
(0.129) (0.263) (0.119) 
Urbanization 
 
-0.0140 0.00677 0.00489 
  
(0.0110) (0.0258) (0.0298) 
Education 
 
-0.0394 -0.0353 -0.0277 
  
(0.0238) (0.0386) (0.0155) 
Ethnic Frac. 
 
0.577 -0.400 0.425 
  
(0.845) (1.119) (1.045) 
 
(2.431) (2.525) (3.636) (3.533) 
Constant 1.736*** 1.719*** 1.755*** 1.628*** 
 
(0.0401) (0.0579) (0.0888) (0.0694) 
Observations 4573 3104 2929 2793 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one period. 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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6.1.3 Logistic regression models 
In this section the logistic regression models analyzing the societal factors and domestic 
terrorism are presented. As opposed to the zero-inflated negative regression analysis 
that predicts the rates of domestic terrorism, the logistic regression shows the 
probability of experiencing domestic terrorism. This section is built in the same way as 
the zero-inflated negative binomial section. First, I present an empirical analysis where 
the economic, political, and socio-cultural factors are separated from each other. Then, 
secondly, I present a final model where these factors are included together. By doing 
this, it is possible to show if certain factors loses or gains significance when included 
together. To account for the probability of experiencing domestic terrorism, I have 
generated a dichotomy variable that are coded 1 if a country experienced domestic 
terrorism in a given year, and 0 if it did not. In addition, in all the logistic models I have 
included time since last domestic terrorist event and three cubic splines. This is to 
control for time dependence in the data.25 Also here, every explanatory variable is 
lagged one period. 
Table 10 displays the empirical evidence of the separated logistic analysis. Here, I have 
chosen to build the model by blocks, namely economic variables in model 17, political 
variables in model 18, and socio-cultural variables in model 19.26  
Model 17 shows that GDP PER CAPITA is significant on the p<0.001 level, and positive. 
This suggests that a country’s wealth may increase the probability of experiencing 
domestic terrorism. The second economic hypothesis (HD2) argues that states with 
higher rates of economic inequality have a higher probability of experiencing domestic 
terrorism. As noted before, the GINI INDEX lacks a vast amount of observations and has 
therefore only been included in the model building in table E1 in appendix E. It is not 
significant when it is only included alongside the control variables, but significant when 
all of the economic factors are tested together. Although, it is difficult to either confirm 
or reject this hypothesis, I do suggest that economic inequality have an influence on both 
the rate and the probability of domestic terrorism. ECONOMIC GROWTH is significant 
and a negative predictor of domestic terrorism, when all other variables are being held 
constant.  
                                                         
25 This was discussed earlier in chapter 5.5 
26 I have tested all the factors separately in appendix E. 
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Model 18 contains the block of political factors. Not only do semi-democracies increase 
the rate of domestic terrorism, it also increases the probability of an event happening. 
This cannot be said about regime DURABILITY. Although, as found in table 9, more 
durable states have a decreased effect on the rates of domestic terrorism, it does not 
increase the probability of it happening (as argued in hypothesis HD5). This may suggest 
that regime DURABILITY have an effect on the rate of domestic terrorism after 
something else has triggered it.  
Model 19 addresses the socio-cultural factors. First, POPULATION GROWTH is not a 
significant predictor of the probability of domestic terrorism, when all other variables 
are being held constant. Second, URBANIZATION is significant and positive on the 
p<0.01 level.  Thus, it may be reason to believe that not only do urbanization increase 
the rate of domestic terrorism, it also increase the probability of experiencing an event. 
As seen earlier, higher EDUCATION may explain an increased rate of domestic terrorist 
events. In appendix E (table E3), it is also found that EDUCATION increases the 
probability of experiencing an event. However, it loses its explanatory power when it is 
included alongside the other socio-cultural factors in model 19. This may be due to a 
high correlation with the variable measuring URBANIZATION, which is over 0.6 (see 
table C1 in appendix C). Finally, ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION is positive and 
significant on the p<0.05 level, suggesting that countries with higher levels of ethnic 
fractionalization may have a higher probability of experiencing domestic terrorism.   
POPULATION SIZE and COUNTRY SIZE are both significant in all models. However, 
POPULATION SIZE is positive, suggesting that countries with higher rates of inhabitants 
have a higher probability of experiencing domestic terrorism. COUNTRY SIZE is, 
however, negative, meaning that larger countries may have a lower probability of 
experiencing domestic terrorism.  
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Table 10: Logistic analysis of domestic terrorism 
 
Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
Population 0.482*** 0.472*** 0.487*** 
 
(0.0335) (0.0333) (0.0446) 
Country Size -0.119*** -0.0954*** -0.149*** 
 
(0.0252) (0.0258) (0.0356) 
GDP per Capita 0.0774*** 
  
 
(0.0221) 
  GDP Growth -0.0232*** 
  
 
(0.00661) 
  Democracy 
 
0.0496*** 
 
  
(0.00538) 
 Democracy2 
 
-0.0061*** 
 
  
(0.00124) 
 Durability 
 
-0.00117 
 
  
(0.00121) 
 Population Growth 
  
-0.0284 
   
(0.0344) 
Urbanization 
  
0.00887** 
   
(0.00283) 
Eduaction 
  
-0.00216 
   
(0.00233) 
Ethnic Frac. 
  
0.442* 
   
(0.175) 
Time Since Dom. -0.156*** -0.144*** -0.190*** 
 
(0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0255) 
_spline1 0.000682** 0.000734** 0.000620*** 
 
(0.000214) (0.000230) (0.000185) 
_spline2 0.0142*** 0.0138*** 0.0130*** 
 
(0.00203) (0.00204) (0.00221) 
_spline3 -0.0069*** -0.0069*** -0.00652*** 
 
(0.00120) (0.00124) (0.00122) 
Constant -6.640*** -5.986*** -6.210*** 
 
(0.437) (0.417) (0.522) 
Observations 5059 5110 3265 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged 
one period. 
* p<0.05           ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001   
 
Table 11, displays the final logistic model. This table consists of four models. In model 
20, the economic and the political factors are included, in model 21 the political and 
socio-cultural factors, and in model 22 the economic and socio-cultural factors are 
tested against each other. In model 23 all the variables are included. 
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First, in the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model (table 9), it shows that the 
rate of domestic terrorism increases as the rate of GDP per capita increases, when all 
other variables are being held constant. This contradicts hypothesis HD1 put forward in 
this thesis, but supports HD1alt. According to hypothesis HD1alt, it is expected that 
countries with higher rates of GDP per capita will experience higher rates and a higher 
probability of domestic terrorism. According to table 11 (model 23) and table 9 (model 
16), it seems that both the rate of domestic terrorism and the probability of 
experiencing an event, increases with higher GDP per capita. Thus, the alternative 
hypothesis HD1alt may be confirmed.   
The second hypothesis (HD2) argues that countries with higher rates of economic 
inequality will experience a higher probability of domestic terrorism. As noted before, 
the GINI INDEX, which are used to measure economic inequality, lacks a considerable 
amount of observations. Thus, I have included this variable only in table E1, in appendix 
E. The model shows that the probability of experiencing domestic terrorism in fact 
increases with higher rates of economic inequality, when all other variables are being 
held constant.  
Hypothesis HD3 argues that countries with higher levels of economic growth will have a 
higher probability of experiencing domestic terrorism. This is measured by including 
ECONOMIC GROWTH. In table 9, the results showed, conversely to the argument in this 
thesis, that a higher rate of economic modernization actually has a decreasing effect on 
the rate of domestic terrorism. As shown in table 11, this is also the case for the 
probability of experiencing domestic terrorism. Thus, this hypothesis cannot be 
confirmed.    
Hypotheses HD4 and HD5 addresses the political factors concerning domestic terrorism. 
First, HD4 argues that semi-democratic countries will experience higher rates and a 
higher probability of domestic terrorism. The findings in table 11 suggest that not only 
do the rate of events increase in these regime types, but also the probability of 
experiencing domestic terrorism increases. Thus, hypothesis HD4 may be confirmed.  
Hypothesis HD5, argues that countries with higher levels of regime stability will 
experience higher lower rates and a lower probability of domestic terrorism. To 
measure for this, I have included a proxy for regime DURABILITY. In table 9, it shows 
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that the rate of domestic terrorism decreases as the regime durability increased. In table 
11, however, regime durability is only significant in model 20, where only economic and 
political variables are included, and not in model 23, when all variables are included. 
This may suggest that, although regime stability may not have a triggering effect on 
domestic terrorism, more unstable regimes may accelerate the rates of events.  
Finally, hypotheses HD6 through HD9 puts forward the socio-cultural arguments on the 
societal causes of domestic terrorism. First, HD6 argues that countries with higher levels 
of population growth will experience higher rates and a higher probability of domestic 
terrorism. In the zero-inflated negative binomial model displayed in table 9, it shows 
that population growth is a significant and positive predictor of the rate of domestic 
terrorism. Yet, as shown in table 11, the probability of experiencing domestic terrorism 
does not increase along an increase in the population. Thus, this hypothesis can only 
partly be confirmed.  
Hypothesis HD7, argues that countries with higher rates of urbanization will experience 
higher rates and a higher probability of domestic terrorism. Table 9 shows that an 
increase in the rate of domestic terrorism cannot be explained by an increase in the level 
of urbanization. In the logistic results displayed in table 11, URBANIZATION is not a 
significant prediction of the probability of experiencing domestic terrorism, when all 
other variables are being held constant.  Thus, hypothesis HD7 cannot be confirmed.  
Hypothesis, HD8 argues countries with higher rates of education will experience higher 
rates and a higher probability of domestic terrorism. The zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression in table 9 shows that this is indeed not the case. Here, it is shown 
that the rate of domestic terrorism decreases with an increase in the level of 
EDUCATION in a country. Although, the direction is the same, table 11, shows 
insignificant results in this regard. Thus, the rate of education may explain an increase in 
the rate of domestic terrorism, yet, it cannot be said to increase the probability of an 
event happening. Therefore, this hypothesis can only partly be confirmed.  
Finally, hypothesis HD9 argues that countries with higher levels of ETHNIC 
FRACTIONALIZATION will experience higher rates and a higher probability of domestic 
terrorism. This hypothesis cannot be confirmed, as this variable is not significant in either 
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the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model or the logistic regression model, 
when all other variables are included and being held constant.   
Table 11: Logistic models of domestic incidents - all variables 
 
Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 
Population 0.433*** 0.422*** 0.430*** 0.423*** 
 
(0.0368) (0.0501) (0.0506) (0.0523) 
Country Size -0.0612* -0.0974* -0.108** -0.0829 
 
(0.0289) (0.0418) (0.0415) (0.0442) 
GDP per Capita 0.158*** 
 
0.132* 0.222** 
 
(0.0353) 
 
(0.0663) (0.0781) 
GDP Growth -0.0249*** 
 
-0.0189* -0.0210* 
 
(0.00692) 
 
(0.00886) (0.00938) 
Democracy 0.0344*** 0.0412*** 
 
0.0383*** 
 
(0.00645) (0.00793) 
 
(0.00885) 
Democracy2 -0.00624*** -0.00456* 
 
-0.00605** 
 
(0.00150) (0.00186) 
 
(0.00203) 
Durability -0.00362* -0.000976 
 
-0.00284 
 
(0.00152) (0.00184) 
 
(0.00198) 
Population Growth 
 
0.0554 -0.0170 0.0365 
  
(0.0396) (0.0486) (0.0502) 
Urbanization 
 
0.00836** 0.00435 0.000229 
  
(0.00323) (0.00402) (0.00432) 
Eduaction 
 
-0.00274 -0.00410 -0.00405 
  
(0.00275) (0.00297) (0.00305) 
Ethnic Frac. 
 
0.217 0.429* 0.209 
  
(0.198) (0.200) (0.211) 
Time Since Dom. -0.839*** -0.924*** -0.924*** -0.883*** 
 
(0.0444) (0.0531) (0.0550) (0.0556) 
_spline1 -0.000136 -0.000291* -0.000206 -0.000237 
 
(0.0000976) (0.000131) (0.000119) (0.000128) 
_spline2 -0.0196*** -0.0235*** -0.0223*** -0.0216*** 
 
(0.00183) (0.00226) (0.00229) (0.00232) 
_spline3 0.00728*** 0.00924*** 0.00851*** 0.00829*** 
 
(0.000927) (0.00119) (0.00117) (0.00120) 
Constant -6.424*** -5.154*** -5.948*** -6.372*** 
 
(0.532) (0.606) (0.696) (0.780) 
Observations 4573 3104 2929 2793 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one 
period. 
*p<0.05      ** p<0.01     *** p<0.001 
  
The control variables suggest that more populous countries have a higher probability of 
experiencing domestic terrorism. This can be stated since POPULATION is significant 
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(on the p<0.001 level) in all models and positive. COUNTRY SIZE is significant and 
negative in all models, except in model 23. Although, it is not significant in the final 
model, it suggests that smaller countries actually have a higher probability of 
experiencing domestic terrorism. 
By comparing the final models of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression (table 
9) and the logistic regression (table 11), there is some interesting aspects. First, there 
seems to be a higher rate of significant factors in the zero-inflated negative binomial 
regression than in the logistic regression. Where nine out of eleven variables are 
significant in the former model, and only five out of eleven in the latter. This may 
suggest that there are more societal factors that may explain higher rates of domestic 
terrorism, than the probability of experiencing at least one event. A second interesting 
aspect is that neither of the socio-cultural factors presented in model 23 in the logistic 
model are significant, while there are two in the zero-inflated negative binomial model, 
namely POPULATION GROWTH and EDUCATION.      
6.2 Transnational terrorism 
In this section I will turn to the factors that are argued to influence the rate and 
probability of transnational terrorism. As discussed earlier there are fewer hypotheses 
that are argued to influence the rate and probability of transnational terrorism than 
domestic terrorism. This may be due to shortcomings in the terrorism literature. An 
explanation for this is that scientists have explained and argued on the causal 
mechanisms leading to domestic terrorism, while tested for transnational terrorism.  
As with the former section, models where the economic, political, and socio-cultural 
factors are separated will be presented. Then, I will present a model where all the 
factors are included. This will first be done with a zero-inflated negative binomial 
regression model to account for the rate of events, then with a logistic method to 
address the probability of experiencing an event.  
6.2.1 Zero-Inflated negative binomial regression 
Table 12 presents the economic variables that are argued to influence the rate and the 
probability of transnational terrorism. According to hypothesis HT1, it is expected that 
countries with higher rates of GDP per capita will experience higher rates of 
transnational terrorism. The results in table 12 suggests that a country’s GDP PER 
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CAPITA is not significant when it is only included with the control variables against the 
dependent variable, in model 1. However, it becomes significant on the p<0.05 level 
when it is combined with the variable measuring a country’s trade openness. An 
interesting aspect is shown in the inflated model. Here, the variable measuring a 
country’s GDP PER CAPITA is significant on the p<0.001 level and negative in both 
model 24 and 26. This suggests that the log odds of being an excessive zero would 
decrease for every additional point on the GDP per capita scale. Thus, the larger the GDP 
per capita, the more likely a country is of experiencing at least one event of 
transnational terrorism. This aspect will, however, be addressed further in the logistic 
models.  
Table 12: ZINB model of economic factors and transnational terrorism 
 
Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 
Count Model 
   Population 0.499*** 0.434*** 0.387*** 
 
(0.0632) (0.0605) (0.0586) 
Country Size -0.102* -0.185*** -0.215*** 
 
(0.0448) (0.0490) (0.0441) 
GDP per Capita 0.0687 
 
0.0834* 
 
(0.0429) 
 
(0.0378) 
Trade Openness 
 
-0.0126*** -0.0159*** 
  
(0.00183) (0.00143) 
Constant -6.610*** -3.296*** -2.552** 
 
(0.741) (0.812) (0.810) 
Inflated Model 
   Population -1.088*** -1.444*** -1.137*** 
 
(0.130) (0.191) (0.175) 
Country Size 0.0946 0.231* 0.0261 
 
(0.0915) (0.107) (0.0974) 
GDP per Capita -0.711*** 
 
-0.828*** 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.157) 
Trade Openness 
 
-0.0175 -0.00720 
  
(0.0102) (0.00379) 
Constant 1.330*** 1.350*** 1.214*** 
 
(0.0548) (0.0553) (0.0526) 
Observation 5184 5023 4887 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one 
period. 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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In model 25, TRADE OPENNESS is included. Here, TRADE OPENNESS is actually 
negatively correlated with the rates of transnational terrorism, with the p< 0.001 level 
in all models, when all other variables are held constant. Thus, economic integration 
actually decreases the rates of transnational terrorism. This goes against the initial 
argument of hypothesis HT2, which argues that countries with higher rates of trade 
openness will experience higher rates of transnational terrorism.  
Hypotheses HT3 and HT4 addresses the political factors that relates to transnational 
terrorism. These factors are presented in table 13. HT3 argues that countries with 
higher rates of democracy will experience higher rates of transnational terrorism. This is 
claimed on the basis that democratic states are not capable of dealing with the threat of 
terrorism in the same degree as autocratic states, since it may affect the civil freedoms of 
the people. In addition, democracies may offer better channels of media exposure than 
autocratic regimes. As displayed model 27 of table 13, DEMOCRACY is indeed associated 
with higher rates of transnational attacks. Moreover, in model 28, I have included 
DEMOCRACY-SQUARED. This suggests, as with domestic terrorism, that there is a 
curvilinear relationship, an inverted U-shape, between the rate of transnational 
terrorism and the level of democracy.  
Hypothesis HT4 argues that instable countries will experience higher rates of 
transnational terrorism. As shown model 29 and 30, this hypothesis can be confirmed 
since the DURABILITY is negative and significant on the p<0.001 level.      
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Table 13: ZINB models of political variables and transnational terrorism. 
 
Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 
Count Model 
    Population 0.326*** 0.386*** 0.578*** 0.422*** 
 
(0.0605) (0.0689) (0.0579) (0.104) 
Country Size -0.0677 -0.0356 -0.141** -0.0315 
 
(0.0629) (0.0513) (0.0451) (0.0518) 
Democracy 0.0526*** 0.0696*** 
 
0.0745*** 
 
(0.0108) (0.00878) 
 
(0.00801) 
Democracy2 
 
-0.0103*** 
 
-0.00758*** 
  
(0.00160) 
 
(0.00185) 
Durability 
  
-0.00770*** -0.00754*** 
   
(0.00104) (0.00134) 
Constant -3.801*** -4.750*** -6.801*** -5.427*** 
 
(0.734) (0.927) (0.728) (1.398) 
Inflated Model 
    Population -1.403*** -1.679*** -1.564*** -1.975 
 
(0.348) (0.500) (0.262) (1.042) 
Country Size 0.299 0.459 0.407** 0.544 
 
(0.202) (0.244) (0.146) (0.364) 
Democracy -0.0131 0.0243 
 
0.0458 
 
(0.0342) (0.0466) 
 
(0.0826) 
Democracy2 
 
-0.00901 
 
-0.0152 
  
(0.00474) 
 
(0.0149) 
Durability 
  
-0.000922 0.00867 
   
(0.00319) (0.0116) 
Constant 1.364*** 1.408*** 1.514*** 1.429*** 
 
(0.0782) (0.0883) (0.0571) (0.128) 
Observations 5110 5110 5325 5110 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one period.  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Table 14 displays the only socio-cultural factor that is argued to influence the rate 
transnational terrorism. The model suggests that higher rates of ethnic fractionalization 
do not explain higher rates of transnational terrorism.  
Table 14: ZINB model of socio-cultural factors and transnational terrorism 
 
Model 31 
Count Model 
 Poulation 0.345*** 
 
(0.0721) 
Country Size -0.106 
 
(0.0696) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.563 
 
(0.359) 
Constant -3.693*** 
 
(0.714) 
Inflated Model 
 Population -1.289*** 
 
(0.191) 
Country Size 0.234 
 
(0.140) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.364 
 
(0.841) 
Constant 1.493*** 
 
(0.0560) 
Observations 4551 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Independent variables lagged one period.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
6.2.2 Final ZINB model transnational 
Table 15 displays the final zero-inflated negative binomial regression model for the 
count of transnational terrorism. The economic, political, and socio-cultural factors are 
included and compared in model 32 through 35. In model 32, I have included, in 
addition to the control variables, the economic and political variables; in model 33, the 
political and socio-cultural variable; and in model 34, the economic and socio-cultural 
variables. Finally, in model 35, I have run a model consisting of all the factors that are 
argued to influence the rate and the probability of transnational terrorism.  
First, hypotheses HT1 and HT2 address the economic factors that are argued to 
influence the rate and probability of being attacked by transnational terrorism. These 
factors are included in model 32, 33, and 35. Hypothesis HT1 argues that countries with 
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higher rates of GDP per capita will experience higher rates of transnational terrorism. 
This argument is certainly confirmed when looking at table 15. Both in model 32 and, 
more importantly, in model 35, this variable is positive and significant on the p<0.001 
level. In model 34, GDP PER CAPITA is not significant. This may suggest, that economic 
conditions, measured by GDP PER CAPITA, gains explanatory power in semi-democratic 
regimes. Hypothesis HT2 argues that countries with higher rates of trade openness will 
experience higher rates and a higher probability of transnational terrorism. As far as the 
rate is concerned, TRADE OPENNESS actually has a decreasing effect on transnational 
terrorism. As displayed in model 32, 33, and 35, this variable is negative and significant 
on the p<0.001 level in all models.  
Turning to the political variables, table 15 displays these variables in model 33, 34, and 
35. First, hypothesis HT3 argues that countries with higher rates of democracy will 
experience higher rates of transnational terrorism. Earlier, in table 13, it was shown that 
an increase in DEMOCRACY increased the rate of transnational terrorism. It was also 
shown that semi-democratic states had a higher rate of attacks. Thus, in table 15, 
DEMOCRACY-SQUARED is included. The results suggest that there is a curvilinear 
relationship between the rates of transnational terrorism and the count of transnational 
terrorism. 
The second hypothesis that addresses transnational terrorism and political factors is 
regime stability. Hypothesis HT4 argues that countries with higher rates of regime 
stability will experience lower rates of transnational terrorism. Thus, the more unstable 
a regime is, the higher rate of transnational terrorism is expected. This argument is 
confirmed as the variable DURABILITY is negative and significant on the p<0.001 level 
in model 32 and 35, and p<0.01 in model 33.  Finally, as noted before, there is little 
evidence that a higher rate of ethnic fractionalization increases the rate of transnational 
terrorism. ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION is only significant in model 34 and not in 
model 35 where all the variables are included.  
Turning to the control variable, POPULATION is significant on the p<0.001 level in all 
models and positive. This suggests that countries with more population will experience 
higher rates of transnational terrorism. In the inflated model, POPULATION is, in 
addition, significant and negative, which suggests that more populous countries may 
have a higher probability of experiencing at least one transnational terrorist event. This, 
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however, will be further addressed in the logistic model. COUNTRY SIZE is, in model 35, 
also significant (on the p<0.01 level). However, conversely to this thesis’ initial thought, 
it is negative. This suggests that countries with lower rates of geographical size will 
experience a higher rate of transnational terrorism.  
Table 15: ZINB model for transnational terrorism - all variables 
 
Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 
Count Model 
    Population 0.348*** 0.355*** 0.216** 0.415*** 
 
(0.0559) (0.0548) (0.0673) (0.0555) 
Country Size -0.110* 0.000510 -0.163** -0.174** 
 
(0.0499) (0.0442) (0.0627) (0.0561) 
GDP per Capita 0.262*** 
 
0.0648 0.380*** 
 
(0.0608) 
 
(0.0425) (0.0689) 
Trade Openness -0.0166*** 
 
-0.0169*** -0.0184*** 
 
(0.00167) 
 
(0.00168) (0.00187) 
Democracy 0.0424*** 0.0692*** 
 
0.0372** 
 
(0.0103) (0.00742) 
 
(0.0138) 
Democracy2 -0.00870*** -0.0105*** 
 
-0.00924*** 
 
(0.00201) (0.00186) 
 
(0.00190) 
Durability -0.00991*** -0.00473** 
 
-0.0105*** 
 
(0.00129) (0.00146) 
 
(0.00208) 
Ethnic Frac. 
 
0.316 0.660* 0.827 
  
(0.232) (0.334) (0.547) 
Constant -4.060*** -4.800*** -0.410 -5.462*** 
 
(0.840) (0.631) (0.856) (1.592) 
Inflated Model 
    Population -1.419*** -4.651** -1.095*** -2.826*** 
 
(0.354) (1.417) (0.201) (1.518) 
Country Size 0.112 1.128** -0.0228 -1.253 
 
(0.157) (0.376) (0.140) (1.013) 
GDP per Capita -0.892*** 
 
-0.828*** -1.291 
 
(0.225) 
 
(0.138) (1.542) 
Trade Openness -0.0103 
 
-0.00121 -0.00939 
 
(0.00669) 
 
(0.00417) (0.0127) 
Democracy -0.0118 0.190** 
 
-0.0461 
 
(0.0363) (0.0689) 
 
(0.123) 
Democracy2 0.00452 -0.0664* 
 
0.0279 
 
(0.00552) (0.0287) 
 
(0.0408) 
Durability 0.0145* 0.0583* 
 
0.00555 
 
(0.00673) (0.0259) 
 
(0.0212) 
Ethnic Frac. 
 
6.038* -0.281 5.106* 
  
(2.861) (0.755) (2.180) 
Constant 1.149*** 1.551*** 1.195*** 1.263*** 
 
(0.0573) (0.0470) (0.0630) (0.162) 
Observations 4526 4160 3802 3617 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one period.  
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
  
88 
 
6.2.3 Logistic regression models      
Table 16 displays the logistic regression model of the analysis of transnational terrorism 
where the economic, political, and socio-cultural factors are separated. As with the 
logistic regression analysis of the domestic hypotheses, I have chosen to build the model 
by blocks, where model 36 includes the economic factors; model 37 the political factors; 
and model 38 the one socio-cultural factor.27 In addition, every model contains a TIME 
SINCE TRANS. variable, measuring the time since last transnational terrorist event, and 
three cubic splines. 
Model 36 addresses the economic hypotheses that argue to influence the probability of 
experiencing transnational terrorism. First, as the GDP PER CAPITA is significant on the 
p<0.001 level and positive. The second hypothesis, HT2, argues that countries that have 
higher rates of trade openness will experience a higher probability of transnational 
terrorism. To measure this, I have included a variable measuring a country’s TRADE 
OPENNESS. The results are displayed in model 36. Conversely to the argument, trade 
openness reduces the probability of transnational terrorism. 
Model 37 addresses the political factors that are argued to influence the probability of 
experiencing transnational terrorism.28 First, DEMOCRACY is significant on the p<0.001 
level and positive, suggesting that higher rates of democracy increases the probability of 
experiencing transnational terrorism. Hypothesis HT4, argues that the probability of 
experiencing transnational terrorism is higher in unstable states since terrorist groups 
may take advantage of regimes where the government do not have control over its 
territory. Since DURABILITY is not significant, this is not confirmed. ETHNIC 
FRACTIONALIZATION is actually significant in model 38. This may suggest that a larger 
amount of ethnic groups in a country increases the probability of transnational 
terrorism.  
 
 
                                                         
27 In appendix E (chapter 9.5) I have analyzed these variables separately, as shown, this did not give 
different effects in the explanatory power.   
28 In appendix E, table E5, it is tested whether a there is a curvilinear relationship between democracy and 
the probability of experiencing transnational terrorism. It is not.   
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Table 16: Logistic model of transnational terrorism 
 
Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 
Population 0.316*** 0.337*** 0.353*** 
 
(0.0352) (0.0343) (0.0340) 
Country Size -0.105*** -0.0457 -0.0572* 
 
(0.0290) (0.0281) (0.0275) 
GDP per Capita 0.148*** 
  
 
(0.0251) 
  Trade Openness -0.00610*** 
  
 
(0.00120) 
  Democracy 
 
0.0282*** 
 
  
(0.00519) 
 Durability 
 
-0.00188 
 
  
(0.00126) 
 Ethnic Frac. 
  
0.348* 
   
(0.152) 
Time Since Trans. -0.851*** -0.869*** -0.829*** 
 
(0.0523) (0.0504) (0.0530) 
_spline1 0.000135 0.000138 0.000167 
 
(0.0000933) (0.000101) (0.000102) 
_spline2 -0.0277*** -0.0291*** -0.0269*** 
 
(0.00343) (0.00334) (0.00351) 
_spline3 0.00759*** 0.00809*** 0.00728*** 
 
(0.00132) (0.00131) (0.00137) 
Constant -4.076*** -4.438*** -4.762*** 
 
(0.532) (0.420) (0.410) 
Observations 4887 5110 4551 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables 
lagged one period. 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
As with the zero-inflated negative binomial regression in table 15, I have separately run 
the different economic, political, and socio-cultural blocks against each other in table 17, 
only this time with a logistic method. Model 39 consists of the economic and political 
factors; model 40 of the political and socio-cultural factors; and model 41 of the 
economic and socio-cultural factors. Finally, in model 42 I have included all variables.  
First, hypotheses HT1 and HT2 address the relationship between a country’s economic 
factors and transnational terrorism. HT1 argues that countries with higher rates of GTD 
per capita will experience higher rates and a higher probability of transnational 
terrorism. In table 15 it was shown that this factor increased the rate of transnational 
attacks. Moreover, table 17 displays that an increase in the GDP PER CAPITA also 
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increases the probability of experiencing transnational terrorism. Thus, hypothesis HT1 
can be confirmed.  
Second, according to hypothesis HT2, it is expected that countries with a higher rate of 
trade openness will experience a higher rate and a higher probability of transnational 
terrorism. As shown in the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model in table 15, 
it seems that trade actually decreases the rate of attacks. The same can be said about the 
probability of being attacked by transnational terrorism. As shown in table 17, an 
increase in the level of trade, actually decreases the probability of transnational 
terrorism. Thus, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed.  
Turning to the political factors, it was shown in table 15 that, not only do democracies 
have an increased rate of transnational terrorism; this is also the case for semi-
democratic states. However, when including DEMOCRACY-SQUARED in the logistic 
model, this variable is not significant (see table E5 in appendix E). Thus, I have only 
included DEMOCRACY in the final model. The results show that, when all other variables 
are being held constant, DEMOCRACY is a significant and positive predictor of the 
probability of experiencing transnational terrorism. Thus, this hypothesis can be 
confirmed.  
The second hypothesis concerning the political factors is regime stability. Hypothesis 
HT4 argues that countries with higher rates of regime stability will experience lower 
rates and a lower probability of transnational terrorism. As shown earlier, in the zero-
inflated negative binomial regression model in table 15, more unstable states, measured 
by regime DURABILITY, have an increased rate of transnational terrorism. Here, in table 
17, the logistic regression analysis displays, in model 42, that unstable state also have an 
increased probability of experiencing an attack. Thus, it is possible to confirm the 
hypothesis that an increase in regime stability decreases the rate and probability of 
experiencing transnational terrorism.  
Finally, hypothesis HT5 argues that an increase in a country’s ethnic fractionalization 
increases the rate and probability of experiencing transnational terrorism. Unlike in the 
zero-inflated negative binomial model ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION is significant when 
all other models are included. This suggests that, although more ethnic groups do not 
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increase the rates of transnational terrorism, it increases the probability of experiencing 
an attack.    
Turning to the control variables it is clear that POPULATION is a significant (on the 
p<0.001 level) and a positive prediction of the probability of transnational terrorism. 
Thus countries with higher rates of population will experience a higher rate and a higher 
probability of foreign attacks. COUNTRY SIZE is, however, not a significant predictor. In 
table 15, the zero-inflated negative binomial model showed that the rate of transnational 
attacks was negatively associated with COUNTRY SIZE. This means that the geographical 
size of a country does increase the probability of an attack, but lower levels of size may 
increase the rate.  
Table 17: Logistic model for transnational terrorism - all variables 
 
Model 39 Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 
Population 0.309*** 0.275*** 0.260*** 0.246*** 
 
(0.0381) (0.0370) (0.0393) (0.0418) 
Country Size -0.0739* -0.0106 -0.0715* -0.0438 
 
(0.0317) (0.0299) (0.0326) (0.0345) 
GDP per Capita 0.182*** 
 
0.170*** 0.193*** 
 
(0.0334) 
 
(0.0303) (0.0387) 
Trade Openness -0.0064*** 
 
-0.00743*** -0.0073*** 
 
(0.00127) 
 
(0.00139) (0.00143) 
Democracy 0.0150* 0.0281*** 
 
0.0157* 
 
(0.00624) (0.00566) 
 
(0.00668) 
Durability -0.0053*** -0.00104 
 
-0.00441** 
 
(0.00149) (0.00135) 
 
(0.00161) 
Ethnic Frac. 
 
0.228 0.417* 0.367* 
  
(0.159) (0.169) (0.172) 
Time Since Trans.  -0.805*** -0.854*** -0.812*** -0.781*** 
 
(0.0535) (0.0548) (0.0582) (0.0587) 
_spline1 0.000152 0.000151 0.000157 0.000169 
 
(0.000103) (0.000101) (0.0000992) (0.000102) 
_spline2 -0.0258*** -0.0284*** -0.0257*** -0.0246*** 
 
(0.00355) (0.00358) (0.00381) (0.00386) 
_spline3 0.00697*** 0.00782*** 0.00691*** 0.00654*** 
 
(0.00139) (0.00139) (0.00147) (0.00149) 
Constant -4.543*** -3.968*** -3.842*** -4.075*** 
 
(0.603) (0.455) (0.600) (0.667) 
Observations 4526 4160 3802 3617 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one period.  
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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In comparing the final zero-inflated binomial regression model shown in table 15 with 
the final logistic model in table 17, there are not many differences. First of all, although 
not every factor has the direction that was expected, every one turned out to be 
significant. That is, every factor except the measure of ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION, 
which was found not to be significant in the zero-inflated negative binomial model. 
Second, every factor, in both models, turned out to be significant either on the p<0.001 
level or the p<0.01 level, expect DEMOCRACY and ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION in the 
logistic model. This suggests that it is possible to generalize their explanatory power 
with a high rate of certainty.  
6.3 Summary of Main Findings 
This empirical analysis has tested whether economic, political, and socio-cultural factors 
can explain the rates and probability of countries experiencing domestic and 
transnational terrorism. Table 14 and table 15 summarize the main findings of the nine 
hypotheses that were argued to explain the rates and probability of domestic terrorism, 
and five hypotheses argued to influence the rate and probability of transnational 
terrorism.  
First, none of the economic hypotheses that were argued to influence both the rate and 
probability of experiencing domestic terrorism was confirmed. GDP PER CAPITA is 
shown to be a significant and positive predictor of both the rate and probability of 
domestic terrorism. This is highly surprising, and goes against earlier findings.29 Thus, 
countries with higher rates of GTA PER CAPITA will experience higher rates and a higher 
probability of both domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism.  
Both economic growth and trade openness turned out to be significant in the opposite 
direction of what was argued. First, GDP growth seems to have a negative effect on both 
the rates and the probability of domestic terrorism. A reason for this may be that 
frustration arises in times of slow economic growth. Likewise, trade openness has a 
negative effect on transnational terrorism. The results suggest that a higher rate of trade 
openness reduces the rate and the probability of transnational terrorism.  
                                                         
29 Findley and Young (2011) also find that countries with higher rates of GDP per capita experience higher 
rates of domestic terrorism. They do not, however, suggest an explanation for this.  
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Turning to the political factors there are some interesting findings. For domestic 
terrorism the argument is that semi-democratic countries will experience a higher rate 
and a probability of terrorism. This was confirmed. Although not hypothesized, this was 
also tested for transnational terrorism. The results show that semi-democratic states 
can experience a higher rate of transnational terrorism, but they do not have a higher 
probability of experience an event. This may suggest that there are some other 
triggering factors leading to a transnational attack, but when an attack has occurred a 
fragile regime type may influence the rate. Another interesting difference between 
domestic and transnational terrorism is uncovered by the variable DURABILITY. This 
variable is used to measure hypotheses HD5 and HT4, namely that countries with higher 
rates of regime stability will experience lower rates and probability of domestic and 
transnational terrorism. For transnational terrorism this turns out to be confirmed, but 
not for domestic terrorism. For domestic terrorism regime stability does not have an 
influence on the probability of an attack, only the rates.  
Another interesting finding is uncovered in the socio-cultural factors. For both domestic 
terrorism and transnational terrorism, none of the socio-cultural factors that are argued 
to influence the rate and probability of an event is confirmed. The only evidence that is 
found is that ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION increases the probability of experiencing 
transnational terrorism. This is a highly interesting find, since it goes against a lot of 
previous findings linking socio-cultural factors to the phenomenon of terrorism.  
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Table 18: Summary of hypotheses for domestic terrorism 
Domestic Terrorism 
Supported 
Partly 
Supported 
Not 
Supported 
Economic Factors    
HD1: Countries with lower rates of GDP per capita will 
experience higher rates and a higher probability of 
domestic terrorism. 
 
 
  
X 
HD1alt: Countries with higher rates of GDP per capita 
will experience higher rates and a higher probability of 
domestic terrorism.  
 
X 
  
HD2: Countries with higher rates of economic 
inequality will experience higher rates and a higher 
probability of domestic terrorism. 
  
X30 
 
HD3: Countries with higher rates of economic growth 
will experience higher rates and a higher probability of 
domestic terrorism.  
   
X 
    
Political Factors    
HD4: Semi-democratic countries will experience higher 
rates and a higher probability of domestic terrorism.  
 
X 
  
HD5: Countries with higher rates of regime stability 
will experience lower rates and a lower probability of 
domestic terrorism.  
  
X31 
 
Socio-Cultural Factors    
HD6: Countries with higher rates of population growth 
will experience higher rates and a higher probability of 
domestic terrorism.  
  
X32 
 
HD7: Countries with higher rates of urbanization will 
experience higher rates and a higher probability of 
domestic terrorism.  
   
X 
 
HD8: Countries with higher levels of education will 
experience higher rates and a higher probability of 
domestic terrorism.  
   
X 
HD9: Countries with higher levels of ethnic 
fractionalization will experience higher rates and a 
higher probability of domestic terrorism.  
   
X 
    
     
                                                         
30 The GINI INDEX lacks a huge amount of observations. Therefore, I do not find the evidence solid enough 
to confirm this hypothesis. Although, the theoretical foundation and the little empirical evidence gives 
reason to believe that the argued hypothesis can be confirmed.   
31 The variable measuring regime stability, DURABILIY, is only significant in explaining the rates of 
domestic terrorism and not the probability. 
32 POPULATION GROWTH is only significant in explaining the rates of domestic terrorism and not the 
probability.  
95 
 
Table 19: Summary of hypotheses for transnational terrorism 
Transnational Terrorism Supported Partly 
Supported 
Not 
Supported 
Economic Factors    
HT1: Countries with higher rates of GDP per capita will 
experience higher rates and a higher probability of 
transnational terrorism.  
 
X 
 
  
HT2: Countries with higher levels of trade openness 
will experience higher rates and a higher probability of 
transnational terrorism.  
   
X 
     
Political Factors    
HT3: Countries with higher levels of democracy will 
experience higher rates and a higher probability of 
transnational terrorism.  
 
X 
  
HT4: Countries with higher rates of regime stability 
will experience lower rates and a lower probability of 
transnational terrorism.  
 
X 
  
     
Socio-Cultural Factors    
HT5: Countries with higher levels of ethnic 
fractionalization will experience higher rates and a 
higher probability of transnational terrorism.  
  
X33 
 
 
 
  
                                                         
33 ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION is only significant when testing for the probability of transnational 
terrorism and nor when tested for the rate.  
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7 Discussion and Conclusion 
During the last couple of decades, the amount of publications that have sought to explain 
the phenomenon of terrorism has ‘exploded’. The majority of this research has been 
focused on finding explanations that may give answers to “why does terrorism occur?” 
and “who are the terrorists?”. On the societal level, scientists have mainly focused their 
research on transnational terrorism, using the target country or the total amount of 
incidents as their main proxy. Still, recent findings show that domestic terrorism 
happens far more frequent than transnational terrorism. This may have led to skewed 
knowledge about the true causes of terrorism. Since, domestic terrorism is far more 
frequent than transnational terrorism, what we might know about the phenomenon may 
only be applicable to a small portion of the overall phenomenon.  
The aim of this thesis has therefore been to explore the root causes of terrorism in a 
cross country longitudinal data approach. Based on the newly presented data from 
Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011), this thesis have for the first time been able to 
separate between domestic and transnational terrorism.  This has been done by creating 
a foundation based on arguments and theories from the literature of political violence, 
namely the theories of identity, frustration, and opportunity. From these theories it has 
created causal relationships leading to economic, political, and socio-cultural societal 
factors that are argued to cause terrorism.  
This thesis was built on two research questions. The first question asked whether the 
societal factors that explain domestic terrorism are the same as  the societal factors that 
explain transnational terrorism. I am tempted to answer yes. This analysis shows that the 
societal factors that are argued to explain the rates and the probability of domestic 
terrorism are relatively similar to those of transnational terrorism. Thus, this thesis 
supports the findings of Kis-Katos, Liebert, Schulze (2011). In the empirical analysis, two 
different statistical methods were applied. First, as the main variable was a discrete 
count variable, a zero-inflated negative binomial regression was used. The results here 
suggest that there are few differences between domestic and transnational terrorism. Of 
the six variables that was included both in the domestic and the transnational zero-
inflated negative binomial regression models, all turned out significant and had the same 
direction. Secondly, dichotomy variables were constructed to test the probability of 
experiencing domestic and transnational terrorism using logistic regression. This test 
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showed that regime stability (measured by regime DURABILITY) is significant for 
transnational terrorism and not for domestic terrorism. In addition, and as expected, 
semi-democratic states have a higher probability of domestic terrorism, but not for 
transnational terrorism. For transnational terrorism, only countries with higher rates of 
democracy have a higher probability of being attacked. Lastly, for transnational 
terrorism, a higher rate of ethnic fractionalization increases the probability of attacks, 
but not for domestic terrorism. 
The second question that was put forward asked if the societal factors that explains 
transnational terrorism also explains domestic terrorism, are the causal mechanisms 
behind them different. The thesis suggests a ‘yes’ to this question. The theoretical 
foundation shows that there are far more causal chains leading to domestic terrorism 
than there are to transnational terrorism. This may be due to the reason that the 
research on terrorism has explained the occurrence of domestic terrorism, while they 
have used transnational data in their analysis. The causal mechanisms that are 
underlying domestic and transnational terrorism may be different. For instance, 
countries with higher levels of GDP per capita will experience higher rates and a higher 
probability of both domestic and transnational terrorism. However, the causal 
mechanisms behind this may be quite different. For domestic terrorism insurgents may 
apply terrorism instead of guerilla warfare, since richer states often has a better 
equipped counter-terrorism system. For transnational terrorism, insurgents may cross 
boarders to countries with higher levels of GDP per capita since these states often has 
more valuable targets and better channels for exposure. Another important finding is 
that the theory of frustration (or relative deprivation) and opportunity are both 
important in explaining the occurrence of domestic terrorism, while for transnational 
terrorism it seems that opportunity has the superior explanatory power. I suggest that 
the reason for this may be that these attacks demands more resources and planning than 
a domestic attacks.  
 
7.1 Value Added and Future Research 
Definitional issues and political agendas have stunted the coordination of scholars 
around a typology of terrorism, and many scholars create their groupings of different 
forms of terrorism. Rather than accept these typologies uncritically, scholars should 
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attempt to identify whether these different forms of terrorism have different causal 
processes. 
         (Young & Findley, 2011) 
This thesis has tried to do just that. By first addressing the different causal mechanisms, 
separating between domestic and transnational terrorism, and secondly, giving an 
empirical analysis on how the different economic, political, and socio-cultural factors 
influence these two forms, this thesis have given an important and pioneering 
contribution to the research on terrorism.  
In addition, the thesis is, to my knowledge, the first attempt to throughout differentiate 
and compare domestic and transnational terrorism on the societal level using the new 
data material presented by Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011). This way, it provides 
a balance to a field of research that is in a large degree fixated on transnational 
terrorism.  
Future research needs to further examine and analyze the difference between domestic 
and transnational terrorism. For instance, since domestic terrorism is far more frequent 
than transnational terrorism, it would have been interesting to analyze the dynamic 
interactions between these two forms. As noted by Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 
(2011), campaigns may start off as domestic terrorism and eventually turn to 
transnational terrorism. This way domestic terrorism might function as a driver of 
transnational terrorism. In this regard, since the data used in this thesis only accounts 
for the targets of transnational terrorism, further research should also look into the 
relationship between domestic terrorism and the origin of transnational terrorism. 
This thesis has also showed that literature on collective political violence is applicable to 
the phenomenon of terrorism. It especially seems that literature on rational choice and 
opportunity can in a large degree contribute to the understanding of transnational 
terrorism. Moreover, examinations on the relationship between civil war and domestic 
terrorism would be a natural step forward in this regard.  
It was show that the three countries that have experience most domestic terrorism was 
located in Latin America, while this was only the case for one of three countries that had 
experienced most transnational terrorism. This suggests that countries that experience a 
100 
 
high rate of domestic terrorism do not necessarily experience the highest rates of 
transnational terrorism. Thus, differences in the geographical locations of domestic and 
transnational terrorism need to be addressed in further research.   
It is not enough to compare domestic and transnational terrorism on the societal level. It 
is also important to account for the individual level and the group level. Psychological 
factors may for instance explain why some individuals choose to perform domestic 
attacks, while they refuse to seek foreign targets. Moreover, addressing the dynamics of 
different groups both in the same country and on different sides of the boarder will 
enhance the field of terrorism research.   
Peru, Colombia, and El Salvador are the three countries that have experienced most 
domestic terrorism. These countries are in a large degree associated with drug 
trafficking. It thus seems natural that this form of organized criminal activity and 
domestic terrorism are associated with each other. Although, this is not new (see 
Feldmann & Perälä, 2004), this thesis suggests that the work on this field needs to be 
further addressed. One way to further explore this phenomenon, is to connect the 
studies of domestic and transnational terrorism to the resource curse literature (see 
Watts, 2004). It is important to differentiate between domestic and transnational 
terrorism also in this regard. Scientists can look into the relationship between drug 
trafficking and domestic terrorism, and, further, how this influences transnational 
terrorism.  
Finally, research on transnational terrorism needs to focus on a dyadic design. Building 
cross-country studies on transnational terrorism using a monadic approach, explores 
only fractions of the full picture. It is not enough to know that countries with a higher 
rate of GDP per capita or higher levels of democracy are more prone to experience 
transnational attacks, scientist also need to look into who the attackers are. Although it 
is plausible that poor countries are the ones that attack rich countries, we cannot prove 
this unless a dyadic approach is applied. Since domestic terrorism is endogenous to the 
country that experiences it, a monadic approach is suitable, this is, however, not the case 
for transnational terrorism.  
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7.2 Policy Implications 
Interestingly, both domestic and transnational terrorism are in a large degree associated 
with a country’s regime type. For domestic terrorism, semi-democratic states have both 
higher rates and a higher probability of experiencing incidents. Transnational terrorism 
is associated with higher rates of democracy. These findings suggest that both states and 
the international community need to focus on their political institutions in order to deal 
with the phenomenon of terrorism. Since higher rates of democracy actually encourage 
transnational terrorism, this poses a dilemma. Strong and secure states needs to be built. 
Yet, the threat of terrorism cannot go on the expense of important features of a 
democracy like a free press and relatively open borders.   
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9 Appendices 
9.1 Appendix A  
Table A1: Empirical cross-country studies on the determinants of domestic terrorism  
Author(s) Data Set Coverage Method Dependent   Main results   
     Economic Political Socio_Cultural 
Abadie (2006) WMRC-GTI 186 countries, 
2003/4 
Cross-
section OLS 
and lV 
Natural logarithm of 
WMRC GTI 
(Terrorism Risk) 
No significant 
association between 
terrorism and poverty. 
Political freedom reduce 
terrorism 
Linguistic fractionalization  
encourage terrorism 
Blomberg and 
Hess (2008a) 
RAND 179 countries, 
1998-2003 
Poisson Number of domestic 
terror incidents per 
year 
Higher income 
discourages terrorism 
in both poor and rich 
countries. 
Greater levels of 
democracy are 
positively related to 
terrorism (Polity lV). 
Linguistic fractionalization  
encourage terrorism.  
Religious fractionalization  
discourage terrorism. 
       Level of education  
encourage terrorism 
Piazza (2011) GTD 172 countries, 
1970-2006 
NBNR Number of domestic 
terror incidents per 
year 
(1) Minority economic 
discrimination is a 
significant positive 
predictor on terrorism,  
(1) Regime age is a 
negative predictor of 
terrorism. (2) Political 
participation is a 
negative predictor of 
terrorism.  
Level of population  
encourage terrorism  
     (2) Countries with 
higher levels of 
economic development 
experience more 
domestic terrorism 
than do poorer 
countries. 
  
II 
 
     (3) High income 
inequality (GINI index) 
encourages terrorism.  
  
Findley and 
Young (2011) 
GTD 149 countries, 
1970-1997 
NBNR Number of domestic 
terror incidents per 
year. 
Higher GDP pr. Capita 
encourages terrorism. 
Presence of independent 
judiciary decreases 
terror incidents.  
Level of population  
encourage terrorism.  
      Terror more likely in 
low democracies and 
autocracies.  
 
      Terrorism is not more 
likely in states that have 
a strong central 
government 
 
      Regimes in transition 
are more prone to 
experience domestic 
terrorism.  
 
Sambanis 
(2008)* 
MIPT, 
STATE 
1997 - 2002. 
133 Countries 
MLOGIT Number of domestic 
incidents per year. 
  Level of population 
encourage terrorism 
*= Also studies transnational terrorism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
Table A2: Empirical studies on the determinants of transnational terrorism (by target).  
Author(s) Data Set Coverage Method Dependent   Main results   
     Economic Political Socio-Cultural 
Blomberg, Hess and 
Weerapana (2004) 
ITERATE 127 Countries, 
1968-1991 
Markov 
Process 
Number of terror 
incidents (targets) 
High income countries 
experience more 
terrorism.  
Democracies are more 
prone to experience 
terrorist attacks.  
 
     Economic contractions 
increase the probability of 
terrorism.  
  
Bravo and Dias 
(2006) 
MIPT 86 Countries, 
1997-2004 
OLS Number of 
incidents per year.  
High level of HDI reduces 
terrorism.  
The number of 
international organization 
memberships of country 
increases terrorism.  
The number of  
ethnic groups  
increases terrorism.  
      The existence of a pluralist 
political system decreases 
terrorism.  
Education reduces  
terrorism.  
Burgoon (2006) ITERATE, 
MIPT 
115 countries, 
1991-1998 
1998-2003 
1975-1995 
NBR Number of 
incidents per year 
A country's welfare efforts 
are negatively correlated 
with terrorism.  
Democracies decrease 
terror in cross-sectional 
analysis, but increases in 
pooled model.  
Population  
encourage  
terrorism.  
Drakos and Gofas 
(2006) 
MIPT 139 Countries. 
1985-1998 
NBR Number of 
incidents per year 
Relatively open 
economies tend to 
experience lower activity 
of terrorism. 
Democracies host more 
transnational terrorism.  
Population density  
increases the risk  
of terrorism.  
Krueger and Laitin 
(2008) 
STATE 150 countries., 
1997-2002 
NBR Number of 
incidents per year 
GDP per Capita increases 
terrorism.  
Civil liberties are not 
significant.  
Population  
increases  
terrorism.  
IV 
 
Li and Schaub 
(2004) 
ITERATE 112 countries, 
1975-1997 
NBR Number of 
incidents per year 
Economic development of 
the country and its top 
trading partners reduces 
the number of terrorist 
incidents inside the 
country.  
Democracy increases 
terrorism.  
 
      Government capability 
positively correlated to 
terrorism.  
 
Tavares (2004) ICT Number of 
countries not 
reported, 1987-
2007 
OLS Number of attacks 
or casualties per 10 
million inhabitants. 
Rich countries (GDP pc) 
are most prone to suffer 
attacks. 
Political rights are not 
significant.  
A young population  
concentrated in  
urban areas  
increases the risk  
of terrorism.  
     GDP per Capita growth is 
positively correlated with 
terrorism.  
Democracies are less 
vulnerable than other 
countries.  
Linguistic  
fractionalization  
increases terrorism.  
Piazza (2006) STATE 96 countries, 
1986-2002 
OLS Number of 
incidents per year 
No significant relationship 
between any of the 
measures of economic 
development (GDP 
growth, HDI, 
unemployment rate, 
inflation) and terrorism 
can be determined. 
The number of parties in 
the national legislature 
increase terrorism.  
Ethno-Religious  
diversity is  
positively  
correlated with  
terrorism.  
Blomberg and Hess 
(2008b) 
ITERATE 179 countries, 
1968-2003 
GAT Number of 
incidents per year 
GDP per Capita increases 
terrorism.  
Democracy increases 
terrorism.  
 
     Globalization (trade/GDP 
and an index of 
integration such as trade 
or participation in the 
WTO) increase terrorism.  
  
V 
 
Campos and 
Gassebner (2009) 
MIPT 130 countries, 
1968-2004 
NBR Number of 
incidence per year 
Per Capita GDP, 
population size and 
foreign aid are found not 
to be consistently 
important in explaining 
international terrorism 
Proximity to the U.S matters 
(measured as the share of 
votes cast in the UN general 
assembly that are in the line 
with the U.S vote.  
 
     GDP per Capita is not 
significant for incidences, 
but increases fatalities.  
Political freedom increases 
terrorism.  
Level of urbanization  
increases terrorism. 
      Being a member of OECD 
increases terrorism.  
 
Dreher and Fisher 
(2010) 
MIPT 109 Countries, 
1976-2000 
NBR Number of 
incidents per year 
Fiscal decentralization 
reduces terrorism. 
Political proximity to the 
U.S. Increases terrorism.  
 
      Political decentralization is 
not significant to terrorism.  
 
Dreher and 
Gassebner (2008) 
MIPT 1975 - 2001, 
116 Countries 
NBR Number of 
incidents per year 
GDP per Capita is not 
significant.  
Political proximity to the 
U.S. Increases terrorism.  
 
      Political freedom change 
reduces terrorism.  
 
      Government 
fractionalization increases 
terrorism.  
 
Eubank and 
Weinberg (2001) 
ITERATE 1980 - 1987, 
159 Countries 
CHI The frequency of 
terrorist events 
occurring. (Target 
and Origin) 
 Terrorist violence more 
common in the stable 
democracies then either 
insecure or partial ones.  
 
VI 
 
Eyerman (1998) ITERATE 1968 - 1986, 
154 countries 
NBR Count of 
international 
terrorist events 
(target) 
GDP per Capita increases 
terrorism.  
Established democratic 
states are less likely to 
experience terrorism, and 
newly founded democracies 
are more likely to 
experience terrorist 
activity. 
 
     The ration of the actual 
taxes collected to the 
potential taxes that could 
be collected by a state 
reduces terrorism.  
  
Koch and Cranmer 
(2007) 
ITERATE 68 countries, 
1975-1997 
NBR Number of 
incidents per year. 
Level of trading 
development reduces 
terrorism.   
Established democratic 
states are less likely to 
experience terrorism. 
 
      Governments of the left are 
more likely to be attacked 
than governments on the 
right or in the center.   
 
Li (2005) ITERATE 1975 - 1997, 
119 countries 
NBR the annual number 
of transnational 
terrorist events 
that occur in a 
country (target) 
GDP per Capita is 
negatively correlated with 
terrorism.  
Democratic participation 
reduces terrorism.  
 
      Government constraints, 
subsuming the effect of 
press freedom, increase the 
number of incidents.  
 
      Proportional 
representation system 
experiences fewer incidents 
than either the majoritarian 
or the mixed system.  
 
VII 
 
Plümber and 
Neumayer (2010) 
ITERATE 150 countries, 
1968-2003 
NBR Number of terrorist 
incidents per year 
 Joint membership in an 
alliance encourages 
terrorism.  
The population  
level is positively  
correlated with  
terrorism.  
      Democracy is not 
significant.  
 
Piazza (2008a)  STATE 153 countries, 
1986-2008 
NBR Number of 
incidents  per year 
Economic freedom and 
HDI is not significant.  
The level of democracy is 
positive correlated with 
terrorism.  
Population is  
positively related to  
terrorism.  
      State failure encourage 
terrorism.  
A Muslim country is  
more prone to host  
terrorism.  
Piazza (2008b)  ITERATE 197 countries, 
1973-2003 
NBR Number of 
incidents per year.  
Level of HDI increases 
terrorism.  
Democracies are more 
likely to be a target.  
Level of population  
is positively  
correlated with  
terrorism.  
      The level of executive 
constraint increase terror.  
Homogeneity  
reduce terror.  
      Regime durability reduce 
terror.  
 
        
Weinberg and 
Eubank (1998) 
STATE, 
RAND 
175 Countries, 
1994-1994 
CHI Number of 
incidents.  
 Terrorist events are 
substantially more likely to 
occur in free and 
democratic settings than in 
any of the alternatives. 
Countries which underwent 
regime change in the period 
under consideration were 
more likely to experience 
terrorism than countries 
which did not. 
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Kurrild-Klitgaard, 
Justesen and 
Klemmensen  
(2006) 
ITERATE 121 countries, 
1996-2002 
BLR Number of 
incidents per year  
GDP per Capita increase 
terrorism.  
Political rights increase 
terrorism (inverse U-shape) 
 
     Trade openness reduce 
terrorism.  
  
Braithwaite and Li 
(2007) 
ITERATE 112 countries, 
1975-1997 
NBR Number of terrorist 
incidents per year 
GDP per Capita reduce 
terrorism.  
Level of democracy increase 
terrorism.  
Population level  
increase terrorism.  
     Government capability 
(percentage index of a 
state's share of the 
world's total population, 
GDP per Capita, GDP per 
unit of Energy, military 
power and military 
expenditures. 
Interstate conflict increase 
terrorism.  
 
Sambanis (2008) MIPT, 
STATE 
133 Countries, 
1997-2002 
MLG Number of 
incidents per year 
GDP per Capita is not 
significant.  
Democracy reduce 
terrorism.  
Population level  
increase terrorism.  
       Religious  
fractionalization  
reduce terrorism. 
       Ethno-linguistic  
fractionalization  
increase terrorism.  
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Table A3: Overview countries and total amount of terrorist incidents.  
 
Country Years 
Domestic 
Incidents 
Transnational 
Incidents Country Years 
Domestic 
Incidents 
Transantional 
Incidents 
 
Afghanistan 1970-2007 573 229 Latvia 1991-2007 7 3 
 
Albania 1970-2007 45 12 Lebanon 1970-2007 512 598 
 
Algeria 1970-2007 1,111 123 Lesotho 1970-2007 16 6 
 
Andorra 1970-2007 0 1 Liberia 1970-2007 7 11 
 
Angola 1975-2007 279 71 Libya 1970-2007 9 5 
 
Argentina 1970-2007 431 244 Lithuania 1991-2007 3 3 
 
Armenia 1991-2007 9 3 Luxembourg 1970-2007 9 1 
 
Australia 1970-2007 32 25 Macedonia 1991-2007 59 6 
 
Austria 1970-2007 47 52 Madagascar 1970-2007 12 5 
 
Azerbaijan 1991-2007 28 4 Malawi 1970-2007 3 0 
 
Bahrain 1971-2007 25 8 Malaysia 1970-2007 24 12 
 
Bangladesh 1972-2007 433 27 Mali 1920-2007 20 4 
 
Belarus 1991-2007 3 1 Malta 1970-2007 9 4 
 
Belgium 1970-2007 37 87 Mauritania 1970-2007 2 4 
 
Belize 1970-2007 1 5 Mauritius 1970-2007 1 0 
 
Benin 1970-2007 5 2 Mexico 1970-2007 228 140 
 
Bhutan 1970-2007 1 0 Moldova 1991-2007 4 14 
 
Bolivia 1970-2007 229 51 Mongolia 1970-2007 0 0 
 
Bosnia 1992-2007 56 47 Montenegro 2006-2007 0 0 
 
Botswana 1970-2007 6 0 Morocco 1970-2007 9 17 
 
Brazil 1970-2007 116 81 Mozambique 1975-2007 134 37 
 
Bulgaria 1970-2007 24 6 Myanmar (Burma) 1970-2007 153 12 
 
Burkina Faso 1970-2007 3 0 Namibia 1970-2007 87 23 
 
Burundi 1970-2007 180 27 Nepal 1970-2007 213 23 
 
Cambodia 1970-2007 121 76 Netherlands 1970-2007 30 62 
 
Cameroon 1970-2007 9 3 New Zealand 1970-2007 5 7 
 
Canada 1970-2007 16 21 Nicaragua 1970-2007 756 110 
 
Cape Verde 1975-2007 0 0 Niger 1970-2007 17 12 
X 
 
 
Central African 
Republic 1970-2007 4 5 Nigeria 1970-2007 64 64 
 
Chad 1970-2007 14 12 Norway 1970-2007 2 8 
 
Chile 1970-2007 1,774 237 Oman 1970-2007 0 0 
 
China 1970-2007 92 23 Pakistan 1970-2007 1,504 237 
 
Colombia 1970-2007 4,218 962 Panama 1970-2007 89 28 
 
Comoros 1975-2007 4 0 Papua New Guinea 1975-2007 39 22 
 
Congo Brazzaville 1970-2007 9 10 Paraguay 1970-2007 12 5 
 
Congo Kinshasa 1970-2007 39 24 Peru 1970-2007 4,648 371 
 
Costa Rica 1970-2007 19 37 Philippines 1970-2007 1,443 322 
 
Croatia 1991-2007 11 29 Poland 1970-2007 19 9 
 
Cuba 1970-2007 16 7 Portugal 1970-2007 58 40 
 
Cyprus 1970-2007 53 41 Puerto Rico 1970-2007 12 93 
 
Czech Republic 1993-2007 9 2 Qatar 1971-2007 1 2 
 
Denmark 1970-2007 12 23 Romania 1970-2007 1 4 
 
Djibouti 1977-2007 8 3 Russia 1991-2007 538 82 
 
Dominican Rep 1970-2007 73 9 Rwanda 1970-2007 66 27 
 
East Timor 2002-2007 5 0 San Marino 1970-2007 0 0 
 
Ecuador 1970-2007 131 60 Saudi Arabia 1970-2007 14 30 
 
Egypt 1970-2007 422 55 Senegal 1970-2007 50 6 
 
El Salvador 1970-2007 3,045 266 Serbia 2006-2007 0 0 
 
Equatorial Guinea 1970-2007 1 0 Seychelles 1970-2007 0 0 
 
Eritrea 1993-2007 0 2 Sierra Leone 1970-2007 33 22 
 
Estonia 1991-2007 6 1 Singapore 1970-2007 2 3 
 
Ethiopia 1970-2007 44 61 Slovak Republic 1993-2007 11 1 
 
Fiji 1970-2007 11 2 Slovenia 1991-2007 4 1 
 
Finland 1970-2007 4 0 Solomon Islands 1978-2007 0 1 
 
France 1970-2007 693 335 Somalia 1970-2007 114 132 
 
Gabon 1970-2007 3 1 South Africa 1970-2007 1,359 47 
 
Gambia 1970-2007 3 0 Spain 1970-2007 2,095 431 
 
Georgia 1991-2007 67 24 Sri Lanka 1970-2007 1,316 115 
 
Germany 1970-2007 304 405 St. Lucia 1979-2007 0 0 
XI 
 
 
Ghana 1970-2007 12 1 Sudan 1970-2007 53 42 
 
Greece 1970-2007 426 287 Suriname 1970-2007 28 15 
 
Grenada 1970-2007 2 1 Swaziland 1970-2007 8 2 
 
Guatemala 1970-2007 1,033 325 Sweden 1970-2007 18 25 
 
Guinea 1970-2007 7 1 Switzerland 1970-2007 36 59 
 
Guinea-Bissau 1974-2007 5 0 Syria 1970-2007 65 26 
 
Guyana 1970-2007 15 1 Tajikistan 1991-2007 75 26 
 
Haiti 1970-2007 132 27 Tanzania 1970-2007 1 7 
 
Honduras 1970-2007 158 87 Thailand 1970-2007 601 56 
 
Hungary 1970-2007 29 8 Togo 1970-2007 37 7 
 
Iceland 1970-2007 0 1 Trinidad 1970-2007 11 4 
 
India 1970-2007 2,944 255 Tunisia 1970-2007 7 8 
 
Indonesia 1970-2007 260 55 Turkey 1970-2007 1,651 282 
 
Iran 1970-2007 354 119 Turkmenistan 1991-2007 0 0 
 
Iraq 1970-2007 1,502 392 UAE 1971-2007 5 9 
 
Ireland 1970-2007 27 34 Uganda 1970-2007 165 50 
 
Israel 1970-2007 891 78 Ukraine 1991-2007 20 3 
 
Italy 1970-2007 916 383 United Kingdom 1970-2007 1,472 108 
 
Ivory Coast 1970-2007 9 21 United States 1970-2007 929 253 
 
Jamaica 1970-2007 16 13 Uruguay 1970-2007 38 30 
 
Japan 1970-2007 293 42 Uzbekistan 1991-2007 12 4 
 
Jordan 1970-2007 23 44 Vanuatu 1970-2007 0 2 
 
Kazakhstan 1991-2007 3 4 Venezuela 1970-2007 121 77 
 
Kenya 1970-2007 67 20 Vietnam 1976-2007 0 0 
 
Kiribati 1970-2007 0 0 
West Bank and 
Gaza 1990-2007 592 45 
 
Korea North 1970-2007 1 0 Yemen 1990-2007 65 59 
 
Korea South 1970-2007 9 9 Zambia 1970-2007 31 9 
 
Kosovo 1970-2007 1 74 Zimbabwe 1970-2007 47 21 
 
Kuwait 1970-2007 22 23 
    
 
Kyrgyzstan 1991-2007 10 3 Total 
 
46,001 10,605 
 
Laos 1970-2007 9 4 
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9.2 Appendix B 
Figure B1: Quadratic Prediction Plot of Democracy and Transnational Terrorism 
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9.3 Appendix C 
Table C1: Pearson’s correlation test 
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             Population 1.0000 
           Country Size 0.7424 1.0000 
          GDP per 
Capita -0.0134 -0.0190 1.0000 
         GDP Growth 0.1184 0.0676 -0.0243 1.0000 
        GINI Index -0.1199 0.0986 -0.3044 -0.0211 1.0000 
       Trade 
Openness -0.6004 -0.5872 0.0050 0.0264 -0.0863 1.0000 
      Democracy -0.1106 -0.1666 0.5901 -0.0579 -0.1135 0.1181 1.0000 
     Durability 0.2191 0.2493 0.5435 0.0107 -0.1744 -0.1881 0.3149 1.0000 
    Ethnic Frac. -0.0235 0.1776 -0.2262 -0.0759 0.2586 0.0311 -0.0295 -0.0871 1.0000 
   Urbanization -0.0483 0.0968 0.7797 -0.0754 -0.1706 -0.0293 0.4875 0.3265 -0.0759 1.0000 
  Education -0.0642 -0.1014 0.6934 -0.0167 -0.4790 0.2173 0.5178 0.3018 -0.1927 0.6860 1.0000 
 Population 
Growth 0.0842 0.2086 -0.3438 -0.0231 0.4770 -0.2348 -0.3709 -0.0416 0.1875 -0.3966 -0.6835 1.0000 
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9.4 Appendix D 
Table D1: Comparison between the final test and a final test with only democracy in the inflated model 
 
Model 43 Model 44 
 
  Model 45 Model 46 
Original Democracy  Original Democracy 
Count Model 
   
Count Model 
  Population 1.010*** 1.266*** 
 
Population 0.345*** 0.462*** 
 
(0.116) (0.0656) 
 
  (0.0535) (0.0423) 
Country Size -0.315*** -0.387*** 
 
Country Size -0.133** -0.0910* 
 
(0.0913) (0.0586) 
 
  (0.0435) (0.0397) 
GDP per Capita 0.351* 0.477*** 
 
GDP per Capita 0.369*** 0.491*** 
 
(0.152) (0.105) 
 
  (0.0487) (0.0457) 
GDP Growth -0.0762*** -0.0677*** Trade Openness -0.0184*** -0.0168*** 
 
(0.0177) (0.0142) 
 
  (0.00160) (0.00154) 
Democarcy 0.0824*** 0.0406** 
 
Democracy 0.0388*** 0.0309** 
 
(0.0249) (0.0140) 
 
  (0.00871) (0.0111) 
Democracy2 -0.0173*** -0.0176*** Democracy2 -0.00953*** -0.0111*** 
 
(0.00371) (0.00287) 
 
  (0.00199) (0.00191) 
Durability -0.00585* -0.0107*** Durability -0.00972*** -0.0122*** 
 
(0.00260) (0.00212) 
 
  (0.00162) (0.00147) 
Population Growth 0.224** 0.140* 
 
Ethnic Frac. 0.837*** 0.408* 
 
(0.0732) (0.0644) 
 
  (0.234) (0.190) 
Urbanization 0.0175 0.0200***    
 
(0.00916) (0.00533) 
 
   
Eduaction -0.0279*** -0.0212***   
  
 
(0.00459) (0.00394) 
 
  
  Ethnic Frac. 0.639 0.897** 
 
  
  
 
(0.524) (0.319) 
 
  
  Constant -12.13*** -16.73*** 
 
Constant -4.772*** -7.993*** 
 
(1.730) (1.021) 
 
  (0.922) (0.667) 
Inflated Model 
   
Inflated Model 
  Population -0.661* 
  
Population -2.826 
 
 
(0.292) 
  
  (1.519) 
 Country Size -0.0626 
  
Country Size -1.066 
 
 
(0.194) 
  
  (0.615) 
 GDP per Capita -0.422 
  
GDP per Capita -2.792 
 
 
(0.374) 
  
  (1.782) 
 GDP Growth -0.000117 
  
Trade Openness -0.0327 
 
 
(0.0388) 
  
  (0.0274) 
 Democracy -0.0489 -0.270*** 
 
Democracy -0.0303 -0.260*** 
 
(0.0677) (0.0343) 
 
  (0.0585) (0.0488) 
Democracy2 0.00682 
  
Democracy2 0.0318 
 
 
(0.0112) 
  
  (0.0479) 
 Durability 0.0192** 
  
Durability 0.0684 
 
 
(0.00630) 
  
  (0.0456) 
 Population Growth 0.209 
  
Ethnic Frac. 9.053 
 
 
(0.119) 
  
  (4.883) 
 Urbanization 0.00489 
  
  
  
 
(0.0298) 
  
  
  Eduaction -0.0277 
  
  
  
 
(0.0155) 
  
  
  Ethnic Frac. 0.425 
  
  
  
 
(1.045) 
  
  
  Constant 1.628*** 1.714*** 
 
Constant 1.287*** 1.332*** 
 
(0.0694) (0.0470) 
 
  (0.0552) (0.0523) 
Observations 2793 2793 
 
Observations 3617 3617 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one period. 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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To compare between the different techniques for analyzing count models, namely the 
negative binomial regression and the zero-inflated negative regression, I have utilized 
the COUNTFIT function in STATA written by Long and Freese (2006).  
Figure D1: Model fit analysis 
 
 
Figure 8 plots the residuals from a model containing all the presented variables. It 
compares the main techniques for analyzing count variables. Namely, Poisson 
Regression (PRM), Negative Binomial Regression (NBRM), Zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP), 
and Zero-inflated negative binomial regression (ZINB). The chosen technique is desired 
to be as close to zero a possible. Here, it is clear that the NBRM and ZINB are vastly 
closer than PRM and ZIP.  
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Table D2: Count model comparison 
NBRM BIC=-20344.269 AIC=     3.861 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZINB BIC=-20421.258 dif=    76.989 ZINB NBRM Very strong
AIC=     3.837 dif=     0.024 ZINB NBRM
Vuong=   4.547 prob=    0.000 ZINB NBRM p=0.000   
Figure 9 displays a comparison between the negative binomial regression model 
(NBRM) and the zero-inflated model (ZINB) along different measures of fit. The first 
measure is the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). According to Long and Freese, 
“[w]hen BIC1 – BIC2 < 0, the first model is preferred. When BIC1 – BIC2 > 0, the second 
model is preferred” (2006, p. 113). Thus, with a difference of 76,989 in favor of the ZINB 
model, the evidence is very strong. AIC stands for Akaike’s information criteria, and 
states that “the model with the smaller AIC is considered the better-fitting model” (Long 
& Freese, 2006, p. 112). In this regard, the ZINB model has a slightly lower AIC-value 
than the NBRM, and thus supports the decision to utilize a zero-inflated technique.  
Greene (1994) suggests using a Vuong test for non-nested models. If Vuong is greater 
than the critical value of 1.96, the second model is preferred. In this case V (NBRM|ZINB) 
= 4.547, and thus favors a Zero-inflated negative binomial regression approach (Long, 
1997, p. 248).    
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9.5 Appendix E 
9.5.1 Domestic terrorism 
Table E1: Logistic model of domestic terrorism and economic variables 
 
Model 47 Model 48 Model 49 Model 50 
Population 0.478*** 0.466*** 0.494*** 0.495*** 
 
(0.0325) (0.0571) (0.0335) (0.0581) 
Country Size -0.118*** -0.0644 -0.131*** -0.0730 
 
(0.0245) (0.0412) (0.0248) (0.0415) 
GDP per Capita 0.0774*** 
  
0.126** 
 
(0.0216) 
  
(0.0430) 
GINI Index 
 
0.0101 
 
0.0149* 
  
(0.00528) 
 
(0.00591) 
GDP Growth 
  
-0.0190** -0.0183 
   
(0.00612) (0.0103) 
Time Since Last 
Dom. -0.153*** -0.214*** -0.162*** -0.211*** 
 
(0.0186) (0.0375) (0.0189) (0.0383) 
_spline1 0.000686** 0.00110*** 0.000654** 0.00103*** 
 
(0.000211) (0.000285) (0.000210) (0.000277) 
_spline2 0.0143*** 0.0158*** 0.0136*** 0.0147*** 
 
(0.00203) (0.00312) (0.00196) (0.00316) 
_spline3 -0.0070*** -0.0084*** -0.0066*** -0.0079*** 
 
(0.00119) (0.00174) (0.00116) (0.00175) 
Constant -6.661*** -6.874*** -6.102*** -8.400*** 
 
(0.422) (0.769) (0.399) (0.958) 
Observations 5184 1773 5141 1734 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one 
period. 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Table E2: Logistic model of domestic terrorism and political factors 
 
Model 51 Model 52 
Population 0.471*** 0.530*** 
 
(0.0332) (0.0321) 
   Country Size -0.0977*** -0.154*** 
 
(0.0256) (0.0245) 
Democracy 0.0489*** 
 
 
(0.00533) 
 Democracy2 -0.0066*** 
 
 
(0.00114) 
 Durablily 
 
-0.000541 
  
(0.00103) 
Time Since Last Dom. -0.144*** -0.157*** 
 
(0.0186) (0.0183) 
_spline1 0.000734** 0.000696** 
 
(0.000230) (0.000218) 
_spline2 0.0138*** 0.0132*** 
 
(0.00204) (0.00197) 
_spline3 -0.0069*** -0.0066*** 
 
(0.00124) (0.00119) 
Constant -5.931*** -6.512*** 
 
(0.411) (0.391) 
Observations 5110 5325 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent 
variable lagged one period. 
* p<0.05    ** p<0.01    *** p<0.001 
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Table E3: Logistic model of domestic terrorism and socio-cultural factors 
 
Model 53 Model 54 Model 55 Model 56 
Population 0.462*** 0.476*** 0.483*** 0.493*** 
 
(0.0319) (0.0313) (0.0388) (0.0344) 
Country Size -0.105*** -0.111*** -0.124*** -0.134*** 
 
(0.0241) (0.0237) (0.0316) (0.0259) 
Population 
Growth -0.0604** 
   
 
(0.0232) 
   Urbanization 
 
0.00619*** 
  
  
(0.00135) 
  Eduaction 
  
0.00461*** 
 
   
(0.00117) 
 Ethnic Frac. 
   
0.433** 
    
(0.143) 
Time Since Last 
Dom. -0.167*** -0.172*** -0.163*** -0.180*** 
 
(0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0215) (0.0213) 
_spline1 0.000729** 0.000711** 0.000717** 0.000549*** 
 
(0.000226) (0.000224) (0.000248) (0.000161) 
_spline2 0.0139*** 0.0131*** 0.0147*** 0.0115*** 
 
(0.00198) (0.00197) (0.00228) (0.00182) 
_spline3 -0.0069*** -0.0066*** -0.0072*** -0.0057*** 
 
(0.00121) (0.00120) (0.00137) (0.00101) 
Constant -5.816*** -6.387*** -6.304*** -6.298*** 
 
(0.379) (0.378) (0.434) (0.413) 
Observations 5629 5596 4015 4551 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one 
period. 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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9.5.2 Transnational terrorism 
Table E4: Logistic model of transnational terrorism and economic factors 
 
Model 57 Model 58 Model 59 
Population 0.386*** 0.331*** 0.316*** 
 
(0.0326) (0.0346) (0.0352) 
Country Size -0.0650* -0.116*** -0.105*** 
 
(0.0261) (0.0285) (0.0290) 
GDP per Capita 0.146*** 
 
0.148*** 
 
(0.0238) 
 
(0.0251) 
Trade Openness 
 
-0.00429*** -0.00610*** 
  
(0.00111) (0.00120) 
Time Since Last 
Trans. -0.830*** -0.868*** -0.851*** 
 
(0.0506) (0.0510) (0.0523) 
_spline1 0.000186 0.000122 0.000135 
 
(0.0000979) (0.0000921) (0.0000933) 
_spline2 -0.0264*** -0.0281*** -0.0277*** 
 
(0.00337) (0.00335) (0.00343) 
_spline3 0.00703*** 0.00776*** 0.00759*** 
 
(0.00131) (0.00130) (0.00132) 
Constant -6.148*** -3.145*** -4.076*** 
 
(0.441) (0.494) (0.532) 
Observations 5184 5023 4887 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables 
lagged one period.  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Table E5: Logistic model of transnational terrorism and political factors 
 
Model 60 Model 61 Model 62 Model 63 
Population 0.335*** 0.334*** 0.401*** 0.337*** 
 
(0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0326) (0.0343) 
Country Size -0.0499 -0.0491 -0.0945*** -0.0457 
 
(0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0262) (0.0281) 
Democracy 0.0259*** 0.0280*** 
 
0.0282*** 
 
(0.00500) (0.00540) 
 
(0.00519) 
Democracy 2 
 
-0.00126 
  
  
(0.00119) 
  Durability 
  
0.000777 -0.00188 
   
(0.00120) (0.00126) 
Time Since Last Trans. -0.870*** -0.869*** -0.833*** -0.869*** 
 
(0.0505) (0.0504) (0.0489) (0.0504) 
_spline1 0.000137 0.000137 0.000148 0.000138 
 
(0.000100) (0.000101) (0.0000998) (0.000101) 
_spline2 -0.0292*** -0.0291*** -0.0271*** -0.0291*** 
 
(0.00334) (0.00334) (0.00330) (0.00334) 
_spline3 0.00811*** 0.00810*** 0.00741*** 0.00809*** 
 
(0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00130) (0.00131) 
Constant -4.404*** -4.318*** -4.982*** -4.438*** 
 
(0.420) (0.425) (0.402) (0.420) 
Observations 5110 5110 5325 5110 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables lagged one 
period. 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
  
